LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



ixip^rtg^t !f u* 

Slielf .__ J..r:xA^ V' I 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



THE 



CIVIL SERVICE LAW: 



A DEFENSE OF ITS PRINCIPLES, WITH CORROBORATIVE 
EVIDENCE FROM THE WORKS OF MANY EM- 
INENT AMERICAN STATESMEN; 



BY 




WILLIAM HARRISON CLARKE. 



/ / 




Offices are public trusts, not private spoils. — Daniel Webster. 

No people have a higher public interest, except the preservation of their 
liberties, than integrity in the adminiairation of their government in all its 
branches. — U. S. Supreme Court. 




NEW YORK 



L. K STROUSE & CO., Publishees, 
95 Nassau Street. 

1888. 






Copyright, 188Y, by William H. Clarke. 



LovEjOY, Son & Co., Electrotypers, 
45 to 51 Rose St., New York. 



DEDICATED TO 

THE NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE REFORM LEAGUE; 

TO WHOSE INTELLIGENT, DISINTERESTED, ENERGETIC, BRAVE 

AND PATRIOTIC MEMBERS IS CHIEFLY DUE THE 

CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND ITS RE- 

SULTANT REFORMS. 



PREFACE. 



The chief object of this work is to defend the prin- 
ciples of the Civil Service Law. It is not a criticism 
of the law, nor does it treat to any great extent of 
civil service economy as such, except in so far as the 
subject is expounded incidentally, but with ability and 
in the aggregate with great success, by many Ameri- 
can statesmen, extracts from whose works embellish 
and enrich its pages. These extracts in fact constitute 
a great part of the civil service history and literature 
of the country, particularly its early history and liter- 
ature, and therefore constitute much of the value of 
this volume. This is well, and is besides opportune, 
for the subject of civil service reform is one of the 
greatest issues of the day, and too much light cannot 
be shed upon it. A work that even aids in elucida- 
ting such an important subject ought to be accepta- 
ble ; indeed it appears to be one of the needs of the 
times. The fact that one chapter of the work is mostly 
devoted to corruption at elections and remedial election 
laws, only adds to its value, for the subject is not only 
collateral but of great importance, of as great impor- 
tance perhaps as civil service reform itself. Whatever 



may be said of the original parts of the volume, the 
compiled parts are certainly both useful and instructive 
reading, and ought to aid in elevating and purifying 
American politics. 

The importance of a sound civil service policy was 
never better illustrated perhaps than by the New York 
Times, when criticising in 1864 Senator Sumner's civil 
service bill. It said the subject was second in impor- 
tance only to the crushing of the then rebellion. The 
Times was then under the editorial direction of Mr. 
Henry J. Raymond, a statesman and one of the best 
known editors of his day. 

I am indebted to Mr. George William Curtis, the 
President of the National Civil Service Reform League, 
for valuable suggestions and encouragement to perse- 
vere in my researches, and also to the Astor Library 
for the use of many books. Other obligations are ac- 
knowledged here and there throughout the volume. 

This work, it should be understood, refers to the 
natioiml civil service law. The civil service laws of 
New York and Massachusetts are patterned after the 
national law, but of course contain provisions peculiar 
to themselves. 

W. H. C. 

New York, July, J888. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

INTRODUCTION— History of Civil Service Legislation, Summary 

of the salient points of the Civil Service Law, &c 7 

CHAPTER I. 

FRUITS AND FACTS. 
The law promotes Education, Efficiency, and Economy. — Its chief 
Object. — Its Constitutionality. — In harmony with the Teachings 
of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay. — Aids instead of Hampers the 
President, who makes his own Rules for its Execution 17 

CHAPTER XL 

COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS. 
Trial by Probation. — Appointees independent of Politicians. — Com- 
petitive Examinations superior to non-Competitive. — The Edu- 
cation required. — Competitive Examinations in large firms. ... 26 

CHAPTER m. 

SOME OF THE LAW'S PROMISES. 
Reforms of priceless value Probable. — The danger of Bribery at 
Elections. — Opinions thereon of Messrs. Buchanan, Harrison, 
Benton, Jefferson, Barton, Bell, and Graves. — The chief Eng- 
lish Election Laws from 1275 to 1883 38 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE PATRONAGE AND MERIT SYSTEMS COMPARED. 

The Merit System more favorable to ex-Soldiers and Sailors. — 
Other points of difference between the two Systems. — How the 
President and Congressmen were harassed under the Patron- 
age System. — Congressman Kleiner of Indiana declines a re- 
pomination on account of the annoyance of Ofiiceseeking 53 



vi CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER V. 

DANGEE OF AN OFFICEHOLDERS' ARISTOCRACY. pAGE 
The importance of the Subject.— The Cause of and Remedy for 
Aristocracies.— No danger in Life Tenures when based on 
Merit.— George William Curtis's opinion of them. — Insolence 
of Office.— Great depravity of the Roman Aristocracy (note). . 61 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM. 

The practicability of the System only Apparent. — General Jackson 
versus President Jackson. — Probable causes of his Radical 
Change. — Probable cause of Senator Marcy's use of the word 
" Spoils." — The spoils doctrine Undemocratic and Ruinous. — 
Appalling Corruption at Washington after the Civil War. — 
The Civil Service Law a Rock to build upon 71 

CHAPTER Vn. 

LEADING STATESMEN'S PRINCIPLES. 

The Merit System both Preached and Practiced by the six first 
Presidents (forty years). — Powerful blows at the Patronage 
System. — A profound disquisition on its Evils by William 
Paley, D.D., of England (1Y85).— Justice James Wilson on 
Patronage and Official Appointments 91 

CHAPTER VHI. 

THE POWER OF REMOVAL. 
A remedy for its Mistakes or Abuse.— The salient points of the 
great debate in the first Congress (1789) on the Power of 
Removal.— The congressional decision then made criticised by 
Benton, Webster, and others.— The Four-years' Term Law and 
some opinions of it (note) 113 

CHAPTER IX. 

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY. 

Its Utility.— The Civil Service Systems of England, Canada, British 

India, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, and China 177 

i™^^ .^r.'.'.m 



INTRODUCTION. 



The Civil Service Law was passed January 16, 
1883. The bill, which was introduced in the Senate by 
Senator George H. Pendleton of Ohio, and is commonly 
known as "the Pendleton bill," was drawn originally 
by Mr. Dorman B. Eaton of New York, as Chairman 
of the Committee on Legislation of the New York Civil 
Service Reform Association. The law was preceded by 
two other laws, namely. Sections 164 and 1753 of the 
United States Revised Statutes (printed on page 23). 
Sec. 164 was passed March 3, 1853 ; Sec. 1753 March 
3, 1871. The latter was originated by Senator Lyman 
Trumbull of Illinois. 

The civil service law bill was preceded by three other 
bills, all of which failed to pass Congress. The first 
was introduced, in 1864, by Senator Charles Sumner of 
Massachusetts, whose only recorded words are (Cong. 
Globe, 1864, p. 1985) : "The object of the bill is to 
provide a competitive system of examination in the civil 
service of the United States." The bill, which is only 
a good foundation on which to build, may be found in 
Charles Sumner's Works (Boston, 1874), vol. viii, p. 452. 
The bill^ owing perhaps to the pressure of other btisj- 



Viii VARIOUS CIVIL SERVICE BILLS. 

ness, never came up for discussion by the Senate. The 
second bill, which was wider in its scope than Senator 
Sumner's, was introduced, in 1865, by Representative 
Thomas Allen Jenckes of Rhode Island, and again, with 
improvements, in 1866. Mr. Jenckes advocated his bill 
ably, argumentatively, and earnestly during several ses- 
sions of Congress. The third bill was introduced, in 
1869, by Senator Carl Schurz of Missouri. It gave the 
President the option of selecting from among the men 
who passed the Board, or of ordering men of his own 
selection before it, and required five and eight year 
terms of office. The object of the five-year term was 
to prevent such appointments from being made on the 
year of the inauguration of the President. The idea 
was, as explained by Mr. Schurz, that appointments, as 
a rule, should not be made until the administration was 
well settled down to business. Senator Schurz's bill 
required a year of probationary service, Representative 
Jenckes's six months. Both required competitive ex- 
aminations. Congress did not distinguish itself by sub- 
stituting Section 1753 for these bills, and that is saying 
a great deal. Other civil service bills have been intro- 
duced at different times by Senators Henry L. Dawes 
of Massachusetts and George F. Edmunds of Vermont, 
and Representatives John A. Kasson of Iowa, Albert 
S. Willis of Kentucky, and Thomas M. Bayne of Penn- 
sylvania. 

It is noteworthy in this connection that Represen- 
tative Samuel Brenton of Indiana, on August 11, 1852, 
offered an amendment to a resolution proposing to in- 



THE LAW'S CHIEF PROVISIONS. IX 

crease the pay of civil service clerks in Washington, 
the concluding part of which is as follows (Congres- 
sional Globe, vol. xxiv, pt. iii, p. 2189) : " No removals 
shall be made except for incompetency, or cause shown 
to the satisfaction of the President of the United States. 
And in the selection of said clerks, they shall, as far 
as practicable, be taken from the several States and 
Territories in proportion to the number of Senators, 
Representatives, and Delegates from each in the Thirty- 
third Congress." 

This is practically the same, so far as it goes, as 
the civil service law. Mr. Brenton said his object was 
to secure permanency, to prevent sectionalism in the 
selection of clerks, and to " break down party spirit as 
much as possible." 

The provisions of the civil service law concerning 
examinations are : It provides that in any State or 
Territory " where there are persons to be examined," 
at least two examinations shall be held each year, and 
in such places " as to make it reasonably convenient 
and inexpensive for applicants to attend before them." 
It provides that the examiners, " not less than three," 
shall be chosen from among United States officials* 
" residing in said State or Territory." It requires the 
Commissioners to make regulations for examinations 
and annual reports of their proceedings, with such sug- 

* This is required not only in the interest of economy but to secure 
examiners who are familiar with the real needs of the offices for which 
applicants are examined. The examiners receive no extra compensa- 
tion. (Third Annual Report, p. 43.) 



X The efficacy of the new RtJLEg. 

gestions as in their judgment will result in improving 
the service ; and it authorizes them to make investi- 
gations concerning all matters "in respect to the ex- 
ecution of this act." It requires that selections for 
office shall be from among the three competitors graded 
highest in the examinations. It forbids favoritism in 
examinations, and exempts officeholders from either 
political assessments or services, and makes a violation 
of either provision a misdemeanor, punishable by fine 
or imprisonment or both, and the new rules (adopted 
February 2, 1888) require that a violation of the latter 
provision shall be followed by dismission from the ser- 
vice. It exempts from examination — " (a) One private 
secretary, or one confidential clerk, of the head of each 
classified department, and of each assistant secretary 
thereof ; and also of each head of bureau appointed 
by the President by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, [b) Direct custodians of money, for 
whose fidelity another officer is under official bond ; 
but this exception shall not include any officer below 
the grade of assistant cashier or assistant teller, (c) 
Disbursing officers who give bonds, (d) Persons em- 
ployed exclusively in the secret service of the govern- 
ment, (e) Chief clerks. (/) Chiefs of divisions." 
Other exemptions are : Deputy collectors who do not 
also act as inspectors, examiners, or clerks ; otherwise 
not ; cashier, assistant cashier, and auditor of the col- 
lector ; deputy naval officers ; deputy surveyors ; as- 
sistant postmasters, and superintendents, custodians of 
money, stamps, stamped envelopes, or postal-cards, who 



PROMOTlOif, iibU CATION, AGE LIMITS, ETO. xi 

are designated as such by the Postoffice Department. 
It provides for non-competitive examinations when com- 
petent persons do not compete, and for several other 
cogent and justifiable reasons. As said on page 27, 
competitors must answer 10 per cent, of the questions 
asked, except ex-soldiers and sailors, who are required 
to answer but 65, the old standard. Competitive ex- 
aminations for promotion are compulsory, except for 
ex-soldiers and sailors, and the widows and orphans 
of deceased soldiers and sailors. These also receive 
preference in case of a reduction of force in any branch 
of the classified service. All who attain an average of 
15 per cent, are eligible to promotion. The education 
required in examinations for ordinary offices embraces 
common- school studies only, and in many cases only a 
few of these. As to the age at which a person may 
be examined, in the Customs Department clerks and 
messengers must be 20 years old; all others 21. In 
the Postal Department clerks must be 18 years old ; 
messengers, stampers, and junior clerks must not be 
under 16 or over 45 ; carriers not under 21 or over 
40 ; all others not under 18 or over 45. Enlisted men 
may be examined on the written consent of the Sec- 
retary of War or the Secretary of the Navy.* 

Other important provisions of the law are : It de- 
clares that its officials sliall not " coerce the political 
action of any person or body, or interfere with any 

* For further information about competitive examinations, and also 
some facts about trial by probation, as well as a few other facts 
pertinent to the above summary, see Chapter II (page 26). 



Kll PENALTY ton H^TERFEElNa WlTfl ELECTION^. 

election," and dismission is the penalty of a violation 
of the provision. It forbids any questions as to an 
applicant's political or religious opinions, and when 
such opinions are known, any discrimination on account 
of them. Further, it requires its officials to discoun- 
tenance the disclosure of such opinions. And again 
dismission is the penalty. It forbids the appointment 
to office of persons who habitually use intoxicating 
liquors to excess. It limits the number of members of 
the same family who shall hold office in the grades 
covered by it. It forbids its three Commissioners, 
" not more than two of whom shall be adherents of 
the same party," from holding any other office under 
the United States. It authorizes the President to " re- 
move any Commissioner." An appointing officer may, 
if he deems it for the good of the service, object in 
writing to making an appointment, and refer the mat- 
ter to the Commission for investigation. No eligible 
person can be certified for appointment more than three 
times. When necessary, transfers may be made from 
one department to another. There are three branches 
of the classified civil service, namely, the departmen- 
tal, the customs, and the postal. 

Such is a summary of the chief features of the law 
and its rules and regulations. The whole is certainly 
a good foundation on which to build a sound civil ser- 
vice system. But the law, even in its present stage of 
perfection, should be increased in scope. There is prob- 
ably no valid reason why all postmasters and employes 
of the railway mail service, internal revenue service. 



KEASO:tfS :B*0II mOllEASlNG THE LAW'S SCOPE. xUi 

mints, &G., should not be included within its provisions. 
Postmasters should be removed only for good cause 
known to the Postmaster-General or President and at 
the request of a majority of the business men of their 
place of office. Further, where it is practicable to hold 
promotion examinations, vacant postmasterships as well 
as subordinate positions should be filled by the person 
standing the best test. There are now about 2,500 
postmasters drawing |1,000 or over a year, who have 
for this reason to be confirmed by the Senate. In from 
twenty to twenty five years more the number will prob- 
ably be 5,000. It is impossible for the Senate to con- 
firm this great number properly and attend to other 
business at the same time. Hence the necessity of 
bringing postmastershij^s under civil service law rules. 

The increase in the number of examinations held 
year after year, State as well as national, is the best 
illustration of the progress of civil service reform. 

In Massachusetts, in 1887, there were 145 examina- 
tions. Number examined, 1,433 ; qualified, 938 ; ap- 
pointments, 403, 21 of whom were women; average 
age, 36 years; education — common-school, 919; colle- 
giate, 19. In Hhe labor service of Boston'* the num- 

* Mayor Hugh O'Brien of Boston, in a speech in 1885, said: " I can 
certainly testify that it has been a great relief to the city of Boston that 
the Civil Service Commission has taken care of the laboring population. 
No men have been more abused than the laborers. They have been 
made the tools of political tricksters ; and with civil service reform en- 
forced they are no longer in the hands of political tricksters." 

One of the best features of this ' labor service ' is that the men, when 



xiv HOW TO PKET:ENT: PEBSOKATiOI^S. 

ber registered was 2,235 ; certified for employment, 
1,998; employed, 1,615. Including the Boston labor- 
ers, the classified service of the State numbers 6,000, 
the aggregate expense being about $4,400,000. The 
total number of persons who have passed examinations 
during the past three years, says Secretary Warren P. 
Dudley, is : 1885, 1,292, of whom 958 passed with a 
percentage of 65 or over ; 1886, 1,035, of whom 791 
passed ; 1887, 1,433, of whom 938 passed. 

Mr. William Potts, who was Chief Examiner of the 
New York State Civil Service Commission during most 
of the year 1887, in his report to the Commission, says 
that 384 applicants were examined during that year, 
148 more than for any previous year. He suggests 
that a roster of the employes be kept, stating by whom 
they are appointed, together with their functions and 
pay. Also that additional means be provided for the 
correction of irregularities in the service. To prevent 
personations at examinations he proposes that each ap- 
plicant shall certify to the examiners in writing as to 
his identity, and afterward to the Commission that he 
passed the examination. The handwriting of the two 
certificates and the signature on the application paper, 
he thinks, will prevent fraud. He gives an instance 
of an applicant who, on account of false reports con- 
cerning the nature of the examinations, spent so much 
time in studying about mountains, the distance to the 
planet Venus, &c., that he failed in ten out of twelve 



wanted, are notified by mail. They thus lose no time in calling or wait- 
ing around for city work. 



tJOMI^ETlTiON AND A EAILROAD COMPANY. XV 

questions in arithmetic. He says the Commission re- 
ceived a letter from the civil engineer of a leading 
railroad company requesting a copy of a list of sixteen 
civil engineers who hjjid passed an examination, with 
a view to filling a position on the staff of that road.* 

In the State of New York, in 1886, the classified 
offices numbered 15,895 ; number of persons examined 
4,007 ; appointments, 2,035. 

In the City of New York the number examined was 
1,927 ; qualified, 1,479 ; appointments, 1,216. Average 
age, 30 years. Education : common-school, 517 ; aca- 
demic, 54; private, 68; collegiate, 171. In addition 
to the classified offices (7,271), there were 3,635 laborers. 

In Brooklyn the number examined was 1,241 ; qual- 
ified, 681 ; appointments, 258. Average age, 40 years. 
Education : common-school, 937 ; academic, 122 ; pri- 
vate, 39 ; collegiate, 143. There were 2,447 laborers 
employed at different times during the year. 

In the smaller cities the education was nearly all 

common-school. 

In the national service the number examined in 1883 

was 3,542 ; in 1884, 6,347 ; in 1885, 7,602 ; from Jan- 
uary 16, 1886, to July 1, 1887, 15,842; total, 33,333. 



The American people had reason to complain of the 
evils of the patronage system many j^ears before the 

* Mr. Potts, to whom I am indebted for the above information in 
advance of its publication, was removed from office without fault of 
his, and in violation of the spirit if not the letter of the civil service 
law. (See note, page 57.) 



Xvi EARNlNa SALARIES BY DEPUTf * 

Declaration of Independence. Sir Thomas llrskine 
May, in his "Constitutional History of England since 
the Accession of George III," says that many of the 
colonial officeholders sent from England were of little 
account — were thought to be good enough for the col- 
onies, but not for England.* The most lucrative colo- 
nial salary, he says, would often be earned by deputy. 
He quotes a letter of Lieutenant General John Huske, 
as follows (ii, 529) : "As to civil officers appointed for 
America, most of the places in the gift of the Crown 
have been filled with broken members of Parliament, 
of bad, if any, principles — valetsde-chamhre, election- 
eering scoundrels, and even livery servants. In one 
word, America has been for many years made the hos- 
pital of England." The letter was written in 1758. 

* Such men were more mischievous in a colony than at home. * * * 
To allay discontent, the government finally surrendered to the local Gov- 
ernors all appointments under £200 a year, to be filled from among the 
citizens of the several colonies. — E. F. Waters. 



THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW. 



CHAPTER I. 

PEUITS AND FACTS. 

The law promotes Education, Efficiency, and Economy. — Its chief Ob- 
ject. — Its Constitutionality. — In harmony with the Teachings of 
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay. — It Aids instead of Hampers the 
President, who makes his own Kules for its Execution. 

The civil service law, judged by its fruits, is a useful 
and successful reformatory measure. Its fruits or re- 
forms are necessarily limited in number, for it applies 
to only about a seventh of the more than one hundred 
thousand public offices. But notwithstanding this fact, 
it has made a good beginning in reforuiing the patron- 
age system of distributing offices, and it promises well 
for the future. One of its best reforms is the relief 
of officeholders from compulsory political assessments. 
Another is the making of subordinate official tenures 
coequal with efficiency and fidelity, instead of their 
depending on the politics of chief officials. It has also 
greatly relieved the President, the Cabinet, Congress- 
men, and customs, postoffice, and other officials of the 
annoying and sometimes embarrassing burdens of office- 
seeking. The National Civil Service Commission, and 
also the State Commissions of New York and Massa- 
chusetts, have received encouraging reports of the util- 
ity of the system from nearly every city wherein it is 
applicable. The New York State Commissioners say 



18 INSPIRED BY GENIUS OF OUE INSTITUTIONS. 

(Second Report, p. 34) : '' Higher grade employes, 
better service, reduction in the number employed, and 
large economy in expenditure are among the prominent 
results already partially realized." 

The law is certainly in harmony with the spirit of 
the times, for it both promotes and encourages educa- 
tion.* Mr. Everett P. Wheeler truly says: "So far 
from its being opposed to the genius of our institutions, 
it is inspired by that genius." Another good feature 
of the law is that it is, like all laws should be, non- 
partisan in its character, having been originated by the 
best known men of both the Democratic and Republi- 
can parties. It makes no distinction on account of sex. 
The provision which requires that examinations for and 
appointments to office shall be controlled by separate 
sets of officials, these by a third set (the Civil Service 
Commissioners), and the Commissioners by the Presi- 
dent, is certainly a wise one, for, like the government's 
legislative, executive, and judicial officials, one set 
checks as well as aids the other. For example, appoint- 
ing officers are required to keep records of removals, 

* Mr. Henry Sherwin, chief examiner of the Massachusetts Civil Ser- 
vice Commission, says (Third Annual Report, p. 11) : "It may be said 
truthfully that, in their way, civil service examinations form a part of a 
general educational system. The demands made upon applicants vary 
. in accoi'dance with the positions for which they are examined. A first 
examination has shown many of them their various deficiencies, and 
they have been stimulated to bring their education up to the required 
standard. In many cases this has been done with the help of friends, 
but more frequently by attendance at the evening schools which are 
maintained in many of the cities of the Commonwealth." 

Many other Americans have made similar testimonials to the above, 
and Sir Charles Trevelyan and many other Englishmen have testified 
that the English civil service law has the same effect in England, Can- 
ada, Australia, British India, &c. To print even a synopsis of so many 
pimilar testimonials is certainly superfluous. 



PUBLIC BUSINESS THE SAME AS PRIVATE. 19 

rejections, resignations, transfers, and the name and 
residence of persons selected for trial by probation. 
This enables the Commissioners to check either unjust 
removals or rejections after trial by probation. 

The chief object of the law is the application of the 
common sense principles of private business to public 
business. Public and, private business may differ more 
or less in detail, and even in mode of performance, yet 
their fundamental principles are the same.* For exam- 
ple, the violation of certain rules will be followed by 
more or less injur}'-, while the violation of certain others 
will be followed sooner or later by insolvency. One of 
these principles or rules is the retention in employment 
of efficient and honest men. Another is the removal of 
either inefficient or dishonest men. The foregoing being 
universally admitted facts, it is therefore self-evident 
that, the services rendered being satisfactory, and the 
exigencies of business permitting, the tenure of service 
of subordinate j)ublic employes, like that of private em- 
ployes, should be during efficient and faithful service, 
which service should be rewarded, when practicable, by 
promotion and a reasonable increase of pay. In private 
business the removal of efficient and faithful employes 
to make room for untried men, who might prove to be 

* The oft-repeated maxim that the public service should be conducted 
on business principles, means that accuracy, promptitude, honesty, econ- 
omy, and efficiency are as essential in public as in private affairs ; but 
the methods of securing these qualities cannot be exactly the same. 
The merchant has a direct personal and pecuniary interest in his private 
affairs which leads him to make a careful selection of his employes ; 
but in the public service there must be substituted some more compli- 
cated agency in the form of laws, regulations, reports, and inspections. 
—Col. Silas W. Burt. 

The very men who advocate the spoils system for public business, 
would call a man a fool if he proposed the same system for private 
^usinesg, — Thomas H, B?;nton. 



20 EEASONABLE WAGES PEOMOTE HONESTY. 

both inefficient and unfaithful, is deemed the hight of 
folly. Is it any less so in public business ? Do railroad 
or telegraph companies injure their business by chang- 
ing their employes every time they change their presi- 
dents? Further, reasonable wages and employment 
during satisfactory service tend to promote honesty. 
Will not an accountant or weigher, public or private, 
who learns that he is to be superseded, be tempted to 
do wrong ? 

The law itself is new, but its principles are as old as 
the government, if not in fact as old as civilization. 
The fact that its principles are in exact conformity with 
both the principles and practices of the founders of the 
government, is a good if not perhaps the best argument 
that can be made in favor of its constitutionality, for it 
is not reasonable that the founders of the government 
would both preach and practice doctrine that is in vio- 
lation of the Constitution.* The law is certainly not 
unconstitutional. It in effect simply authorizes the 
President to appoint commissioners to aid him in dis- 
charging his constitutional functions. The President's 
powers are therefore really increased, not, as charged 
by the opponents of the law, diminished. Thus, instead 
of hampering the President, the law materially increases 
his facilities for transacting business ; and the increase 
of facilities is not greater than the increase of business. 

* Daniel Webster says (iv, 196, 198): "I think the legislature pos- 
sesses the power of regulating the condition, duration, qualification, 
and tenure of office in all cases where the Constitution has made no 
express provision on the subject. * * * If Congress were to declare 
by law that the Attorney-General or the Secretary of State should hold 
his office during good behavior, I am not aware of any ground on 
which such a law could be held unconstitutional. A provision of that 
kind might be unwise, but I do not perceive that it would transcend 
the power of Congress," 



3Pi&ESIi)ENT MADISON'S VISWS. 21 

Further, so far as tlie President is concerned, the en- 
forcement of the law is optional instead of compulsory. 
In fact he can nullify it by merely refusing to enforce 
it. Thus everything is practically left to the President. 
This is precisely what the Constitution says Congress 
may do. Art. II., Sec. 4, says "the Congress may by 
law vest the appointment of such inferior officera as 
they think proper in the President alone, in the courts 
of law, or in the heads of departments." 

This is the modest, not to say timid, way in which the 
Congress of 1883 sought " to regulate and improve" a 
small part of the national civil service. But here is the 
way in which President Madison, one of the framers* 
of the Constitution itself, says he would proceed (iv, 
385) : " The right of suffrage, the rule of apjDortioning 
representation, and the mode of appointing to and re- 
moving from office, are fundamentals in a free govern- 
ment, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. An 
unforeseen multiplication of offices may add a weight 
to the executive scale, disturbing the equilibrium of the 
government. I should therefore see with pleasure a 
guard against the evil, * * * even hy an amendment 
of the Constitution.'^'* 

Alexander Hamilton, another framer of the Constitu- 
tion, not only advocated principles but even proposed a 

* The opinions of the framers of the Constitution ought to have great 
weight. William E. Gladstone says : " As the British Constitution is 
the most subtile organism which has proceeded from progressive his- 
tory, so the American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever 
struck ofiF at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." If this 
does not increase the weight of the framers* opinions, what can ? But 
the Constitution needs revising. Jefferson says (iii, 106) : " Every con- 
stitution and every law naturally expires at the end of every 34 ye^rs." 
Speaking of other omissions, he said he thought the Constitution ought 
to contain a provision for ** the restriction of monopolies." (ii, 229.) 



22 HAMILTON'S PLAI^ AND JAY's PRACTICE. 

plan very similar to both tiie plan and fundamental prin- 
ciples of the civil service law. Indeed it may be said 
that the law is only an enlargement and improvement 
of his plan. His " select assembly " would have been, 
what the Civil Service Commissioners are to-day, a 
material aid to the President, if not in fact a sort of 
second Cabinet. He says (" The Federalist," p. 355) : 
" It will be agreed on all hands that the power of ap- 
pointment, in ordinary cases, can be properly modified 
only in one of three ways. It ought to be vested in a 
single man ; or in a select assembly of moderate num- 
ber ; or in a single man, with the concurrence of such 
an assembly." He deprecated "party bargains" (p. 
356) as a mode of distributing offices, because " party 
victories " would " be more considered than the intrinsic 
merit of the candidate" or ''the advancement of the 
service." 

The Federalist papers were intended by their authors 
— Hamilton, Madison, and Jay — to be explanations of 
the Constitution. So it is hardly necessary to say that 
Hamilton's plan is what he believed to be the Constitu- 
tion's plan. 

John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, did not, so far as I know, formulate 
any plan for or expatiate at length concerning the dis- 
tribution of offices. But his actions, when Governor of 
New York, in I'ZQo, spoke louder than plans, or even 
the emphatic words he then used, for he refused to 
' make removals on account of politics, notwithstanding^ 
Gov. Clinton's officeholders had bitterly opposed him, 
and his (Jay's) political friends "anticipated the spoils 
of victory."* (Life of Jay, i, 392.) When one of the 



* These words were written by William Jay, John Jay's son and biog- 
rapher, before the delivery of Senator Marcy's spoils doctrine speech. 



TWO dTHER CIVIL SEEVICE LAWS. 23 

council of four men that then confirmed nominations, 
advised the Governor to appoint a Federalist to office, 
on account of " his zeal and usefulness," he replied : 
" That, sir, is not the question. Is he fit for the office ?" 
In his inaugural address he said (i, 389) : " To regard 
my fellow-citizens with an equal eye, to cherish and 
advance merit wherever found, * * * are obligations 
of which I perceive and acknowledge the full force." 

The civil service law, so far as non-competitive ex- 
aminations are concerned, is not without precedent. 
Two other acts, namely, sections 164 and 1753 of the 
United States Revised Statutes, provide as follows : 

§ 164. No clerk shall be appointed in any department, 
in [any] of the four classes above designated, until he 
has been examined and found qualified by a board of 
three examiners. 

§1753. The President is authorized to prescribe such 
regulations for the admission of persons into the civil 
service of the United States as may best promote the 
efficiency thereof, and ascertain the fitness of each can- 
didate in respect to age, health, character, knowledge, 
and ability for the branch of service into which he 
seeks to enter ; and for this purpose he may employ 
suitable persons to conduct such inquiries, and may 
prescribe their duties and establish regulations for the 
conduct of persons who may receive appointments in 
the civil service. 

The civil service law is a careful elaboration and im- 
provement of sections 164 and 1753. Therefore one is 
about as unconstitutional as the other. But even if all 
were unconstitutional, the evils tliey are designed to 
correct would have to be dealt with by some other law. 
The law not only appears to be constitutional, but it or 
^ law similar to it appears to be expressly authorized by 



^4 now TO AbAPf LAWS TO THIl PEOPL:Ei. 

the Constitution itself. It causes, it must be admitted, 
a radical change. Therefore it is not strange that it 
should meet with opposition, for doubt and distrust are 
the natural consequences of all radical governmental 
changes. The Constitution itself was not an exception 
to this rule, for it was voted down by two of the States 
(Rhode Island and North Carolina),* and even some of 
its framers doubted its permanent utility. Is it strange 
then that some men doubt the utility of the civil service 
law? 

The Constitution requires that the President ** shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed." In har- 
mony with and apparently in view of this fact, the civil 
service law authorizes the President to make his own 
rules for its execution, and requires the Commissioners 
to aid him, " as he may request," in preparing them. 
As the rules are subject to such modifications as the 
President and his aids may find necessary, they ought 
in the course of time to become not only satisfactory as 
rules, but also important adjuncts to the law itself. 
This is well, for the law, which has not yet, except in 
certain places, had a fair trial, may have faults of both 
omission and commission,! the exact nature of and rem- 

* George Bancroft says (" History of the Constitution," ii, 350) : 
** Neither of the two States which lingered behind remonstrated against 
the establishment of a new government before their consent ; nor did 
they ask the United States to wait for them. The worst that can be 
said of them is that they were late in arriving." 

f Sir George Cornwall Lewis says (" Methods of Observation and 
Reasoning in Politics," i, m) : " A government is, by the nature of its 
action, constantly trying experiments upon the community. All new 
measures, all laws enacted for the first time, are in the nature of ex- 
periments. They are not indeed scientific experiments ; but they are 
experiments made for a practical purpose, and they are regarded merely 
as provisional and tentative until experience has proved their fitness 
ftud they are confirmed by the proof of practical success. Being tried, 



edy for which time only will determine. Therefore, in 
the meantime, good rules will give it strength as well 
as facilitate its execution. The execution of the law 
like the law itself, is simple, but it is laborious. For 
example, in 1885 examinations were held in all the 
States and every Territory except Utah. The number 
of examinations held was 150, and the number of appli- 
cants examined was 7,602, of whom 730 were women. 
Total in three years, 17,491.* 

not ' in corpore vili,' but upon the lives and fortunes of the people, the 
conduct of the experiment must be regulated by the nature of the sub- 
ject upon which it is made. Hence the progress of such experiments is 
carefully watched by the legislature, while the executive authorities 
proceed cautiously and gently with a new law, feeling their way as they 
advance, and exercising their discretion as to its more rapid or tardy 
advancement, either generally or in particular districts. It is by trying 
a new law on a people, as the maker of new apparel fits it on the body, 
and by enlarging here and diminishing there, where it does not suit the 
shape, that the legislature gradually adapts its work to the wants and 
feelings of the community. This is an experimental process, for the 
purpose, not of ascertaining a general truth, but of improving the insti- 
tution, and of giving it the form best suited to the circumstances of the 
nation." 

* For further and later details on thia subject, and also for further 
*' Fruits and Facts," see Introduction, 
2 



CHAPTER 11. 

COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIOlSrS. 

Trial by Probation. — Appointees independent of Politicians. — Competi- 
tive Examinations superior to non-Competitive. — The Education 
required, Etc., Etc. 

The competitive examinations, which may be called 
the backbone of the civil service law system, about 
which there is more or less complaint, are a simple 
mode of ascertaining the relative theoretical qualifica- 
tions of applicants for office, and of naming those who 
are entitled to trial by probation as to their practical 
qualifications before final appointment. The proceed- 
ings of the examiners are as impartial as are those of a 
court of justice, and " are open to such spectators as 
can be accommodated without interfering with the 
quiet due to those being examined." The examiners 
know the applicants and their respective papers by 
numbers, not by names.* There is therefore practically 
no reason for favoritism f on the part of the examiners, 



* Regulation 21. The examination papers of each applicant shall be 
marked only with a number, and his name with his number shall be 
placed in a sealed envelope, which shall not be opened until after hi3 
papers are marked. 

Regulation 35. Complaints which show injustice or unfairness on the 
part of any Examining Board, or any one acting under the Commission, 
or any error in marking, will be considered by the Commission, and if 
necessary it will revise the marking and grading on the papers, or onJer 
a new examination, or otherwise do justice in the premises, 

I It (the Commission) does not regard itself QV th§ exsmiJierg »n bftY» 



Mow TO WEED OUT IMPRACTICABLE THEORISTS. 2^ 

and consequently no reason for complaint on the part 
of the applicants. Applicants who answer seventy per 
cent, of the questions asked, except veteran soldiers and 
sailors, who are required to answer bat sixty-five, are 
eligible, when wanted, to trial by probation, without 
farther examination. Those who do not, are eligible to 
try again in some future examination. 

The utility of competitive examinations is proved in 
many ways, but best perhaps by trial by j^robation. 
Trial by probation is for six months. It is the gover- 
nor, as it were, of the civil service law system. Its 
province is to correct an inherent fault of all theoretical 
examinations, namely, the indorsement now and then 
by the examiners of impracticable theorists. Experi- 
ence shows that, when tried by probation, less than two 
per cent, of the applicants who have passed competitive 
examinations fail of final appointment. What system 
could do better ? The utility of the system is also 
proved by examinations for promotion among office- 

ing any more right to take into account requests, recommendations, or 
the wishes or sympathies of persons, however high in official and social 
standing, than a judge or jury has to depart from the law or the evi- 
dence by reason of such interposition. (Com'rs' Third An. Rept., p. 73.) 

The Postmaster-General has found the recommendations of persons 
for inspectors in the Postal service, who are not yet within the civil ser- 
vice examinations, to be so unreliable that he has been compelled to 
resort to examinations to protect himself against fraud and incompe- 
tency. For the same reasons the Secretary of the Navy has enforced 
examinations for securing skilled workmen at the navy-yards. (Ibid., 
p. 60.) 

Applicants are required to file formal application papers. These are 
of themselves " a sort of preliminary examination," for they contain a 
record of the birth, age, education, physical condition, capacity for 
business, residence, &c., of each applicant. Besides this three reputable 
persons must vouch for the applicant's chai'acter. In New York and 
Massachusetts the sponsors must certify their willingness that their cer- 
tificates may be published, This makes thera careful. 



28 CIVIL Am MILITARY SERVICES COM^AftlBlB. 

holders themselves. The records in such cases are de- 
cidedly in favor of those who have passed competitive 
examinations as against those who have not. Examina- 
tions for promotion should receive careful attention, for 
sooner or later many chief officials may be chosen from 
among the subordinates who pass best in them. * 

The best feature perhaps of the competitive system is 
the entire independence of its a23pointees of politicians. 
How can public business be efficiently conducted if 
politicians practically appoint, control, and tax the men 
who conduct it ? Under the competitive system ap- 
pointees win their positions by merit, and by merit only 
can they retain them or be promoted. 

The civil service law system of competitive examina- 
tions is similar to the system of choosing cadets to the 
military school at West Point,f that is when the latter 
is not made a matter of patronage, and it compares 
favorably with it in its results. The failures, in after 
life, among the cadets who graduate, like those who are 
tried by probation in the civil service, are less than two 
per cent. The cases are not strictly analogous, but 

* In 1860 a Parliamentary Committee of Investigation said that 
among the ends to be accomplished was the following : " To encourage 
industry and foster merit, by teaching all public servants to look for- 
ward to promotion according to their deserts, and to expect the highest 
prizes in the service if they can qualify themselves for them." (Eaton's 
" Civil Service in Great Britain," p. 220.) 

f The respective civil departments of the government being in effect 
schools of practical instruction, as in fact are all offices, vocations, and 
avocations, would it not be policy, when practicable, to make them, hke 
West Point and Annapolis, schools of special theoretical instruction 
also ? In practical instruction, under the civil service law system, they 
are eqaal if not superior to either West Point or Annapolis. Such 
schools would produce diplomatists, financiers, soldiers, &c. All able- 
bodied public employes should be soldiers, for they not only belong to 
but are a part of the government itself. 



POLITICALLY AMBITIOtJS OFFICIALS CHECKED. 29 

educational tests are required in both, and trial by pro- 
bation also, it may be said, for th'e cadets are practically 
on trial for four years, during which time incompetent 
persons are weeded out by numerous examinations. 

Again, the examinations are a check on politically 
ambitious officeholders. For example, under the pat- 
ronage system the Collector of the Port of New York, 
wishing to be Governor of the State of New York, can 
remove subordinate officials, with or without cause, to 
make room for his personal political supporters. Under 
the competitive or merit system he is checked in two 
ways. 1. While he has an unrestricted power of re- 
moval, it is dangerous to abuse it, for, as before said, 
he has to furnish the Civil Service Commissioners with 
records of removals, rejections, &c. 2. Pie cannot make 
appointments to office, except in conjunction with other 
officials, with whom he has no connection, and then only 
such as have passed an examination. 

The examinations relieve the President of burdens of 
which Washington complained, even before his inau- 
guration as President. (" Writings," ix, 479.) As the 
public offices have increased about a hundredfold since 
Washington's day, it is self evident that a proper exam- 
ination into the qualifications of all subordinate office- 
holders would occupy the time of at least fifty men, 
that is if the officeholders were changed every four 
years. Hence the enactment of sections 164 and 1753 
of the United States Revised Statutes, and finally of 
the civil service law. The President and Cabinet now- 
adays are sometimes overworked in the performance of 
regular official duties. Those of the Secretary of the 
Treasury are sufficient for two men. 

The failure now and then of worthy and practical 
men to get appointments is no valid argument against 
the competitive system, for where there are so many 



30 COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS IN LARGE FIRMS. 

ai3plicaiits, the same tbing will occur sometimes under 
any system. No system of course is perfect. But can 
any system do more than require applicants to prove 
both theoretical and practical ability before appoint- 
ment ? The question of satisfactory future service is 
always a problem, let the business be public or private, 
and must be taken for granted. Further, the failure of 
worthy and practical men to get public employment 
is the means sometimes of securing them private em- 
ployment. The Civil Service Commissioners say that 
the examinations are " the means of the most worthy 
securing private employment." Besides this, examina- 
tions to determine merit are being used by large private 
business firms and corporations in both this country and 
Europe. 

Competitive examinations are superior to the non- 
competitive or " pass " examinations in perha23S every 
respect ; besides it is far more creditable to an applicant 
to pass the former than the latter. Some of the non- 
competitive examinations held under section 164 were a 
mockery, a burlesque on business, and a fraud on the 
government, the questions asked, according to J. D. 
Cox (Secretary of the Interior under President Grant), 
consisting of such as " How far is it to your boarding- 
house ? " and " Where do you go to get your pay at the 
end of the month?" President Grant, in 1870, said: 
*' The present system does not secure the best men, and 
often not even fit men for public place." John Stuart 
Mill says : "A mere pass examination never, in the long 
run, does more than exclude absolute dunces. * * * 
The examinations should be competitive, and the ap- 
pointments given to those who are the most successful." 

The competitive examinations, while not a guarantee 
of good character, are sometimes, but very rarely, the 
means of exposing bad character, Dorman B. Eaton, 



THE ADVANTAGE OF BUSINESS EXPERIENCE. 31 

who speaks from experience, having been a Civil Ser- 
vice Commissioner, and having also studied the subject 
(civil service) in Europe, says (" The Spoils System and 
Civil Service Reform," p. 60) : " Every competitor has 
his chance of an appointment increased by every one he 
can strike from the list above him. If he can expose 
bad character in any person graded higher, that person 
will be no longer in his way. This interest leads to 
inquiry and exposure." But, Mr. Eaton might have 
added, this privilege is liable to abuse. * 

The claim that a collegiate education is necessary to 
pass a competitive examination is not sustained by the 
facts. As a rule about 85 per cent, of the appointees, 
as is shown in the Introduction, are from common 
schools and 15 from colleges. But it is true that some 
offices require proficiency in a greater number of studies 
than others, and that others again require special educa- 
tion. The fact that more or less knowledge of mathe- 
matics, grammar, geography, and a few other elemen- 
tary studies, is necessary to the proper discharge of 
general commercial and financial business is certainly 
indisputable, and it is no hardship for young men fresh 
from school to be examined in them. But with elderly 
men the case is different. It is not reasonable to expect 
them to describe the minute details of these studies 
after fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years of more or 
less disuse.f There is need of intelligent and practical 

* The Commissioners say (Third Annual Report) that out of more 
tlian 17,000 individual examinations, not more than six or seven un- 
worthy persons have been discovered on the records. " The ' Records ' 
are the books in which the names of applicants for examination are 
entered. The ' Registers' are the books in which the names of those 
found eligible for appointment after examination are entered. 

f The Commissioners' Report for 1885 says business experience is 
almogt the exact equivalent of a fresh recollection of studies, 



32 WASHINGTON, GALLATIN, JEFFERSON, EVERETT. 

discrimination here. In private business uneducated 
men do not apply for work which requires educated 
men. It would be useless. But in public business the 
case is different. This fact alone justifies competitive 
examinations. 

The requirement of educational qualifications on the 
part of officeholders is not new in this government, nor 
perhaps in any other. Washington says (" Writings," 
ix, 461): "The nominator ought to be governed pri- 
marily by the abilities which are the most peculiarly 
adapted to the nature and duties of the office which is 
to be filled." In his last message to Congress Washing- 
ton recommended the establishment of both a Military 
School and a National University, the specific object of 
the latter to be, he said, " the education of our youth in 
the science of government. In a republic," he con- 
tinues, " what species of knowledge can be equally im- 
portant?" (Benton's Abridged Debates, ii, 16.) His 
admonition, in his Farewell Address, to promote " the 
general diffusion of knowledge" is familiar to every 
school-boy. 

Albert Gallatin, writing to Jefferson, in 1801, said : 
"So far as respects subordinate offices, talent and integ- 
rity are to be the only qualifications." Jefferson, in re- 
ply, said : " Talent and worth alone are to be inquired 
into." (Adams's Gallatin, p. 279.) 

Edward Everett, in an address on " The importance 
of Education in a Republic," says (" Orations," &c., ii, 
319, 320): "But I have not yet named all the civil 
duties for which education is needed as the preparatory 
discipline. The various official trusts in society are to 
be filled, from a Commission of the Peace to the place 
of Chief Justice ; from a Constable up to the President 
ot the United States. The sphere of duty of some of 
these functionaries is narrow ; of others, large and in- 



EDtrCATION CONGENIAL WITH REPUBLIC ANISM. 33 

expressibly responsible ; of none, insignificant. Taken 
together, they make up the administration of free gov- 
ernment — the greatest merely temporal interest of civil- 
ized man. There are three courses, between which we 
must choose. We must have officers unqualified for 
their duties ; or we must educate a privileged class to 
monopolize the honors and. emoluments of place ; or we 
must establish such a system of general education as 
will furnish a supply of well-informed, intelligent, and 
respectable citizens, in every part of the country and in 
every walk of life, capable of discharging the trusts 
which the people may devolve upon them. The topic 
is of great compass, but I cannot dwell upon it. It is 
superfluous to say which of the three courses is most 
congenial with the spirit of republicanism." 

Similar citations might be made from many other 
statesmen, but they are certainly superfluous. Some 
statesmen's deeds speak louder than words ; as, for ex- 
ample. Governor Samuel J. Tilden's late posthumous 
gift for educational purposes. 

The New York Civil Service Commission says (Second 
Report, 1885, p. 20) : "The competitive method is sup- 
ported by reasons so obvious and cogent that argument 
in its favor seems almost superfluous. Competition is 
the law of nature, and is universal in its application. It 
prevails in every department of human activity, and is 
the test by which men are measured in every profession, 
calling, and sphere. It is the only absolutely democratic 
rule, and therefore consonant with the spirit of our in- 
stitutions, founded on the political equality of men. By 
eliminating the elements of favoritism, nepotism, and 
partisan recompense, it stimulates manly aspirations, 
develops independence in thought and character, pro- 
tects the equal rights of every citizen, and secures fair 
play against selfishness and presumptuous mediocrity." 



34 COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS IN IRELAND. 

Again the Commission says (Same Report, p. 24) i 
« It is rapidly becoming clear that the system of com- 
petitive examinations is easily applicable to almost every 
subordinate post, however high, in every branch of the 
public service, State or municipal. In Ireland the four 
national examiners of the public schools are selected by 
competitive examination, and a note of the subjects for 
examination gives an idea of the varied scientific and 
scholarly attainments in which the applicants must be 
versed." 

And again the Commission says (Fourth Report, 1887, 
p. 26) : " One advantage of the competitive system, on 
which stress has been laid by a Professor of Trinity 
College, Dublin, is in its avoidance of animosities aris- 
ing from religious differences, which, he remarked some 
thirty years ago, * are greatly embittered by the patron- 
age system.' " 

Mayor Seth Low of Brooklyn, New York, in 1885, said 
of the competitive system : " There is a fairness and 
openness about it peculiarly American, and smacking of 
all that is best in the American love of fair play and the 
American demand for equal treatment of all citizens." 

Governor David B. Hill says (An. Message, 1886) : 
" Open competition rests on the solid basis of equal 
rights and fair play, and is a principle so thoroughly 
democratic in its character, so completely in harmony 
with the theory of our institutions and the spirit of our 
people, that the method would seem to commend itself 
to universal approval. When merit alone, ascertained 
by fair competition, is recognized as the ground of ap- 
pointment and promotion, the equity and propriety of 
the mode are self-evident and require no defense. * * * 
It is besides a constant stimulus to the better education 
and training of the people, and a recognition of the 
utility of our common schools, sustained at the public 



GOOD EFFECT OF THE PEOBATIOI>rAEY TEEM. 35 

expense, and an incentive for the best men to seek the 
public service." 

Collector William H. Robertson, writing Dec. 8, 1883, 
says (First Rept. New York C. S. Com., p. 266) : " For 
several years the civil service system has been in force 
in the Custom House at this Port, and the results are 
highly gratifying to its friends. The appointments are 
made upon competitive examination wherever it is prac- 
ticable to do so. No wiser or safer rule could be de- 
vised for filling these offices." 

Postmaster Henry G. Pearson of New York, who 
also believes in the wisdom of competitive tests, says 
(Same Report, p. 271) : "I do not desire, however, to 
be understood as maintaining that the syston of ap- 
pointment through competitive examination is a never- 
failing means of securing the services of none but the 
most efficient and deserving for the performance of the 
public business. In spite of all precautions, it is and 
has been possible for idle, intemperate, dishonest, and 
careless persons to obtain employment under that sys- 
tem. But the cases have been rare in which those 
defects have not been discovered before the expiration 
of the six months' term of probation, and the unfaithful 
or incompetent servant dismissed." 

Silas W. Burt, who speaks from experience as Naval 
Officer of the Port of New York and also Chief Exam- 
iner of the Mew York Civil Service Commission, says 
(Second Rept. N. Y. C. S. Com., p. 47) : " Open compe- 
tition gives the broadest scope of choice, determines 
with substantial accuracy the relative fitness of all who 
apply, and puts on record all the transactions, with their 
details." 

As early as 188], two years before the passage of the 
civil service law, the New York Chamber of Commerce, 
whose members' business connection with Custom House 



S6 K. Y. CHAMBER COMMERClJ, WEBSTER, GODKIlf. 

officials makes them eminently qualified to judge of their 
merits, passed the following among other resolutions : 

Resolved, That in the judgment of this Chamber the 
system of examinations for appointment to place in the 
Custom House, which has ruled during the last few 
years, has been of substantial value to the mercantile 
community, and is, in their eyes, of great importance. 

Resolved, That this Chamber hereby instructs its 
Committee on Foreign Commerce and the Revenue 
Laws to wait upon the new Collector, when he shall be 
installed, with a copy of these resolutions, and to press 
upon his attention the importance of their subject- 
matter. 

The following maxim of Webster is similar in princi- 
ple to competitive examinations (iii, 4) : " Nothing is 
more unfounded than the notion that any man has a 
fight to an office. This must depend on the choice of 
others, and consequently on the opinions of others, in 
relation to his fitness and qualification for office." 

Edwin L. Godkin says (" Danger of an Officeholding 
Aristocracy," p. 14) : " It may be laid down as one of 
the maxims of the administrative art, that no public 
officer can ever take the right view of his office, or of 
his relation to the people whom he serves, who feels 
that he has owed his appointment to any qualification 
but his fitness, or holds it by any tenure but that of 
faithful performance. No code of rules can take the 
place of this feeling. No shortening of the term can 
take its place." 

So far as my researches go. Commissioner of Patents 
S. S. Fisher has the honor of being the first person to 
practice the system of competitive examinations in this 
country. He began them in 1869, and his example was 
followed by most if not all of his successors in the 



MSHER AND THOMAS AS PIONEERS. 37 

Patent Office. Colonel Fisher, who wns a well-known 
patent lawyer, accepted office more to accommodate 
President Grant than anything else. But as his profes- 
sion was more remunerative than his office, he resigned 
at the end of eighteen months. 

John L. Thomas, Collector of the Port of Baltimore, 
instituted, in 1889, strict non-competitive examinations 
in the Baltimore Custom House. The system was so 
satisfactory that his two successors in office continued 
it. When Mr. Thomas was again appointed Collector, 
in 1877, he found that all the clerks, with three or four 
exceptions, whom he had appointed between 1869 and 
1873 had been retained ; and when he left the office, in 
1882, they were still there. (Senate Report No. 576, 
for 1882, pp. 179, 182.) 

Silas W. Burt instituted competitive examinations 
for promotion among the employes in the New York 
Naval Office in 1871. This was on his own responsibil- 
ity. In 1872 he began competitive examinations under 
the Grant rules for general admission to the service. 
In the same year Postmaster Patrick H. Jones began 
competitive examinations in the New York Postoffice. 
These were continued by his successor in office, Thomas 
L. James, in 1873. In 1879 Mr. James improved the 
system, and issued " Rules governing appointment and 
promotion in the New York Postoffice." 

Collector Chester A. Arthur, who was appointed in 
1871, introduced radical changes in the New York Cus- 
tom House. Mr. Eaton says ("Term and Tenure of 
Office," p. 82) that in five years Mr. Arthur made only 
144 removals as against 1,678 during the preceding five 
years. Mr. Arthur advocated as well as practiced re- 
form in the civil service, as is shown in Chapter YII of 
this work. 



CHAPTER III. 

SOME OF THE LAW'S PKOMISES. 

Reforms of priceless value Probable.— The danger of Bribery at Elec- 
tions.— Opinions tbereon of Messrs. Buchanan, Harrison, Benton, 
Jefferson, Barton, Bell, and Graves.— The chief English Election 
Laws from 1275 to 1883. 

An honest and intelligent enforcement of the civil 
service law promises to have numerous beneficial effects, 
some of which are more or less indirect. This is nat- 
ural. A good law not only aids in and leads to other 
reforms, but is sometimes the parent of other good laws. 
Further, it creates a general spirit of reform. 

It promises^ by securing the services of men of busi- . 
ness as well as intellectual ability, to materially in- 
crease, if not double, the efficiency of the civil service. 
In fact this has been partly accomplished already. In- 
crease of efficiency will naturally lead to perfection of 
system, and perfection of system will naturally lead to 
economy. Are efficiency and system probable, or, in a 
great degree, even possible, when officeholders are ap- 
pointed chiefly on account of their politics, and without 
much if any regard to their ability to discharge the 
peculiar duties of their offices, and who, for obvious rea- 
sons, take more interest in politics than in their official 
business ? 

It promises to aid in purifying and elevating politics, 
and to thereby induce and encourage men of character 
and ability to take part in the affairs of state. It was 
by such men that the government was founded, and it 



HOW TO STRENGTHEN REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS. 39 

is only by such that it can be preserved. Hence the 
necessity of using any and every means to thwart the 
bold and violent men whom Franklin warned us would 
thrust themselves into our government and be our 
rulers. 

It has materially interfered with and promises to ruin 
what, for lack of a better name, may be called the office 
brokerage business, the stock in trade of which has 
heretofore consisted rather in the promise than the be- 
stowal of office. When there are fewer offices to either 
promise or bestow, the evil will be abated ; and when 
there are none at all, it will cease altogether. 

It promises to stimulate and lead men to vote for 
principle — principle, the pedestal on which the monu- 
ment of republican institutions rests! — principle, the 
life-blood of the body-politic ! When men vote for 
principle, they vote to refresh, preserve, strengthen, 
deepen, broaden, and spread republican institutions. 
This is as unquestionable as is the opposite proposition 
that when they vote from purely selfish motives, they 
vote to undermine and weaken reiDublican institutions, 
and to sooner or later put pirates in command of the 
ship of state. From Alderman to President men should 
vote for principle. And voting for a man of principle 
is voting for principle. Officeholders themselves can 
now so vote, for, as before said, they are independent of 
politicians. This is well, because it is not only proper 
to so vote, but a respectful independence, even of office- 
holding itself, is both desirable and commendable. 

It promises to at least ameliorate an evil that threat- 
ens the most direful ultimate results, namely, bribery at 
elections. Even the amelioration of this body-politic 
cancer is a matter of importance, for in the course of 
time, with the aid of and in conjunction with other re- 
forms, it may be practically eradicated. The nation can 



40 THE LAW AIDS ANOTHER ifEEDED REFORM, 

stand the sporadic and local corruptions that are the 
bane of jjrivate as well as public business, but it cannot 
stand, as a republic, the general, far-reaching, and mul- 
tiform evils that continual bribery at elections will 
cause. * 

If the cause of corruption at elections be removed, 
there will be no corruption. As official patronage, either 
direct or indirect, is a great if not perhaps the chief 
cause of corrupt elections, it logically follows that the 
less patronage there is, the less corruption there will be. 
Therefore if all, or nearly all, of the non-elective public 
offices were distributed strictly as rewards of merit, and 
without regard to politics, there would be far less cor- 
ruption at elections. This plan ought besides to mate- 
rially increase public interest in elections, in which of 
course too much care and interest cannot be taken. 
The civil service law will aid in accomplishing this 
reform ; and in this way it will tend to renew and 
strengthen public confidence not only in the fidelity and 
sacredness of the ballot, but in the stability of the gov- 
ernment itself. 

President Buchanan, writing to the Pittsburg Cen- 
tenary Celebration, in 1858, said (Reports Corns. H. of 
Rep., 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1859-60, v, 25) : " We have 



* Webster says (iv, 179, 180): "The principle of republican govern- 
ments, we are taught, is public virtue ; and whatever tends either to 
corrupt this principle, to debase it, or to weaken its force, tends, in the 
same degree, to the final overthrow of such governments. * * * 
Whenever personal, individual, or selfish motives influence the conduct 
of individuals on public questions, they affect the safety of the whole 
system. When these motives run deep and wide, and come in serious 
conflict with higher, purer, and more patriotic purposes, they greatly 
endanger that system ; and all will admit that, if they become general 
and overwhelming, so that all public principle is lost sight of, and every 
election becomes a mere scramble for office, the system inevitably must 
fall." ^ 



VENALITY VEESUS LIBERTY. 41 

never heard until within a recent period of the employ- 
ment of money to carry elections. Should this practice 
increase until the voters and their representatives in the 
State and National legislatures shall become infected, 
the fountain of the government will be poisoned at its 
source, and we must end, as history proves, in a military 
despotism. * * * When the people become venal, 
there is a canker at the root of the tree of liberty which 
must cause it to wither and die." 

President Harrison, in 1841, in a circular prepared by 
his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, said (Civil Ser- 
vice Reform League Proceedings, 1885, p. 15) : "I will 
remove no incumbent * * * ^ho has faithfully and 
honestly acquitted himself of the duties of his office, 
except where such officer has been guilty of an active 
partisanship, * * * thereby bringing the patronage o'f 
the government in conflict with the freedom of elec- 
tions." 

Senator Thomas H. Benton, in reporting, in 1826, on 
the " expediency of reducing the patronage of the Exec- 
utive," said (Appendix to Gales & Seaton's Debates in 
Congress, 1820, p. 137): "The power of patronage, 
unless checked, must go on increasing until Federal in- 
fluence will predominate in elections as completely as 
British influence predominates in the elections of Scot- 
land and Ireland. * * * < '-pj^g President wants my 
vote, and I want his patronage. I will vote as he wishes, 
and he will give me the office I wish for.' What will 
this be but the government of one man ? and what is 
the government of one man but a monarchy ?" 

Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Governor Thomas 
McKean of Pennsylvania, in 1801, says (" Writings," 
iv, 350) : " The event of the election is still in chibio. 
A strong portion in the House of Representatives will 
prevent an election if they can. I rather believe they 



42 PUKE ELECTIONS THE PILLLARS OF LIBEETY. 

will not be able to do it, as there are six individuals of 
moderate character, any one of whom, coming over to 
the Republican vote, will make a ninth State. Till this 
is known, it is too soon for me to say what should be 
done in such atrocious cases as those you mention, of 
Federal officers obstructing the operation of the State 
governments. One thing I will say, that, as to the 
future, interference with elections, whether of the State 
or general government, by officers of the latter, should 
be deemed cause of removal, because the constitutional 
remedy by the elective principle becomes nothing, if it 
may be smothered by the enormous patronage of the 
general government. How far it may be practicable, 
prudent, or proper to look back, is too great a question 
to be decided but by the united wisdom of the whole 
administration when formed." 

Mr. Jefferson issued a circular to the officers of the 
government after his election, wherein he said he had 
"seen with dissatisfaction officers of the general gov- 
ernment taking, on various occasions, active parts in the 
election of public functionaries, whether of the general 
or State governments." He further said that an officer 
should " not attempt to influence the votes of others, 
nor to take any part in the business of electioneering, 
that being deemed inconsistent with the Constitution 
and his duties to it." 

Senator David Barton of Missouri says (Gales & Sea- 
ton's Debates, 1830, vol. vi, pt. i, p. 462) : "The free- 
dom and purity of elections are as essential to our liber- 
ties as the pillars to the dome they support." 

Representative John Bell of Tennessee (afterward 
United States Senator, and, in 1860, a prominent candi- 
date for the presidency), introduced, in 1837, "A bill 
to secure the freedom of elections." In the course of a 
most remarkable speech he said (G. & S.'s Debates, vol. 



SPOILS SYSTEM TOO DANGEEOUS EVEN FOR WAR. 43 

xiii, pt. ii, pp. 1455, 1462, 1475, 1478) : "I presume, sir, 
it will scarcely be denied that a lai;ge proportion of the 
officers of the Federal government, from the President 
down to the lowest grade of persons employed in its 
service, have interfered of late in all Federal elections, 
directly, openly, and industriously. * * * Offices and 
employments have been given as the wages of political 
profligacy — the rewards of hireling service in support 
of favorite candidates. * * * The abuse of patronage 
is the Pandora's box of our system. It is the original 
sin of our political condition, to which every other sin 
of the times may be fairly ascribed. * * * It is labor 
thrown away to pursue with research, however relent- 
less and penetrating, the authors of corruption in the 
public offices, while the j)rolific parent of all is permit- 
ted to survive. * * * It is * * * not so much the 
aggregate amount of patronage within the control of 
the government as it is the want of proper legal limita- 
tions and restrictions upon the use of it, in the hands of 
the Executive, which is to be dreaded and guarded 
against. All other dangers in the operation of the gov- 
ernment will wear out by time, and are of small moment 
in comparison with this of patronage. * * * If, in 
war between civilized nations, the spoils principle is 
regarded as too dangerous for the general safety of 
property and society, how much more dangerous and 
insuiferable must such a princijDle be when applied to 
the contests for power between political parties in a 
free government ? " * 

* Mr. Bell q-uotes copiously from English history. He says (p. 1472) 
that, in 1779, "A Lord Lieutenant of a county, an officer appointed by 
the Crown, was detected in writing to his friends in the county of 
Southampton, urging them to give their support to his friend, who was 
also the government candidate for Parlian^nt. When his conduct was 
brought before the House of Commons, and some of the letterp which 



44 A MEMORABLE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION'. 

Representative Wm. J. Graves of Kentucky, speak- 
ing of Mr. Bell's freedom of elections bill, said (Same 
Debates, pp. 1517, 1518, 1525) : "In 1829 the attention 
of this nation was called to this subject, in the most sol- 
emn manner, by General Jackson, in his first inaugural 
address, in which he employs the following language : 
* The recent demonstrations of public sentiment inscribe 
on the list of executive duties, in characters too legible 
to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require 
particularly the correction of abuses that have brought 
the patronage of the Federal government into conflict 
with the freedom of elections.' * * * This was the 
precept of President Jackson when first elected. But, 
incredible to tell, in the first term of his administration 
he hurled from oftice between nine hundred and one 
thousand ofticers. * * * Just as well might General 
Jackson march the regular army to the doors of this 
capitol, and demand the head of every member or Sen- 
ator who has dared to speak the truth of hira, as to 

he had written exhibited, Lord North ventured to say that he thought 
the case presented no great cause of alarm. Instantly, and it would 
appear from all sides of the House, there arose such indignant clamors 
that it was some time before order could be restored, and Lord North 
was obliged to explain and qualify his meaning. But the most decisive 
piODf of the spirit which prevailed upon the subject, even in corrupt 
times, and the odium in which all intermeddling of officeholders in elec- 
tions has ever been held in Great Britain, is to be found in the follow- 
ing resolution, which the House of Commons adopted on that occasion 
(1779), without a division, and without a dissenting voice: 

" ' Resolved, That it is highly criminal for any minister or ministers, 
or any other servant of the Crown in Great Britain, directly or indi- 
rectly to make use of the power of his office in order to influence tli« 
election of members of Parliament ; and that an attempt to exercise^ 
that influence is an attack upon the dignity, the honor, and the inde- 
pendence of Parliament, an infringement of the rights and liberties of 
the people, and an attempt to sap the basis of our free and happy Con- 
stitution,' " 



ifR. CtritTIS POEMULATiES CIVIL SERVICE RtJLfiS. 45 

wreak his vengeance, or that of some unprincipled sub- 
altern, upon the helpless officer, by hurling him from his 
station, for daring to discharge his constitutional right 
at the polls. Yes, a thousand times better would it be 
for the country, for in the one case the people would 
see and understand the object of the movement, and 
would fly to the rescue, and deal out vengeance on such 
a blood-thirsty despot ; whilst in the other case the 
same object is attained by the concentration of all power 
in the hands of one man, but in a secret, sly, and insin- 
uating mode, which it seems the acuteness of the public 
vision has not yet so clearly discerned." 

George William Curtis lays down the following fun- 
damental principles for the general guidance of office- 
holders ("Harper's Weekly," Nov. 19, 1887): "When 
a man accepts public office he necessarily surrenders the 
exercise of certain private rights as a citizen. He is 
morally bound to promote public respect for the office 
that he holds and personal confidence in himself. He is 
bound in every proper way to prevent all suspicion that 
he misuses his position either for a personal or a partisan 
object. He is indeed a member of a party, and by a 
party he is nominated and elected. But he administers 
his office not for the benefit of a party, but of the peo- 
ple ; and while upon fitting occasions and in a becoming 
manner he may justly profess his confidence in the po- 
litical principles that he holds, he cannot without gross 
impropriety descend to the mere details of party conten- 
tion, and endeavor by the weight of his official position 
to promote the interest of individual party candidates." 

As before said, too much care and interest cannot be 
taken in elections. The recognition of this fact no 
doubt accounts, to a great extent, for the wonderful 
stability of the English government, a stability that has 
parried it through war after war, civil as well as foreign^ 



4(j AJsciENT electio:n' laW^. 

and even revolutions. The following extracts from the 
chief election laws passed by that government, shows 
the jealous care with which it has guarded, defended, 
and perfected its elective franchise system. Every act 
was passed for the purpose of remedying dangerous 
evils. 

In 1275 (3 Edward I) it was provided: "And be- 
cause elections ought to be free, the King commandeth 
upon great forfeiture, that no man by force of arras, nor 
by malice or menacing, shall disturb any to make free 
elections." (The Statutes : Revised Edition, i, 16.) 

In 1429 (8 Henry VI, 7) Parliament passed the fol- 
lowing law : " Item, whereas the elections of knights of 
shires to come to the Parliaments of our Lord the King, 
in many counties of the realm of England, have now of 
late been made by very great, outrageous, and excessive 
number of people dwelling within the same counties of 
the realm of England, of the which most part was of 
people of small substance, and of no value, whereof 
every of them pretended a voice equivalent, as to such 
elections to be made, with the most worthy knights and 
esquires, dwelling within the same counties, whereby 
manslaughters, riots, batteries, and divisions among the 
gentlemen, and other people of the same counties, shall 
very likely rise and be, unless convenient and due rem- 
edy be provided in this behalf ; our Lord the King, 
considering the premises, hath provided, ordained, and 
established, by authority of this present Parliament, 
That the knights of the shires to be chosen within the 
same realm of England to come to the Parliaments of 
our Lord the King hereafter to be holden, shall be 
chosen in every county of the realm of England by peo- 
ple dwelling and resident in the same counties, whereof 
every one of them shall have free land or tenement to 
the value of forty shillings by the year at the least 



t>ilirALtY FOR FALSE ELECTION EETUENS. it 

above all charges ; and such as have the greatest num- 
ber of them that may expend forty, shillings by year and 
above, as afore is said, shall be returned by the sheriffs 
of every county, knights for the Parliament, by inden- 
tures sealed between the said sheriffs and the said 
choosers so to be made." * * * (Ruffhead's Statutes 
at Large, i, 481.) 

In 1444 (23 Henry VI), owing to sheriffs returning 
" knights, citizens, and burgesses * * * which were 
never duly chosen," and other fraudulent practices, a 
stringent law was passed, which, among other things, 
imposed a fine of £100 to the King and £100 to the 
aggrieved person for false election returns. 

In 1690 (2 William and Mary, 7) Parliament passed 
" An act to declare the right and freedom of election of 
members to serve in Parliament for the Cinque Ports " 
as follows : " Whereas the election of members to serve 
in Parliament ought to be free ; and whereas the late 
Lord Wardens of the Cinque Ports have pretended 
unto, and claimed as of right, a power of nominating 
and recommending to each of the said Cinque Ports, 
the two ancient towns, and their respective members, 
one person whom they ought to elect to serve as a baron 
or member of Parliament for such respective port, an- 
cient town, or member, contrary to the ancient usage, 
right, and freedom of elections, * * * be it therefore 
declared * * * that all such nominations or recom- 
mendations were and are contrary to the laws and con- 
stitutions of this realm, and for the future shall be so 
deemed and construed." (Ruffhead, &c., iii, 422.) 
^ In 1696* (7 and 8 William III, 4) Parliament passed 

* T. B. Macaulay, writing of this period, says (" History of England," 
iv, 549) . " It was something new and monstrous to see a trader from 
liiombard street, who had no tie to the soil of our island, and whose 



iB UOmt m ELECTIONS IN SI2fTEE2J Nm£:TY-SlJC. 

"An act for preventing charge and ex23ense in elec- 
tions of members to serve in Parliament " as follows : 
" Whereas grievous complaints are made * * * ^f 
undue elections of members to Parliament, by excessive 
and exorbitant expenses, contrary to the laws, and * * 

* dishonorable, and may be destructive to the constitu- 
tion of Parliaments, * * * be it enacted * * * that 
no person or persons hereafter to be elected to serve in 
Parliament, * * * shall * * * directly or indirectly 
give, present, or allow to any person or persons, having 
voice or vote in such election, any money, meat, drink, 
entertainment, or provision * * * to or for such 
person or persons * * * in order to be elected, or 
for being elected, to serve in Parliament. * * * 
^jjfj * He * ^Yi^^ every person and persons so giving 

* * * are hereby declared and enacted disabled and 
incapacitated, upon such election, to serve in Parlia- 
ment." (Ruffhead, iii, 570.) 

During the same year Parliament passed " An act for 
the further regulating elections of members to serve in 
Parliament, and for the preventing irregular proceed- 
ings of sheriffs and other officers in the electing and 
returning such members." The preamble charges that 
*' freeholders and others, in their right of election, as 
also the persons by them elected to be their representa- 

wealth was entirely personal and movable, post down to Devonshire or 
Sussex with a portmanteau full of guineas, offer himself as a candidate 
for a borough in opposition to a neighboring gentleman, whose ances- 
tors had been regularly returned ever since the Wars of the Roses, and 
come in at the head of the poll. Yet even this was not the worst. 
More than one seat in Parliament, it was said, had been bought and 
sold over a dish of coffee at Garraway's. The purchaser had not been 
required even to go through the form of showing himself to the elec- 
tors. Without leaving his counting house in Cheapside, he had been 
chosen to represent a place which he had never seen. Such tUinga 
were intolerable," - , - , — - 



MEAVy penalty fob dORRtJP't VOtlNCi. 40 

lives, have heretofore been greatly injured and abused." 
(iii, 589.) 

In 1729 (2 George II, 24) Parliament passed " An act 
for the more effectual preventing bribery and corrup- 
tion in the elections of members to serve in Parliament." 
The elector's oath is as follows : " I, A. B., do swear 

* * * I have not received, * * * directly or 
indirectly, any sum or sums of money, office, place, or 
employment, gift or reward * * * j^ order to give 
my vote at this election, and that I have not been 
before polled at this election." The presiding officer 
had to administer the oath or forfeit £50, and a bribed 
voter forfeited £500, and was forever disfranchised and 
treated as if he " was naturally dead." (v, 510.) 

In 1734 (7 George II, 16) a stringent act was passed 
" for the better regulating the election of members to 
serve in the House of Commons for that part of Great 
Britain called Scotland ; and for incapacitating the 
judges of the Court of Session, Court of Justiciary, and 
barons of the Court of Exchequer, in Scotland, to be 
elected or to sit or vote as members of the House of 
Commons." (v, 65].) 

"An act for regulating the quartering of soldiers 
during the time of the elections of members to serve in 
Parliament," passed in 1735, required that, inasmuch as 
" all elections ought to be free," all soldiers should be 
removed two miles from the place of election, (v, 681.) 

By " An act for the better regulating of elections," 
&c., passed in 1746 (19 George II, 28), voters are re- 
quired to swear that they have '' a freehold estate * * 

* of the clear yearly value of forty shillings, * * * 
and that such freehold estate has not been granted or 
made to you fraudulently, on purpose to qualify you to 
give your vote." (vi, 312.) 

In 1782 (22 George III, 41) Parliament passed ^'Ab 



50 FOltTY THOtTSAND VOTERS DlSB'RAK'CHlgED.^ 

act for the better securing the freedom of elections,'* 
&c., which disfranchised excise, customs, and postoffice. 
employes to the number of about 40,000. A violation 
of the law entailed forfeiture of office and a fine of 
£100. (ix, 230.) 

The passage of this act was the result of corruption 
amomr the officials named. It remained in force till 
1858, when, on account of the reforms brought about 
by the present British civil service law, an act of re- 
enfranchisement was passed. It is a consolation to 
know that this course has never been necessary in this 
country. 

In 1827 (7 and 8 George IV", 37) Parliament passed 
" An act to make further regulations for preventing 
corrupt practices at elections," &c., wherein it is de- 
clared that **if any person shall, either during any 
election, * * * or within six calendar months previ- 
ous to such election, or within fourteen days after it 
shall have been completed, be employed at such election 
as counsel, agent, attorney, poll clerk, flagman, or in 
any other capacity, for the purposes of such election, 
and shall at any time, either before, during, or after 
such election, accept or take, * * * for or in consid- 
eration of or with reference to such employment, any 
sum or sums of money, retaining fee, office, place, or 
employment, * * * such person shall be deemed in- 
capable of voting at such election, and his vote, if given, 
shall be utterly void and of none effect." (xi, 126.) 

The present English election law, passed in 1872, 
which is founded on the Australian election system, is 
perhaps the best law of its kind ever devised. William 
M. Ivins says (" Machine Politics and Money in Elec- 
tions in New York City," pp. 90, 91, 94, 95, 96) : "This 
act provides that at every poll at an election the vote 
ehall be given by ballot j that the ballot of each voter 



THE MOt)EL ELECTION LAW. 5l 

shall contain the names and description of all the candi- 
dates for tlie particular office for which he is voting, 
which ballot-paper has a number printed on the back of 
it, and is attached to a stub, or * counter foil,' as it is 
called, with the same number printed on the face of the 
stub. * * * ^11 voters are registered before each 
election, and when the voter has registered, he is given 
a registration number. This registration number is 
marked on the stub of the ballot at the time the ballot 
is delivered to him. * * * 

"The following is the form of directions for the guid- 
ance of the voter in voting, which is required by the 
English law to be printed in conspicuous characters and 
placarded in every polling-station and in every compart- 
ment of every polling station : 

" ' The voter may vote for candidates. The 

voter will go into one of the compartments, and with a 
pencil provided in the compartment, place a cross on 
the right-hand side opposite the name of each candidate 
for w^hom he votes. The voter will then fold up the 
ballot-paper, so as to show the official mark on the back, 
and leaving the compartment, will, without showing the 
front of the paper to any person, show the official mark* 
on the back to the presiding officer, and then, in the 
presence of the presiding officer, put the paper into the 
ballot-box, and forthwith quit the polling station. If 
the voter inadvertently spoils a ballot paper, he can 
return it to the officer, who will, if satisfied of such 
inadvertence, give him another paper. 

"'If the voter votes for more than candidates, 

or places any mark on the paper by which he may be 
afterward identified, his ballot-paper will be void and 
will not be counted. 

* Election officers are required to keep the official mark secret, and a 
ballot cast without it is void, 



5§ SIE HENRY JAMES'S GREAT IaW. 

" ^ If the voter takes a ballot-paper out of the polling- 
station, or deposits in the ballot-box any other paper 
than the one given him by the officer, he will be guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and be subject to imprisonment for 
any term, with or without hard labor. 

" '■Note. — These directions shall be illustrated by ex- 
amples of the ballot-paper.' " 

Notwithstanding this admirable law, the elections, on 
account of the immense and corrupt use of money, often 
miscarried. A remedy was sought, and it was found in 
the Prevention of Corrupt Practices Act of 1883-84, an 
act that limits the sum of money that may be used for 
election purposes by a candidate or his agent, defines 
bribery, treating, and undue influence, forbids the use 
of liquor saloons for committee-room purposes, &c. 

This latter act, which was originated by Sir Henry 
James, produced almost phenomenal results. Mr. Ivins 
says (pp. 148-9) : "In 1880, with about 3,000,000 voters 
in 419 constituencies, there was spent over £3,000,000, or 
$15,000,000; while in 1886, with an increased number 
of voters, there was expended but £624,086, or about 
$3,000,000. In 1880 ninety-five petitions alleging cor- 
rupt practices were presented, while only two were pre- 
sented in 1885, and only one in 1886. * * * As was 
pointed out by the Neio York Evening JPost, the most 
significant fact disclosed by the English elections of 
1886 is Hfiat the grand total of expenditure by candi- 
dates is only a little more than one-half of the grand 
total allowed by the law? " 

The principles of the two preceding laws should be 
adapted to all American elections. What has been 
done in England can and must be done in America. It 
is fortunate for the nation that we can profit by Eng- 
land's six hundred years of experience in battling for 
pure elections. Pure elections are the pillars of liberty I 



CHAPTER lY. 

THE PATEONAGE AND MEEIT SYSTEMS COMPAEED. 

The Merit System more favorable to ex-Soldiers and Sailors. — Other 
points of difference between the two Systems. — How the President 
and Congressmen were harassed under the Patronage System. 

Section 1754 of the United States Revised Statutes 
gives the preference of aj)pointment to office to only 
such properly qualified soldiers and sailors as have been 
discharged on account of " wounds or sickness incurred 
in the line of duty." The civil service law gives pref- 
erence to all honorably discharged and properly quali- 
fied soldiers and sailors. * 

Under the patronage system partisanship and inter- 
ference at elections were the surest means of retaining 
an office. Under the merit system they are the surest 
means of losino; it. 

Under the patronage system officeholders were almost 
invariably appointed with regard to politics, and usually 
had to vote with their party or lose their offices. Under 
the merit system they are appointed without regard to 
politics, and can vote as they choose. 

Under the patronage system officeholders, as a rule, 
cannot command that degree of public respect and con- 

* The Massachusetts Civil Service Commissioners say (Third Annual 
Report, p. <;2): "The veterans have triumphed by being able to show 
that they possess qualifications equal to or higher than their competit- 
ors. It has been a triumph in a fair field, with no favor, except that 
of preference in case of equality." This speaks well for the Massachu- 
setts soldiers who were educatod over a quarter of a century ago, 



64 LOSS OF TIME UNDEE PATRONAGE SYSTEM. 

fidence that is essential to good government.* As the 
mode of obtaining office under the merit system is the 
reverse of that of the patronage system, officeholders 
appointed in accordance with its provisions ought to 
command both the respect and confidence of the people. 
They can have self-respect at least ; and self-respect 
begets self-confidence as well as the respect and con- 
fidence of others. 

Under the patronage system nearly all the chief of- 
ficials of the government, outside of as well as in Wash- 
ington, were forced to devote a large part of their time 
to the selection of subordinate officials, of whose qualifi- 
cations, either theoretical or practical, they knew little 
or nothing. The merit system has not only stopped 
this waste of valuable time, but it is supplying the pub- 
lic service with officials of proved ability and fitness. 

Under the patronage system an officeholder whose 
tenure depended on the mere caprice of an official supe- 
rior, or perhaps a Ward or some other kind of joolitician, 
was little better than a slave. Besides, under such cir- 
cumstances, he was constantly tempted to do wrong. 
Under the merit system the conditions of tenure are 
precisely the reverse, and are therefore conducive not 
only of a feeling of freedom, but of self-respect and 
manly independence. 

Again, under the patronage system chief as well as 
subordinate public officials were assessed to raise money 
for partisan purposes, and as a natural consequence they 



* A few years ago the Rev. Dr. Howard Crosby said a person would 
as soon think of admitting the small-pox into his house as some New- 
York City politicians. The only thing that can be said in extenuation 
of their offenses is that they were, and to some extent still are, the vic- 
tims of a corrupt system of politics, and that is saying a great deal. It 
is always in order to fight corrupt systems i but, as a rule, unless it i§ 
unavoidable, individuals should not be attacked, 



INTELLIGENT VEESUS IGNORANT OFFICEHOLDERS. 55 

were sometimes tempted to do wrong in order to reim- 
burse themselves. Under the merit system assessments 
for partisan purposes are not allowed. 

Under the patronage system many honorable and 
meritorious persons were deterred from even attempting 
to enter the public service, because, as a rule, only poli- 
ticians, or the subservient henchmen of politicians, ap- 
plied for office. Under the merit system the rule is 
practically the reverse of this. 

Under the patronage system many of the subordinate 
public officials were incompetent. Under the merit sys- 
tein applicants have to pass a competitive examination, 
and then prove their competency by trial by probation 
before appointment. Therefore all, or practically all, 
are competent. 

Under the patronage system some officeholders did 
not know even the rudiments of the business of the 
offices they held. Some years ago a newspaper corre- 
spondent called at a public office in Washington to get 
some official information. The officeholder whom he 
chanced to meet could not give him a word of the infor- 
mation he desired, but he could and did, so the corre- 
spondent said, tell him precisely how the election was 
going in Ohio the next fall ! Under the merit system 
the case ought to be about the reverse. 

Under the patronage system officeholders whose ten- 
ures depended on the success of their own political party 
naturally favored members of it in preference to mem- 
bers of an opposite party, especially about election time. 
Favoritism is a form of injustice that cannot be wholly 
eradicated. It is an inherent if not necessary fault of 
humanity. A law may restrain a man, but it cannot 
change his nature. Yet in this case the merit system 
will have a beneficial eifect at least, for there is on^ 
reason less for showing favoritism. 



56 THE DANOEE OF SWEEPING EEMOVALS. 

Under the patronage system the public service was 
injured by sweeping removals from office. Under the 
merit system no sweeping removals are made. The 
injury caused by sweeping removals is of course in 
proportion to the number of offices. As these are con- 
stantly multiplying, the injury, under the patronage 
system, would in the course of time not only be serious, 
but in case of the success of a party with corrupt lead- 
ers, it would sooner or later become a source of absolute 
danger. Under the merit system, with solid, tranquil, 
educated men guarding the thousands of minor but im- 
portant offices, whose tenures depend solely on efficiency 
and fidelity, the country is comparatively safe, with or 
without the President. Further, even if the President 
should remove every chief official in the service, the 
public business would not be much injured, for the sub- 
ordinate officials, owing to security of tenure, can trans- 
act all ordinary business as well during as before or 
after the change of the chief official. 

In 1883 Governor Cleveland sent the name of ex-State 
Senator William H. Murtha of Brooklyn to the Senate 
of New York for confirmation as Emigration Commis- 
sioner. But as Mr. Murtha would not promise patron- 
age in advance, the Senate refused to confirm him. 
Under the merit system this disgraceful action of the 
Senate would not occur, for under it there is no patron- 
age to either promise or bestow. The execution of the 
then new law which was desi^jned to correct abuses at 
Castle Garden, depended on Mr. Murtha's confirmation. 
Therefore a few minutes before the final adjournment 
of the Senate, Governor Cleveland sent a special mes- 
sage to that body urging Mr. Murtha's confirmation, in 
the course of which he said of the then management at 
Castle Garden : " The present management of this very 
important department is a scandal and a reproach to 



GREAT COST OF REVENUE COLLECTIONS. 51 

civilization. Bare-faced robbery has been committed, 
and the poor immigrant who looks to the Institution for 
protection finds that his helplessness and forlorn condi- 
tion afford but a readily seized opportunity for imposi- 
tion and swindling." And yet the Senate of the great 
State of New York was so debauched by the vicious 
patronage system that it refused to confirm the man 
who would have stopped this imposition and swindling ! 

In 1877 the Jay Commission,* among other things, 
reported to President Hayes that the expense of collect- 
ing customs revenue in the United States was more 
than three times as large as in France, more than four 
times as large as in Germany, and nearly five times as 
large as in Great Britain. The revenue collections in 
this country were then made under the patronage sys- 
tem, while those of the foreign countries named were 
made under the merit system. Again, the Commission 
said, on the authority of the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, that in 1874 it cost the United States about 
$7,000,000 to collect the duties on imports of the value 
of 1642,000,000, while in the same year it cost Great 
Britain only $5,000,000 to collect the duties on imports 
valued at $1,800,000,000 ! 

Under the patronage system it was frequently difficult 
to remove incompetent and unworthy officials because 
of the " influence " of the politicians who vouched for 
them. " The same vicious, extraneous influence," says 
Mr. D. B. Eaton, " which puts them in office, keeps 
them there." Under the merit system they can be 

* The Commission was composed of John Jay and Lawrence Turnure 
of New York and J. H. Robinson of the Department of Justice at Wash- 
ington. Mr. Jay has since served as a New York State Civil Service 
Commissioner from 1883 till the fall of 1887, when he and his equally 
faithful colleague, Henry A. Richmond, were removed without fault of 
theirs, Mr. Augustus Schoonmaker having resigned in June, 1887. 



B8 DUPLICITY CAUSED BY PATEONAGE SYSTeM. 

readily removed, because there is no power behind thd 
throne to protect them. * 

Under the patronage system the President was now 
and then greatly embarrassed on account of some Con- 
gressmen reporting on some applications for office both 
favorably and unfavorably. Under the merit system 
Congressmen are not allowed to sign recommendations 
for office, except as to an applicant's character and resi- 
dence. J. D. Cox says (" North American Review," 
1871, p. 84) : "It is no uncommon thing for one who 
has written a high eulogium on the character and ac- 
quirements of a place-hunter, to write a private note 
begging that his formal indorsement may not be re- 
garded as of any weight, or to seek a private interview, 
in which he will state that the person is quite the re- 
verse of the picture drawn of him in the testimonial 
filed." Sometimes, says Mr. Cox, the President and his 
Secretaries are confronted by both the officeseeker and 
his sponsor, while in the drawer of the table at which 
they sit, listening to the latter's mock praises, is the be- 
fore mentioned private note contradicting every word 
uttered. It is not strange that Mr. Cox should say that 
Congressmen in those days (1869-70) often ajjologized 
for their importunity, nor that an effort was made to 
stop the disgraceful practice. Senator Lyman Trumbull 
introduced a bill in 1869 making it a misdemeanor for 

* The Chairman : The common question among employes is, " Who is 
your influence ? " 

Mr. Graves : That is a standard phrase in the Department, " Who is 
your influence ? " Where persons have very strong influence, they are 
apt, if any difficulty occurs in the Department, to threaten to go and get 
their " influence " and have the matter set right. Manliness and inde- 
pendence are destroyed by such a system. (Senate Keport No. 576, for 
1882, p. 132.) 

Mr. Edward 0. Graves at the time (1882) had had eighteen years' ex- 
perience in the Treasury Department at Washington. 



THE WHITE HOUSE BESIEGED. 69 

Congressmen to directly or indirectly recommend men 
for office, " except such recommendation be in wi'iting, 
in response to a written request from the President or 
head of a Department asking information, or a Senator 
giving his advice and consent in the manner provided 
by the Constitution." 

The unanimous report of the Senate Committee on 
Civil Service and Retrenchment,* made on May 15, 
1882, by Senator Hawley, both corroborates and supple- 
ments Mr. Cox's statements. The following extracts 
speak for themselves (Senate Report No. 576, for 1882, 
pp. 2, 3) : " It has come to pass that the work of paying 
political debts and discharging political obligations, of 
rewarding personal friends and punishing personal foes, 
is the first to confront each President on assuming the 
duties of his office. * * * Instead of the study of 
great questions of statesmanship, of broad and compre- 
hensive administrative policy, either as it may concern 
this particular country at home, or the relations of this 
great nation to the other nations of the earth, he must 
devote himself to the petty business of weighing in the 
balance the political considerations that shall determine 
the claim of this friend or that political supporter to the 
possession of some office of profit or honor under him. 
* * :j« ^Yi^Q executive mansion is besieged, if not 
sacked, and its corridors and chambers are crowded 
each day with the ever -changing but never-ending 
throng. Every Chief Magistrate, since the evil has 
grown to its present proportions, has cried out for de- 

* The Committee was composed of members of both parties as fol- 
lows : Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut, Chairman ; George H. Pendle- 
ton of Ohio, Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, John I. Mitchell of 
Pennsylvania, M, C. Butler of South Carolina, James D. Walker of 
Arkansas, John S. Williams of Kentucky, Edward H. Rollins of New 
Hampshire, and John P. Jones of Nevada. 



60 CONGRESSMEN HAtTNTED NIGHT AND DAY. 

liverance. Physical endurance even is taxed beyond its 
power. More than one President is believed to have 
lost his life from this cause. * * * 

" The malign influence of political domination in ap- 
pointments to office is wide-spread, and reaches out from 
the President himself to all possible means of approach 
to the appointing pov/er. It poisons the very air we 
breathe. No Congressman in accord with the dispenser 
of power can wholly escape it. It is ever present. 
When he awakes in the morning it is at his door, and 
when he retires at night it haunts his chamber. It goes 
before him, it follows after him, and it meets him on 
the way. It levies contributions on all the relationships 
of a Congressman's life, summons kinship and friend- 
ship and interest to its aid, and imposes upon him a 
work which is never finished, and from which there is 
no release. Time is consumed, strength is exhausted, 
the mind is absorbed, and the vital forces of the legisla- 
tor, mental as well as physical, are spent in the never- 
ending struggle for offices." 

Representative John J. Kleiner of Indiana declined a 
renomination for Congress in 1886 because of the an- 
noyance of officeseekers. As reported by many daily 
newspapers, he said : " It is no wonder to me that the 
House was charged with inefficiency last session. The 
Democratic members were kept so constantly engaged 
in looking after places for constituents that they had 
not time to give legislative subjects consideration. I 
know that I found it impossible to keep the run of cur- 
rent business. The greatest reform we could bring 
about would be to free Senators and Representatives of 
all responsibility as to the distribution of offices." 



CHAPTER V. 

THE DANGER OE AN OFFCEHOLDERS' ARISTOCRACY. 

The importance of the Subject. — The Cause of and Remedy for Aristoc- 
racies. — No danger in Life Tenures when based on Merit. — George 
William Curtis's opinion of them. — Insolence of Office. 

It is feared by some that the civil service law system 
will create an officeholders' aristocracy. This is a mat- 
ter of importance, and is not to be pooh-poohed, not- 
withstanding the fact that the same system has not only 
checked the English aristocracy's long monopoly of 
public office, but has, as before said, so purified the 
English civil service as to cause the annullment of the 
act of 1782, an act that disfranchised 40,000 customs, 
postoffice, and other officials for corrupt practices at 
elections. But the fear, it may as well be said first as 
last, so far as officeholders who draw low salaries are 
concerned, is certainly unfounded, notwithstanding of- 
ficeholders are human, and are therefore liable to err. 
The idea of an aristocracy of public inspectors, account- 
ants, weigiiers, clerks, &c., in this country, is almost 
ridiculous. It is as improbable perhaps as an aristoc- 
racy among soldiers, sailors, or private employes. Mr. 
E. L. Godkin says (" The Danger of an Officeholding 
Aristocracy," p. 13) : "There is no country in which it 
would be so hard for an aristocracy of any kind to be 
built up as this, and probably no class seeking to make 
itself an aristocracy Avould, in the United States, have a 
smaller chance of success than a body composed of un- 



62 THE EEAL AND THE APPARENT ARISTOCEAT. 

ambitious, quiet-minded, unadventurous government of- 
ficers, doing routine work on small salaries, and with 
but little chance or desire of ever passing from the em- 
ployed into the employing class. One might nearly as 
well try to make an aristocracy out of the college pro- 
fessors or public school teachers." Mr. T. A. Jenckes 
says ("Congressional Globe," 1869, p. 521) : "There is 
not enough in this aristocratical notion to bring out of 
it a new farce of * High Life below Stairs.' It runs 
itself into the ground without comicality." 

But the question, as before said, is a matter of impor- 
tance, for, as Mr. Godkin says, " Nothing is more difii- 
cult to eradicate than the remembrance of insulting 
treatment at the hands of an aristocracy of any kind." 
It has therefore a serious as well as a semi-comic aspect. 
The law may sooner or later be applied to officeholders 
who draw high salaries. This would put a different 
face on the matter, for high salaries certainly have 
a tendency to create aristocracies. Aristocracies may 
have their uses in some countries, but we certainly have 
no use for them in this country. They are stern reali- 
ties. They are as undemocratic as they are undesirable. 
They are antagonistic to American ideas and institu- 
tions. Therefore it is our duty to study the causes of 
aristocracies, in order that we may guard against them. 
Bat we must learn to discriminate between the real and 
the apparent aristocrat. For example, learned men are 
often denounced as aristocrats because they do not asso- 
ciate with the unlearned. This is a mistake, for it is 
as natural for learned men to associate together as it 
is for the unlearned to do so. Learned men are often 
emmently democratic, as indeed are many rich men. It 
IS the driving and selfish capitalist that is mostly to be 
feared. The idle and selfish capitalist is also bad, but 
is of course not so dangerous. - ^ 



THE CAUSE OF ARISTOCRACIES. 63 

What is the real cause of aristocracies ? Aristocra- 
cies are caused by great and broad distinctions between 
people. There are many causes for the distinctions be- 
tween people, but the chief cause is the possession by 
some people of more money and property and conse- 
quently greater power than others. What but money 
causes the aristocracies of monarchical Europe ? And 
what but money has planted a pale, sickly, mushroom- 
like variety of aristocracy in the uncongenial soil of 
republican America ? * 

* John W. Draper says (" History of the Intellectual Development of 
Europe," i, 252, 253): "An evil day is approaching when it becomes 
recognized in a community that the only standard of social distinction 
is wealth. That day was soon followed in Rome by its unavoidable 
consequence, a government founded upon two domestic elements, cor- 
ruption and terrorism. No language can describe the state of that cap- 
ital after the civil wars. The accumulation of power and wealth gave 
rise to a universal depravity. Law ceased to be of any value. A suitor 
must deposit a bribe before a trial could be had. The social fabric was 
a festering mass of rottenness. The people had become a populace ; 
the aristocracy was demoniac ; the city was a hell. No crime that the 
annals of human wickedness can show was left un perpetrated — re- 
morseless murders ; the betrayal of parents, husbands, wives, friends ; 
poisoning reduced to a system ; adultery degenerating into incests, and 
crimes that cannot be written. Women of the higher class were so 
lascivious, depraved, and dangerous that men could not be compelled 
to contract matrimony with them; marriage was displaced by concu- 
binage ; even virgins were guilty of inconceivable immodesties ; great 
officers of state and ladies of the court, of promiscuous bathings and 
naked exhibitions. In the time of Caesar it had become necessary for 
the government to interfere, and actually put a premium on marriage. 
* * * They (the women) actually reckoned the years, not by the 
consuls, but by the men they had lived with. To be childless, and 
therefore without the natural restraint of a family, was looked upon 
as a singular felicity. Plutarch correctly touched the point when he 
said that the Romans married to be heirs and not to have heirs. Of 
offenses that do not rise to the dignity of atrocity, but which excite our 
loathing, such as gluttony and the most debauched luxury, the annals 



64 THE WANING ENGLISH AKISTOCEJLCy 

These propositions being admitted, then it follows 
that if ever we have an officeholders' aristocracy in this 
country, it will be caused chiefly by money. Therefore 
the subject of ofiiceholders' salaries should receive care- 
ful attention. 

There is too much difference in officeholders' salaries. 
Some are too high and some are too low. * Of course 
all cannot be put on an exact equality, for, among other 
things, an officeholder's expenses must be taken into ac- 

of the times furnish disgusting proofs. It was said, ' They eat that 
they may vomit, and vomit that they may eat,' " 

Professor Draper quotes from Tacitus to prove that his statements 
are not exaggerated. The times described are before, during, and after 
the reign of Julius Caesar. 

It is related of Caesar that on receiving a letter one day in the Senate 
a fellow-Senator accused him of receiving communications from the en- 
emy. Caesar passed the document over to the Senator. It was a lewd 
letter from the Senator's own sister, and was flung back with the re- 
mark, " Take it, you sot ! " 

Mr. A. J. Mundella, a member of Parliament, in a lecture, in 1870, 
said : " Until long after the passing of the first reform bill, offices 
were the reward of political services, and very frequently of political 
dishonor. * * * Mr. Bright characterized our civil and military 
services as a system of out-door relief for the aristocracy." 

This is not complimentary to the English aristocracy ; nor is it en- 
couraging to would-be imitators of it here or elsewhere. It proves, if 
it proves anything, that while money may create an aristocracy, it can- 
not teach it how to use it. The words " political dishonor" may speak 
for themselves ; but they are no more applicable to an ai'istocracy than 
to any other class of people who are cursed by the patronage system. 
According to James Russell Lowell, the famous speeches of the Prince 
of Wales are written for hira by another man! (See "New York 
World," October 24, 1886, p. 9.) 

Note.— Learning that Mr. Lowell was greatly displeased with the 
"World's" article, I wrote to him and asked if the above statement 
was true. I did not receive a reply from hira. Therefore I take it 
for granted that Mr. Julian Hawthorne reported Mr. Lowell's words 
correctly. 

* Franklin deprecated high salaries (v, 147) ; Webster also (iv, 183). 



THE EVIL OF HIGH AND LOW SALARIES. 65 

count. But it is wrong to give one man from $10,000 to 
$50,000 a year, and another, in his way equally capable, 
reliable, and meritorious, only $500. No man with a fam- 
ily can live comfortably in this country on $500 a year. 
The claim sometimes made that competent men cannot 
be induced to accept office unless the salary is high, is 
usually not true. There are plenty of competent men 
who would be glad to fill some offices for a third of 
the present salary, and they could live comfortably and 
honestly too. No officeholder should receive greater 
compensation than the average sum paid for similar ser- 
vices, where there are such, in private business, and he 
should be held to as strict an accountability as to service 
as is the private employe.* It is a high salary and little 
work that make the aristocrat. Extremely high salaries 
are conducive of extravagance, a feeling of superiority, f 
and sometimes of the assumption of unwarrantable priv- 
ileges. Extremely low salaries are conducive chiefly of 
want and a feeling of inferiority. It is bad for the pub- 
lic service when some officials, because of high salaries, 
feel that they are autocrats instead of servants ; but it 

*Erastus Brooks, the veteran editor, who believed "in competitive 
test and standards of the persons appointed to all responsible places," 
writing on October 22, 1883, says (First Report New York State C. S. 
Com., p. 263): " Men in public service should receive no more favors, 
and no better pay, and serve neither more nor less time during the day 
or year, than is required of qualified and responsible men in the highest 
or comparative grades in commercial, mechanical, and general business 
life." 

f Nothing has so much to do with a man's manners as the manners 
of the society in which he lives, * * * The English or German 
official gives himself airs and thinks himself an aristocrat because, as a 
matter of fact, his official superiors are aristocrats, and the government 
is administered in all the higher branches by an aristocracy. * * * 
In any country in which politics is largely managed by an aristocracy, 
the aristocratic view of life is sure to permeate the civil as well as the 
military service, be the terms long or short. — E, L. Godkin, 



66 MEEIT LIFE TENlJEES DEMOCRATIC. 

is worse when others, because of low salaries, feel that 
they are menials, and are sometimes tempted to act dis- 
honestly. 

The way to remedy as well as to prevent an aristoc- 
racy is to remove its cause. Therefore the way to pre- 
vent an officeholders' aristocracy is to pay no extremely 
high or extremely low salaries. There is probably no 
immediate danger, but the principle is none the less 
sound, for aristocracies will disappear exactly in propor- 
tion as the distinctions between people disappear. An 
equitable readjustment of salaries is what is wanted.* 

The fear of an officeholders' aristocracy seems to be 
based chiefly on the life tenures of office that may occur 
under the civil service law system. But the fear, so far 
as life tenures, as such, are concerned, is certainly un- 
founded. Do not life tenures occur under all systems 
and in all governments ? But, unless the officeholder is 
eminently qualified to fill his office, is it not seldom that 
they occur in this government ? Therefore life tenures, 
when they are solely the reward of merit, are, on the 
whole, democratic instead of aristocratic. Such life 
tenures as these strengthen the government ; and any- 
thing that strengthens republican government is demo- 
cratic. 

But life tenures, even under the civil service law 
system, will probably be the exception rather than the 

*0n January 24, 181Y, on motion' of Representative Samuel McKee 
of Kentucky, the following resolution was passed by the national House 
of Representatives : 

Resolved, That the said Committee be instructed to inquire into the 
expediency of equalizing the pay and emoluments of the officers and 
persons employed in the civil, military, and naval departments of the 
government." 

The New York State Civil Service Commission recognizes the need of 
^' a judicious readjustment of salaries," (First Report, 1884, p. 4.) 



WHY LIFE TENURES WILL BE RARE. 6*7 

rule. Changes will occur. The characteristic ambition 
of Americans to better their condition in life will alone 
cause many resignations. Some will resign because a 
few years of experience in many public offices qualifies 
an intelligent and ambitious man to discharge the duties 
of better paying stations in private life ; * some will 
save their money and resign in order to establish them- 
selves in private business ; some will resign from sheer 
dislike of public life ; some from other causes, and 
some will doubtless be removed. 

George William Curtis says (" Civil Service Reform 
League Proceedings," 1884, pp. 11, 12): "The objec- 
tion which is expressed in the cry of ' life tenure ' and 
* a privileged class ' is one of the most ancient and 
familiar appeals of the spoils system to ignorance and 
prejudice. Whenever it has been proposed to recur to 
the constitutional principle and the early practice by 
treating the public clerk as the private clerk is treated, 
by ordaining that the public business shall be trans- 
acted upon business principles, and that filching politi- 
cians shall be forbidden to turn the public service to 
their private profit, we are told that a life tenure and a 
privileged class are odious and un-American, as if any- 
thing were so odious as a system tending to destroy the 
self-respect of public officers, or anything so really un- 
American as turning out an honest, efficient, and experi- 
enced agent because somebody else' wants his place. 
There can indeed be no life tenure in an offensive sense 
so long as the power of removal is unchecked except by 
a sole consideration for justice and the public service ; 
and the retention of a faithful, capable, and tried public 
servant confers no privilege which every such servant 
of every great corporation and of every great or small 

* A fact practically the same as the above is shown in Chapter II, 
page 30. 



68 tMe kind of coal-heavers wanted. 

business house, and of every well-ordered department 
of human industry, does not ah-eady enjoy. Of all the 
familiar tricks of the American demagogue none is 
more amusingly contemptible than the effort to show 
that a system which tends to promote a degrading loss 
of self-respect and a cringing dependence upon personal 
favor is peculiarly a manly and American system. It 
is a cry raised most vociferously by those who most 
despise and distrust the people, and as the sure and 
steady progress of reform plainly shows, it no more 
deceives and alarms an intelligent public opinion than 
the ridiculous assertion that civil service reform is a 
system which requires that a man shall pass a satisfac- 
tory examination in astronomy and the higher mathe- 
matics in order to be eligible to appointment as a night- 
watchman in the Custom House.* In the familiar story 

* On page 16 Mr. Curtis says : " The essential point is not to find 
coal-heavers who can scan Virgil correctly, but coal-heavers who, being 
properly qualified for heaving coal, are their own masters and not the 
tools of politicians." 

Mr. Curtis closes his address for 1885 in this lofty, hopeful, and pa- 
triotic strain : " Gentlemen, the stars in their courses fought against 
Sisera. But they fight for us. The desire of good government, of 
honest politics, of parties which shall be legitimate agencies of great 
policies ; all the high instincts of good citizenship ; all the lofty im- 
pulses of American patriotism, are the ' sweet influences ' that favor 
reform. Every patriotic American has already seen their power, 

" ' And by the vision splendid 
Is on his way attended.' 

*• Sir Philip Sidney wrote to his brother upon his travels, ' Whenever 
you hear of a good war, go to it.' That is the call which we have heard 
and obeyed. And a good war it has been, and is. Everywhere indeed 
there are signs of an alert and adroit hostility. They are the shots of 
outposts that foretell the battle. But everywhere also there are signs 
of the advance of the whole line, the inspiring harbingers of victory. 
Never was the prospect fairer. If the shadows still linger, the dawn is 
deepening,— the dawn that announces our sun of Austerlitz," 



^XGLIgH VIEW VERSUS AMiRldAif VIEW. 6§ 

the young lawyer was reminded by the judge that the 
court might be supposed to know some law. The 
American demagogue is incessantly taught by the ex- 
perience of this country that the American people may 
be supposed to have some common-sense." 

Mr. Curtis again says (C. S. R. L. Proceedings, 1885, 
p. 22) : " So long as the power of removal remains free, 
and while it is committed to agents appointed by of- 
ficers whom the people elect, a life tenure in any un- 
American or undesirable sense is impossible." 

The power of removal, for cause — and even without 
cause, if the chief ofiicer is willing to take the risk of 
abusing his power — is as free under the civil service law 
system as it is in private business. 

The view taken by the aristocracy of England, in 
1855, of the probable effect of the British civil service 
law was the opposite of that taken now by some Ameri- 
cans as to the probable effect of the American civil ser- 
vice law. The following extract from the Third An- 
nual Report of the United States Civil Service Com- 
mission (p. 31) speaks for itself: "The aristocratic 
classes, with many honorable exceptions, opposed the 
introduction of the merit system on the same ground 
that they opposed popular education at the public ex- 
pense ; that is, that both would weaken their means of 
controlling the government, at the same time that they 
would give greater opportunities and influence to the 
sons and daughters of the common people." 

" In a volume of official papers issued by the British 
government, in 1855, when the subject of introducing 
examinations was under consideration, it is declared 
that * The encouragement given to education would no 
doubt be great, but it will all be in favor of the lower 
classes of society and not of the higher. * * * ^p. 
pointments now conferred on young men of aristocratic 



10 EEMEDT FOB HABITTTAL INSOLENCE OE OFFICE. 

connection will fall into the hands of a much lowei' 
grade in society. * * * Such a measure will exercise 
the happiest influence on the education of the loioe^^ 
classes throughout England, acting by the surest of all 
motives, the desire a man has of bettering himself in 
life.' The volume shows that the examinations were 
opposed by the privileged classes because they foresaw 
that such would be the effects." 

It is an interesting question whether the civil service 
law system will or will not cause an increase in what 
Shakespeare calls " insolence of office," a phase of pub- 
lic life that is a kind of first cousin to an officeholders' 
aristocracy, with this distinction, that insolence is more 
the result of a personal than an official defect of charac- 
ter, and is therefore not so easily cured. " Nothing is 
older in story," says Mr. Godkin, " than the ' insolence 
of office.' We can go back to no time, in the annals of 
the Old World, when the man ' dressed in a little brief 
authority ' was not an object of popular odium." This 
seems to settle the question, if such a question can be 
settled, in favor of the civil service law system, for is it 
not reasonable that the man " dressed in a little brief 
authority," which is a good description of the usually 
precarious tenure of office under the ^^atronage system, 
is more likely to be insolent than the man who holds his 
office on condition of good behavior and efficient and 
faithful service ? Insolence is not good behavior. As 
before said, the defect is not easily cured, but the rem- 
edy for habitual insolence of office is removal. As a 
rule men of merit are not insolent. It is contrary to 
their nature. 



CHAPTER Yl. 

THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM^ 

The practicability of the System only Apparent. — General Jackson ver- 
sus President Jackson. — Probable causes of his Kadical Change. — 
Probable cause of Senator Marcy's use of the word "Spoils." — 
The spoils doctrine Undemocratic and Ruinous. — Appalling Cor- 
ruption at Washington after the Civil War. — The Civil Service 
Law a Rock to build upon. 

The patronage system of distributing public offices 
was first practiced in this country in the State of New 
York.* But as President Jackson was the first to prac- 

* Mr. George William Curtis says that in 1801 " the spoils system 
was as much in vogue in the State of New York as it ever has been in 
the country since. Under the old New York Council of Appointment a 
man could not be an auctioneer unless he was on the right side in poli- 
tics. * * * In our political history in New York, one of the amus- 
ing incidents is that the charter of the Manhattan Bank, which is one 
of the chief banks in the city of New York, was procured by Aaron 
Burr in what was really a charter for a water company. The trick was 
ventured in order to hide the fact that the persons who asked for this 
bank were of the wrong side in poHtics." (Senate Report No. 576, for 
1882, pp. 153, 154.) 

Mr. Dorman B, Eaton says : '• Unfortunately for the politics of New 
York, one of the first of her great politicians and officers was the most 
adroit and unscrupulous political manipulator this country has pro- 
duced. Aaron Burr was our first partisan despot. * * * Martin 
Van Buren, probably without knowing the true character of Burr, early 
became his admirer and follower. ' He learned his tactics from Aaron 
Burr.' He was so adroit in applying them to his own use, that as early 
as 1808 he got the office of Surrogate of Columbia county as the price 
of his support of Tompkins for Governor. This perhaps is the earliest 



^2 JOHN LAWEEKCE ON PATROifAG^:^. 

tice it nationally, the history of the beginning of the 
system naturally pertains chiefly to him and his admin- 
istration. 

The system, as explained by its advocates, and when 
abstractly considered, is apparently reasonable and prac- 
ticable. For example, its advocates say that when A is 
President, he should have none but his own political 

instance in our politics of an office, especially a judicial office, being 
pledged and delivered for political support." (" Spoils System," &c., 
pp. 4, 6.) 

" His (Jackson's) election was notoriously the work of Martin Van 
Buren, inspired by Aaron Burr, and with his inauguration was initiated 
a sordidly selfish political system entirely at variance with the broad 
views of Washington and of Hamilton." (" Atlantic Monthly," April, 
1880, p. 537.) 

" Among the maxims of Colonel Burr for the guidance of politicians, 
one of the most prominent was that the people at elections were to be 
managed by the same rules of discipUne as the soldiers of an army; 
that a few leaders were to think for the masses, and that the latter 
were to obey implicitly their leaders, and to move only at the word of 
command. He had therefore great confidence in the machinery of 
party, and that system of regular nominations in American politics of 
which he may perhaps be considered one of the founders. Educated as 
a military man, and imbibing his early views with regard to governing 
others in the camp, it is not surprising that Colonel Burr should have 
applied the rules of military hfe to politics." (" Statesman's Manual," 
ii, 1139.) 

Representative John Lawrence of New York appears to have ante- 
dated Aaron Burr several years in the advocacy of the patronage sys- 
tem. In the great debate in the first Congress (1789) on the power of 
removal he said (" Gales & Seaton's Debates," vol. i, pt. i, p. 504): " It 
has been said that if it (the power of removal) is lodged here (in the 
President), it will be subject to abuse ; that there may be a change of 
officers, and a complete revolution throughout the whole Executive De- 
partment on the election of every new President. I admit this may be 
the case, and I contend that it should be the case, if the President 
thinks it necessary. I contend that every President ought to have 
those men about him in whom he can place the most confidence, pro- 
Tided the Senate approve his choice," - 



PATEO:b^A(iE SYST:eM LEADS TO COKilUl*TlOK. IB 

friends in the subordinate as well as the chief offices at 
his disposal ; for in what other way, they ask, can he be 
responsible for the execution of the laws ? There is 
besides, they say, another advantage, for his political 
friends have a double incentive to be faithful and effi- 
cient — their own good names as well as that of the 
party in power. But this reasoning is fallacious. First, 
because the system is diametrically opposed to business 
principles ; second, because long and sad experience has 
proved, in this as well as in other nations, that it leads 
to corruption. 

Again, an equitable division of patronage between 
political parties, as was favored by President Jefferson 
and also Governor De Witt Clinton of New York, is 
politically fair, and might lessen the evils of the wholly 
partisan system. But, like the preceding proposition, it 
is not in accordance with sound business principles. 

General Jackson's preaching and President Jackson's 
practicing were very different. General Jackson, writ- 
ing from Washington, in 1804, said (Parton's " Life of 
Jackson," i, 237) ; " Of all characters my feelings de- 
spise a man capable of cringing to power for a benefit 
or office. Such characters are * * * badly calculated 
for a representative system. * * * Merit alone should 
lead to preferment." The General desired to be Gover- 
nor of Louisiana Territory, but he doubted the propri- 
ety of calling on the President in the capacity of an 
officeseeker. " Before I would violate my ideas of pro- 
priety," he said, " I would yield up any office in the 
government." Writing to President-elect Monroe, in 
1816, he said (ii, 360): "Everything depends on the 
selection of your ministry. In every selection party and 
party feeling should be avoided. Now is the time to 
exterminate the mo?ister called party spirit. * * * 
The Chief Magistrate of a great and powerful natioji 



'74 PlfeESlBEKT JACKSON FIGHTS POLITICALLY. 

should never indulge in party feeling." In 1829 Presi- 
dent Jackson practiced almost the reverse of what he 
preached in 1804 and 1816. His most notable departure 
was the removal of hundreds of faithful civil service 
officials, and for purely partisan reasons. 

What caused this change? There may have been 
many causes, but the chief cause was probably the fol- 
lowing. During the campaign of 1828 some newspapers 
abused the General's wife, and even assailed the memory 
of his dead mother.* This was bad enough, but the 
death of Mrs. Jackson, which was accelerated if not 
caused by campaign abuse, was too much for human 
nature. General Jackson had years before killed Charles 
Dickinson in a duel on account of trouble that probably 
originated in the latter's alleged abuse of Mrs. Jackson. 
He could not now fight his enemies personally, but he 
could and did fight them politically ; f and under such 
circumstances it was as natural for him to fight them as 
it was for him to fight Dickinson or the British at New 
Orleans. 

Are not these facts alone sufficient to account for the 



* Mrs. Jackson, whom Major Lewis describes as " that good woman," 
once, in 1828, found her husband in tears. Pointing to a newspaper 
paragraph, he said : " Myself I can defend, you I can defend, but now 
they have assailed even the memory of my mother." (iii, 141.) 

Mr. Parton, speaking of Mrs. Jackson, says (iii, 154): "Perhaps, if 
the truth were known, it would be found that she is not the only female 
victim of our indecent party contentions." 

f The <' Atlantic Monthly," in speaking of the life and death of Mrs. 
Jackson, says (April, 1880, pp. 53Y, 538) : " Her sorrow-stricken hus- 
band came to Washington with a stern determination to punish those 
who had mahgned her during the preceding campaign ; and those who 
eulogized her always found favor with him." 

The Washington " Telegraph " said : " We know not what line of 
policy General Jackson will adopt. We take it for granted, however, 
that he will reward his friends and punish his eftemies," 



Major lewis differs with jacksok ^S 

change ? In fact does not the General's high character 
preclude almost any other explanation of it ? But the 
General's own words are the most convincing. For 
example, shortly after his inauguration he told a promi- 
nent and faithful official, Colonel Thomas L. McKenney, 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, that he was charged 
with being " one of tlie principal promoters of that vile 
paper, We the People^ in which my wife Rachel was so 
shamefully abused." (iii, 216.) 

Thus did a wrong beget a wrong. Thus did a private 
curse become a public curse. In a word, thus did like 
beget like. Mr. Parton says President Jackson " was a 
sick, unhappy, and perplexed old man, * * * ahvays 
mourning for his dead wife." 

President Jackson's course, which was at war with 
that of all his predecessors in office, and even, as has 
been shown, with his own sentiments as expressed in 
1804 and 1816, was condemned by many of his contem- 
poraries, as is shown by extracts from their works in 
this and the two succeeding chapters. 

Major William B. Lewis, the man, says Mr. Parton 
(iii, 224), who contributed the most to General Jack- 
son's election to the presidency, and his most intimate 
and constant companion, wrote to him as follows : "■ In 
relation to the principle of rotation * * * I hold it to 
be fraught with the greatest mischief to the country. 
* * * Whenever the impression shall become gen- 
eral that the government is only valuable on account 
of its offices, the great and paramount interests of the 
country will be lost sight of, and the government itself 
ultimately destroyed." 

Another material cause of President Jackson's change 
of policy — namely, the influence over him of Mr. Martin 
Van Buren — is best described in the words of members 
of the United States Senate, who were considering, in 



*^6 Me. yan bueek ceiticised. 

1832, the confirmation of the latter gentleman as Minis- 
ter to England. 

Senator Clay of Kentucky said (" Gales & Seaton's 
Debates in Congress," 1831-32, vol. viii, pt. i, p. 1324) : 
" I have another objection to this nomination. I be- 
lieve * * * that to this gentleman is principally to be 
ascribed the introduction of the odious system of pro- 
scription for the exercise of the elective franchise. I 
understand that it is the system on which the party in 
his own State, of which he is the reputed head, con- 
stantly acts. He was among the first of the Secretaries 
to apply that system to the dismission of clerks in his 
department, known to me to be highly meritorious, and 
among them one who is now a representative in the 
other House. It is a detestable system, drawn from the 
worst periods of the Roman republic, and if it were to 
be perpetuated, * * * our government would finally 
end in a despotism as inexorable as that at Constanti- 
nople." * 

Senator Samuel A. Foot of Connecticut went even 
further in his criticisms of Mr. Van Buren than Senator 
Clay. He said (Same Debates, p. 1328) : " In my opin- 
ion there is not a Senator on this floor, or any other 
careful observer, who has noticed the proceedings of 
this administration from its commencement, who is not 
fully convinced that there had been * behind the throne 
a power greater than the throne itself,' which has di- 

*Mr. Clay, in a speech delivered on June 21, 1840, relates the fol- 
lowing extraordinary case of court-martial (" Speeches," ii, 203) : " Two 
officers of the army of the United States have been put upon their sol- 
emn trial, on the charge of prejudicing the Democratic party by making 
purchases for the supply of the array from members of the Whig party ! 
* * * And this trial was commenced at the instance of a Committee 
of a Democratic Convention, and conducted and prosecuted by them." 

The trial took place at Baltimore, where the Convention met. 



HE FLATTERS PRESIDENT JACKSON. ^*J 

reeled most of its movements. I will not say there is 
le2:al evidence sufficient to convict a man before a court 
of justice ; but there is enough to produce conviction in 
my mind, and I sincerely believe that General Jackson 
came to this place fully determined to remove no man 
from office but for good cause of removal. I am fully 
convinced that the whole ' system of proscription ' owes 
its existence to Martin Van .Buren ! that the dissolution 
of the Cabinet was effected by his management, and for 
his benefit ! and that the hand of the late Secretary of 
State may be traced distinctly in another affair, which 
has produced an alienation between the first and second 
officers of the government, and also * * * for the 
great abuse of the patronage of the government ! " 

Senator George Poindexter of Mississippi said, among 
other things, that Mr. Yan Buren, "whose whole course 
was marked by a systematic tissue of dark and studied 
intrigue," had "seized on circumstances which pre- 
existed his induction into office, novel in their character 
in this country, but familiar at the court of Louis the 
Fifteenth, in France, and of Charles the Second of Eng- 
land, by means of which he contrived to ' ride upon the 
whirlwind and direct the storm,' and to render the cred- 
ulous* and confiding chief, whose weakness he flattered 
and whose prejudices he nourished, subservient to all 
his purposes, personal and political. * * * Possessed, 
as he was, of the unlimited confidence of General Jack- 
son, he very soon found free access to his ear, and, by 
appropriate advances, led him into excesses and errors 

* David Crockett says (" Life of Martin Van Buren," p. 12) : " For a 
man that has as much resolution and fight in hira as General Jackson, 
there never was one that was so easy to be duped." 

Colonel Crockett served under General Jackson during the Creek In- 
dian w-ir of 1813, His " Life of Martin Van Buren" is unique if not 
unprejudiced q,nd exhaustive, 



VS SENATOR FORSYTH'S TWISTED ARGUMENT. 

fatal to the tranquillity of the country, without affording 
the slightest evidence that he in any manner participated 
in producing the results which he anxiously desired to 
accomplish. The prescriptive policy, pushed, as it was, 
to extremities which the public interest did not seem to 
require, and far beyond the practice of any other Chief 
Magistrate, has been universally attributed to the advice 
and influence of Mr. Van Buren. This system, com- 
bined with the whole patronage of government, was, as 
far as practicable, placed at his discretion, to smooth 
the way to the ulterior object of his ambition." (pp. 
1340, 1341, 1342.) 

Senator John Forsyth of Georgia, who favored Mr. 
Yan Buren's confirmation, in reply to Mr. Poiudexter, ^ 
said (p. 1346) : " What, sir, the most artful man in the 
world proclaim to a paltry editor that he acted in the 
manner indicated to escape the storm consequent on the 
dissolution of the Cabinet ! " And yet on the very next 
page he says : " He is called an artful man — a giant of 
artifice — a wily magician. From whom does he receive 
these opprobrious names ? From open enemies and pre- 
tended friends." 

Senator Stephen D. Miller of South Carolina said (pp. 
1372, 1373) : " Sir, one of the most decided objections I 
have to the confirmation of this appointment is that the 
patronage of the government was exercised with a view 
to make this nominee, at the end of the present incum- 
bent's term of office, the President. I believe this power 
was exercised to a criminal extent. * * * I do not 
think the power to turn out one man and put in another, 
as a mere arbitrary exercise of executive authority, does 
exist. * * * J think it a violation of the Constitution. 
* * * It is the essence of tyranny." 

Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina said (p. 
138]) he had no 4oubt that Mr. Van Buren had a4- 



MR. VAN BUREN PHILOSOPHIZED ON PATRONAGE. V9 

vanced " himself at the expense of all who were sup- 
posed to stand in his way ; and, what is worse, at the 
expense of the success of the administration, and at the 
imminent hazard to the best interests of the country." 
He further said that he believed " that Mr. Van Buren, 
while Secretary of State, used the influence derived 
from his high office for the purpose of controlling in- 
juriously the domestic and social relations of this com- 
munity ;* and that his conduct was in other respects 
inconsistent with the dignity of his station and the 
character of the country." 

Kepresentative Henry A. Wise of Virginia, speaking, 
in 1836, of Mr. Van Buren, said (Same Debates, vol. 
xiii, pt. i, p. 1066) that he held him " responsible for 
most mischief that has been done, and most that is now 
doing," and that he was " elected by executive patron- 
age, corruption, and dictation." 

Mr. James Parton, speaking of Martin Van Buren, 
says ("Life of Jackson," iii, 120): "How are we to 
know anything about a man who was supposed to excel 
all men in concealing his motives and his movements?" 

Again (p. 126) Mr. Parton says that President Van 
Buren, speaking of official patronage, once said : " I 
prefer an office which has no patronage. When I give 
a man an office, I offend his disappointed competitors 
and their friends, and make enemies of the man I re- 
move and his friends. Nor am I certain of gaining a 
friend in the man I appoint, for in all probability he 
expected something better." 

I wrote to Mr. Parton and asked him where he got 

* " It is odd enough," wrote Daniel Webster to a personal friend, 
" that the consequence of this dispute in the sociable and fashionable 
world is producing great political effects, and may very probably deter- 
mine who shall be successor to the present Chief Magistrate." (" At- 
lantic Monthly," April, 1880. 



80 A GOOD WOED TOE ME. VAN BtTEEN. 

his information concerning Mr. Van Buren's opinion of 
the drawbacks of official patronage. With his permis- 
sion, I give his reply in full. 

Newbukyport, Mass., August 24, 1887. 

Dear /Sir: Martin Van Buren, I think, was a far more 
respectable human being than many of his more gifted 
contemporaries, such as Webster, Clay, Calhoun, and 
others. The best and fairest view of him is given by 
himself in his work entitled "Inquiry into the Origin 
and Course of Political Parties in the United States," 
N. Y., 1867. He was a good democrat, but fell upon a 
difficult time, inherited a developing system, and had 
very strict personal limitations. I believe it was the 
late Coventry Waddell (the " X. Clark " of Chap, xix, 
vol. iii, of my Jackson), who told me Van Buren's re- 
marks on appointments to office. 

All the men who surrounded Jackson in 1829 knew 
very well that Jackson alone had the courage and har- 
dihood to introduce the system of turning out political 
opponents from minor offices. It was his fell work, and 
his alone. All was done to wreak revenge upon Clay 
for wrongs purely imaginary. If he turned out a post- 
master in Kentucky, he thought he was hitting Henry 
Clay. 

I hope you will put all your force into the work in 
hand. If the people of free countries cannot learn to 
be good employers of labor, freedom is not for man. 
Very truly yours, 

JAMES PARTON. 

Mr. Parton is a stanch opponent of the patronage sys- 
tem, and he devotes much space in his " Life of Jack- 
son" to a scathing denunciation and exposure of it. 
He attributes its origin to Aaron Burr, and says that 
Martin Van Buren "learned his tactics from Burr." 



SENATOR MARCY'S FAMOUS SPEECH. 81 

His portrayal of what he calls the " Burrian Code," is 
an excellent description of the patronage system in its 
worst form. 

It was during the debate on Mr. Van Buren's con- 
firmation that Senator William L. Marcy of New York, 
in reply to Senator Clay, made his famous spoils doc- 
trine speech, the gist of which is as follows (G. & S.'s 
Debates, vol. viii, pt. i, p. 1326) : 

"It may be, sir, that the politicians of the United 
States are not so fastidious as some gentlemen are as 
to disclosing the principles on which they act. They 
boldly preach what they practice. When they are con- 
tending for victory, they avow their intention of enjoy- 
ing the fruits of it. If they are defeated, they expect 
to retire from office. If they are successful, they claim, 
as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They 
see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victor belong 
the spoils of the enemy."* 

Mr. Parton ("Life of Jackson," iii, 377) says that 
Senator Marcy, when writing out his speech, said he 
would willingly recall the last quoted words. President 
Madison says (iv, 357) ; "The first, I believe, who pro- 
claimed the right, is now the most vehement in brand- 
ing the practice." I wrote to Mr. Parton and asked 

* Mr, Marcy, whose speech was mostly in reply to Mr. Clay, said that 
Mr. Clay's " own political friends " had practiced the patronage system 
in- Kentucky. Mr. Clay said (p. 1356): "It is not practiced in Ken- 
tucky by the State government when in the hands of the opposition to 
this administration. Very lately Governor Metcalfe has appointed to 
one of the three highest judicial stations in the State a supporter of 
this administration. * * * The Governor also renewed the appoint- 
ment, or commissioned several gentlemen opposed to him in politics, as 
State attorneys. And recently th,' Legislature appointed a President of 
one of the banks from the ranks of one of the friends of this adminis- 
tration, and several other officers." 



82 MRS. MAECY VERSUS MR. MARCY. 

him what he thought of Mr. Madison's statement. In 
a letter dated May 4, 1886, he said : " Mr. Marcy, as I 
understood, did not renounce the doctrine of the spoils, 
but merely regretted the blunt, impolitic words in which 
he expressed the same. He was simply too honest a 
man to alter or recall his words. My impression is that 
he lived and died a spoilsman." 

The word spoils, if not military, is frequently used 
by military men. Therefore its use by the soldier- 
statesman Marcy was perhaps only the result of habit. 
Here is an example of his use of military figures of 
speech (Curtis's " Life of James Buchanan," ii, 36) : 
" This little battery has kept up a brisk fire for you. 
* * * For want of experience you do not know the 
potency of such an adversary. An enemy in the camp 
is more dangerous than one outside of it." Here are 
three military figures of speech in almost as many lines. 

"This little battery," which was "an enemy in the 
camp," was Mj^s. Marcy ^ and the gentleman in whose 
behalf she " kept up a brisk fire," and to whom Mr. 
Marcy was writing, was James Buchanan, a bachelor ^ 
and Mr. Marcy''s rival for the then coming Democratic 
presidential nomination of 1852'. The letter is as hu- 
morous as it is kind and noble. 

In the political lottery of 1852-53 Governor Marcy 
drew the prize of Secretary of State, and it is note- 
worthy that he told Mr. Buchanan some months after 
accepting the ofiice that, on account of ofliceseekers and 
Cabinet Councils, " he had not been able to devote one 
single hour together to his proper ofiicial duties." (ii, 
81.) So his change of mind, if it came at all, must have 
come late in life. 

Senator Marcy was not the first person to distinguish 
himself during the Jackson administration by making 
pointed and figurative spoils doctrine speeches. Gover- 



ANOTHER SPOILS DOCTRINE SPEECH. 8S 

nor John Reynolds of Illinois relates the following by 
Lieutenant Governor William Kinney of Illinois (" My 
Own Times," p. 185) : " Governor Kinney* had been to 
the city of Washington at the inauguration of General 
Jackson, and had considerable agency at the Federal 
city in the proscription visited on the Whigs of Illinois, 
It was said he remarked that the Whigs should be 
whipped out of office like dogs out of a meat-house." 

On page 199 Governor Reynolds says (inaugural ad- 
dress) : '■' My official care and patronage shall not be 
exclusively bestowed upon a few men, and on a partic- 
ular section of the State, and proscribe the balance. 
Proscription for opinion's sake is, in ray opinion, the 
worst enemy to a republic. It is the birthright of every 
freeman to express his political sentiments frankly and 
freely at the polls of an election, or elsewhere, without 
the hope of reward or the fear of punishment." 

President Lincoln, like President Jackson, preached 
one thing and practiced another. His administration, 
so far as political parties are concerned, is therefore par- 
allel with and an offset to President Jackson's. Writing 
to Congressman John T. Stuart of Illinois, on December 
17, 1840, he said ("Century Magazine," January, 1887, 
p. 377) : 

" This affair of appointments to office is very annoy- 
ing — more so to you than to me doubtless. I am, as 
you know, opposed to removals to make places for our 
friends." 

* As Governor Reynolds merely says " Governor Kinney," I wrote to 
the Chicago Historical Society and asked when Mr. Kinney was Gover- 
nor of Illinois. In reply the Secretary, Mr. Albert D. Eager, said: 
" ' Governor Kinney of Illinois' is a myth. On the 6th of December, 
1826, at the time Ninian Edwards was inaugurated Governor of Illinois, 
William Kinney of St. Clair county was installed Lieutenant Governor, 
and held the position till December 9, 1830." 



84 LAMON'S DAIRK PiCTtTBE OF LIKCOLN. 

President Lincoln, however, unlike President Jackson, 
made what is called "a clean sweep," that. is, he prac- 
ticed the patronage system to its full extent. Bat he 
appears to have regretted his course, and to have had 
his early convictions confirmed by experience. In 1865, 
pointing toward a group of ofiiceseekers, he said : " Be- 
hold this spectacle ! We have conquered the rebellion ; 
but here is a greater danger to the country than was 
the rebellion." Senator Charles Sumner vouched for 
these w^ords to Senator Carl Schurz. Again, shortly be- 
fore the fall of Richmond, Mr. Lincoln left Washington 
for City Point, Virginia, partly, he said, to be near 
the important military operations then in progress and 
partly to get away from the ofiiceseekers. To the then 
General Schurz, speaking of ofiiceseeking, he said : " I 
am afraid that thing is going to ruin republican govern- 
ment," and much more to the same effect, says Mr. 
Schurz in a letter of April 30, 1886. And again. Ward 
H. Laraon says President Lincoln said that if ever the 
government was overthrown it would be caused by " the 
voracious desire of ofiice — this wriggle to live without 
toil, from which I am not free myself."* 

* Ward H. Lamon says ("Life of Lincoln," pp. 237, 483, 480, 481, 
242): "There is no instance where an important office seemed to be 
within his reach and he did not try to get it. * * * Notwithstanding 
his overweening ambition, he had not a particle of sympathy with the 
great mass of his fellow-citizens who were engaged in similar scrambles 
for place. When a candidate himself, he thought the whole canvass 
ought to be conducted with reference to his success. He would "say to 
a man, ' Your continuance in the field injures me,' and be quite sure he 
had given a perfect reason for his withdrawal. He did nothing out of 
mere gratitude, iind forgot the devotion of his warmest partisans as 
soon as the occasion for their services was past. What they did for 
him was quietly appropriated as the reward of superior merit, calling 
for no return in kind. * * * It was seldom that he praised anybody; 
and when he did, it was not a rival or an equal in the struggle for pop- 



LINCOLK ABUSES HIS LADY-LOVE. 85 

A few more words concerning the rise, progress, and 
probable fall of the patronage system in this country is 
not inappropriate as a conclusion to this chapter. 

The doctrine that to the victors belong the spoils, 
which, as before said, was first practiced nationally in 
this country by President Jackson, has probably had 
its day. If it has, it is well. Like the doctrine itself, 
spoils is a bad word. It is synonymous with robbery, 
pillage, destruction ! It is suggestive of the days of 

ularity and power. No one knew better how to ' damn with faint 
praise,' or to divide the glory of another by being the first and frankest 
to acknowledge it. His encomiums were sometimes mere strategems to 
catch the applause he pretended to bestow. * * * Fully alive to the 
fact that no qualities of a public man are so charming to the people as 
simplicity and candor, he made simplicity and candor the mask of deep 
feelings carefully concealed and subtle plans studiously vailed from all 
eyes but one." 

His private life appears to have been, in some respects, as false as 
his public life, Mr. Lamon says : " For many reasons the publication of 
this letter (a document which sheds so broad a light on one part of his 
life and one phase of his character), is an extremely painful duty. If it 
could be withheld, and the act decently reconciled to the conscience of 
a biographer professing to be honest and candid, it should never see 
the light of these pages. Its grotesque humor, its coarse exaggerations 
in describing the person of a lady w^honi the writer was wilhng to marry, 
its imputation of toothless and weather-beaten old age to a woman really 
young and handsome," &c. (The letter is too long and irrelevant for 
insertion here. The picture is black enough without it.) 

His final marriage looks like retributive justice. Mr, Lamon says: 
" The marriage of Mr. Lincoln and Mary was quick and sudden — one or 
two hours' notice. How poor Mr. Lincoln felt about it may be gathered 
from the reminiscences of his friend, J. H. Matheny, who says that 
Lincoln and himself, in 1842, were very friendly; that Lincoln came to 
him one evening and said: 'Jim, I will have to marry that girl.' He 
was married that evening, but Matheny says * he looked as if he was 
going to the slaughter.' " 

It was fitting that such a spoils administration should end in the rob- 
bery of the White House. 

( ■ ■ 'i 

( 'I 



86 THE EUN'MAD PATRONAGE SYSTEM 

Nero. It is akin to barbarism, not to civilization. It 
is adapted to war and a description of war times, not to 
peace. If Americans, when talking about public offices, 
would stop to think of the exact meaning of this word, 
it would no longer mar our political vocabulary. In 
private life what chance of success would a man have 
who, when he applied for employment, talked about the 
spoils of private business? Of course he would have 
none. Then why should such a man have a chance in 
public life? Is not the spoils system as unreasonable, 
reprehensible, and ruinous in public as in private busi- 
ness ? If it is, then is it not undemocratic ? And being 
undemocratic, does it not logically follow that it is un- 
American ? If a system is wrong, is not the true rem- 
edy the application of a precisely opposite system ? Is 
not the civil service law system the precise opposite of 
the patronage system ? If it is, then is it not both dem- 
ocratic and American ? But some people say it is both 
undemocratic and un American, Can this be possible ? 
If Washington, the Adamses, Jefferson, Madison, Mon- 
roe, Franklin, Jay, Hamilton, Gallatin, Quincy, Web- 
ster, Clay, Calhoun, Benton, Barton, Bell, and the many 
other statesmen and patriots whose words of wisdom 
are quoted in this volume, are not specimen democrats 
and Americans, then who are ? 

We now come to a period in the history of the gov- 
ernment when the patronage system reached its natural 
and legitimate conclusion ; that is, it became a system 
of spoils. The patronage system is bad enough, but 
the spoils system is the patronage system run mad. 
The patronage pandemonium reached its hight appar- 
ently during the administration of President Johnson, 
who, on account of the then peculiar and extraordinary 
state of national affairs, made nearly as many official 
removals as if he had been the leader of a new party. 



DESCEIBED BY JACOB D. COX. 87 

But some of his appointments were caused by resigna- 
tions instead of removals. Ttie resignations were caused 
by dissatisfaction with President Johnson's change of 
policy ; for after his war passions cooled down, he 
chose to stand, as it were, almost between rather than 
on the side of either the Kepublican or Democratic 
party. And thus was this iron-willed and tried Union 
man enabled, despite the intense turmoil and strife of 
the times, and despite his naturally combative nature, 
to pursue a comparatively conservative course till the 
passions of the people had also cooled down. Person- 
ally Andrew Johnson was incorruptible ; but the cor- 
ruption among officeseekers during his administration, 
and for some years afterward, caused as much perhaps 
by the demoralization of the unparalleled civil war that 
had just closed as by the then runrmad patronage sys- 
tem, and aggravated by the complications of reconstruc- 
tion and the President's quarrel with and impeachment 
by Congress, was simply appalling. Much documen- 
tary evidence might be cited, but the testimony of 
one person will suffice. Jacob D. Cox, a distinguished 
Union soldier, who was a State Senator in Ohio before 
the war. Governor of Ohio after the war (1866), and 
Secretary of the Interior in 1869, says ('^ North Ameri- 
can Review," 18'71, pp. 87, 88) : 

" During Mr. Johnson's administration * * * a con- 
dition of things existed which rivals the most corrupt 
era that can be found in the history of any nation. 
Men were known to offer $5,000 for the influence which, 
might secure an appointment to a ganger's situation in 
the revenue service, where $1,500 was the limit of the 
pay that could be honestly earned, and when it was 
morally certain that the advent of a new administration 
would terminate the employment within a year. This is 



§8 FRANKLIN'S WARNING VOICli. 

simply a type of similar transactions extending through 
many grades of the public service." 

Speaking of the duplicity used to obtain " an appoint- 
ment from one end of the Avenue and a confirmation 
from the other," Mr. Cox says (p. 87) : 

" In many instances two wholly separate sets of recom- 
mendations were procured, one proving that the appli- 
cant was a faithful supporter of the President, the other 
proving him an utter despiser of the presidential policy. 
More than this, it may be easily proven that one or the 
other party was often cognizant of the fraud perpetra- 
ted, and the partisans of either side congratulated each 
other that an appointment or a confirmation had been 
procured by which the other party was completely 
cheated. * * * it was a game of ' diamond cut 
diamond,' in which the two parties were using all the 
resources and refinements of intrigue to get the start of 
the other in the control of the ofiices."* 

The spoils doctrine has done more perhaps to corrupt 

* Benjamin Franklin, addressing the Constitutional Convention of 
1787 on the subject of salaries, seems to have had a prevision of the 
scenes above described. He said ("Franklin's Works," v, 145): "Sir, 
there are two passions which have a powerful influence in the affairs of 
men. These are ' ambition ' and ' avarice ' — the love of power and the 
love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting 
men to action ; but when united in view of the same object, they have 
in many minds the most violent effects. Place before such men a 
post of ' honor,' that shall at the same time be a place of ' profit,' and 
they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. * * * 

And of what kind are the men who will strive for this profitable pre- 
eminence ? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace 
and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and 
the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in 
their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your govern- 
ment and be your rulers." 



THE EVILS OP SPOILS SCHEMES INSIDIOUS. 89 

American politics than all other causes combined. Its 
evils, which are reflected in the darkest pages of the 
world's history, are insidious. This fact has just been 
well illustrated, for what did the general public know, 
at the time, of the corruption described by Mr. Cox ? 
Again, who but the principals and their accomplices 
would know of the corruption of New York's fugitive 
(1884) Aldermen, if the facts had not been published? 
Further, spoils and insidious spoils schemes are not con- 
fined to public business. Many are private, or semi- 
private ; such, for example, as the numerous " rings " 
and monopolies throughout the country, the corruption 
of many of which has been exposed by newspapers dur- 
ing the past twenty-five years. 

But, as before said, this bad doctrine, which for full 
fifty years hung over the nation like the black clouds 
that precede as well as attend the coming storm, but no 
blacker than the picture of partisan patronage just por- 
trayed, has probably had its day. And again, as before 
said, if it has, it is well, for fifty years more of such 
corruption would imperil the safety of the nation.* 
Fortunately a welcome, timely, and salutary change 
has come. The beclouded skies are slowly but surely 
clearing, and the outlook is hopeful. A great political 
storm is subsiding and is being succeeded by a political 
sunshine that not only makes the dangers through which 
we have passed plainer, but is teaching us how to avoid 
them in the future. 

Our course is plain. The civil service law, in order 
to make it a complete success, must be enforced and 
perfected and its scope gradually increased. Its en- 
forcement will naturally lead to its perfection, and its 

* Doubts may well be entertained whether our government could sur- 
vive the strain of a continuance of this system. — Grover Cleveland, 



^0 SOMETHING BETTER THAN OFFICEHOLDING. 

perfection to its increase of scope. As before said, tlie 
law has made a good beginning. It must also make a 
good ending. The increase of its usefulness must not 
cease till it has utterly destroyed the political dragon 
that has done so much to degrade American politics. 
Safety itself demands that, no matter what the circum- 
stances may be, a repetition of the scenes described by 
Mr. Cox shall be rendered impossible. This, notwith- 
standing it requires the practical abolition of the pat- 
ronage system, is not as difficult as it seems. When 
business men and business men only, without regard to 
politics, fill all non-political public offices, the patronage 
system will be practically dead, and the complete reform 
of the civil service will be a question of only a few 
years. 

The civil service law promises to gradually accom- 
plish this result. It will then have been carried to its 
legitimate conclusion. And it is well. There is some- 
thing higher, better, and more important for Americans 
than ordinary officeholding.* The time and talent here- 
tofore spent in striving for office can hereafter be more 
usefully devoted to studying the exact nature of public 
grievances and to originating corrective measures for 
them. This is noble, patriotic, and useful work, for it 
subserves the interests of the people as a body. Ameri- 
cans who are not already qualified, should qualify them- 
selves for this work In short, they should* imitate the 
statesmen whose wise words and examples are given in 
the succeeding as well as other chapters of this volume. 

* The support which has been given to the present administration in 
its efforts to preserve and advance this reform * * * should con- 
firm our belief that there is a sentiment among the people better than a 
desire to hold office, and a patriotic impulse upon which may safely rest 
the integrity of our institutions and the strength and perpetuity of our 
government,— Grover Cleveland, 



CHAPTER YIL 

LEADING STATESMEN'S PEINCIPLES. 

The Merit System both Preached and Practiced by the six first Presi- 
dents (forty years). — Powerful blows at the Patronage S3'Stem. — 
A profound disquisition on its Evils by William Paley of England 
(1785). — James Wilson on Patronage and Official Appointments. 

President Washington's tliree cardinal rules were 
(" Writings," ix, 479) : 1. He would not be under en- 
gagements to any person. 2. He would not be influ- 
enced by " ties of family blood." 3. Three things were 
to be considered : (a) Fitness, (b) The " comparative 
merits and sufferings in service." (c) The equal distri- 
bution of appointments among the States. 

It is noteworthy that the civil service law is practic- 
ally the same as the three last requirements. It is there- 
fore Washingtonian. 

President John Adams went into office with the " de- 
termination to make as few removals as possible — not 
one from personal motives, not one from party consid- 
erations" (ix, 47). But he would not countenance " mis- 
conduct in office," and he removed "several officers at 
Portsmouth " because their " daily language," reported 
to him, implied "aversion if not hostility to the govern- 
ment." 

President Jefferson's principles are expressed in thirty- 
three words, thus (iv, 391) : " Good men, in whom there 
is no objection but a difference of political principle, 
practiced only as far as the right of a private citizen 



92 JEFFERSON, MADISON, MONEOE, J. Q. ADAMS. 

will justify, are not proper subjects of removal." Re- 
ferring to removals from office, Jefferson says (iv, 409) : 
" I had foreseen, years ago, that the first Republican 
President * * * would have a dreadful operation to 
perform." The Marshals removed by him were charged 
with packing juries. When urged by a representative 
of the Tammany Society of Baltimore to remove Feder- 
alists from office, the philosopher said (Parton's "Life 
of Jefferson," p. 611) : '* What is the difference between 
denying the right of suffrage and punishing a man for 
exercising it by turning him out of office ?" 

President Madison, writing to Edward Coles, August 
29, 1834, said (iv, 356) : "You call my attention, with 
much emphasis, to the principle * * * that offices 
were the spoils of victory. * * * j fully agree in all 
the odium you attach to such a rule. * * * The prin- 
ciple could not fail to degrade any administration." 

President Monroe says (Gilman's " Monroe," p. 202) : 
" No person at the head of the government has, in my 
opinion, any claim to the active partisan exertions of 
those in office under him." 

President John Quincy Adams, not only refused to 
remove political opponents, but he even refused to re- 
move a naval officer who had been concerned in an 
unexecuted project to insult one of his (Adams's) polit- 
ical friends. He says (Morse's "Adams," p. 180) : "I 
have been urged to sweep away my opponents and pro- 
vide for my friends. I can justify the refusal to adopt 
this policy only by the steadiness and consistency of my 
adherence to my own. If I depart from this in one in- 
stance, I shall be called upon to do the same in many. 
An invidious and inquisitorial scrutiny into the personal 
dispositions of public officers will creep through the 
whole Union, and the most selfish and sordid passions 
will be kindled into activity to distort the conduct and 



5^YLEii, :feijCHANAN, JOHNSOlf. 9^ 

misrepresent the feelings of men whose places may be- 
come the prize of slander upon them."* 

President Tyler was opposed to making removals on 
account of political opinions. In his first annual mes- 
sage he said he had used the power only in cases of 
unfaithfulness, incompetency, and partisanship that led 
to undue influence over elections. He further said 
(Benton's Debates, xiv, 375) : "I shall cordially concur 
in any constitutional measures for regulating and re- 
straining the power of removal." 

James Buchanan, in discussing in the Senate, in 1839, 
a bill to prevent the interference of Federal officers with 
elections, said (Curtis's "Buchanan," i, 395): "Now, 
sir, if any freak of destiny should ever place me in one 
of these executive departments * * * j gi^aH iqW jq^ 
the course I would pursue. I should not become an 
inquisitor of the political opinions of the subordinate 
officeholders. * * * For the higher and more respon- 
sible offices, however, I would select able, faithful, and 
well tried political friends. * * * With General 
Washington, I believe that any other course ' would be 
a sort of political suicide.' " f 

President Johnson says (Appendix to Cong. Globe, 
1867, p. 4) : "The unrestricted power of removal from 
office is a very great one to be trusted even to a Magis- 
trate chosen by the general suffrage of the whole peo- 
ple, and accountable directly to them for his acts. It is 
undoubtedly liable to abuse, and at some period of our 
history perhaps has been abused." 

* Washington, says Mr. James Parton, made 9 removals, J. Adams 9, 
Jefferson 39, Madison 5, Monroe 9, and J. Q. Adams 2. Total, 73. J. 
C. Calhoun (ii, 438) says J. Adams made 10 removals and Jefferson 42. 
President Jackson's removals, in eight years, aggregated nearly 1,000. 

f Washington's Writings, xi, 75. On page 78 of the same volume he 
gpeaks of " governmental suicide." 



§4 GRANT, HATES, TILDEN. 

President Grant was not long In perceiving the need 
of reform in the civil service. In his first annual mes- 
sage he says (Cong. Globe, ISYO, p. 9) : "I would re- 
S23ectf ally call your attention to * * * a reform in 
the civil service of the country. I would have it go 
beyond the mere fixing of the tenure of oflice of clerks 
and employes, * * * X would have it govern * * * 
the manner of making all appointments. There is no 
duty which so much embarrasses the Executive and 
heads of Departments as that of appointments. * * * 
The present system does not secure the best men, and 
often not even fit men for public place." 

President Hayes denounced the patronage system and 
advocated " a return to the principles and practices of 
the founders of the government " in both his letter of 
acceptance and his inaugural address. He also de- 
nounced the farming out of appointments among Con- 

* The following " plank " from the national Democratic " platform " 
of 1876 favors the requirement of " proved competency" in filling pub- 
lic offices, which is precisely what the competitive examination system 
has accomphshed. It is statesman-like and is in harmony with the 
present civil service law : 

" Reform is necessary in the civil service. Experience proves that 
officient, economical conduct of the governmental business is not possi- 
ble if its civil service be subject to change at every election ; be a prize 
fought for at the ballot-box ; be a brief reward of party zeal, instead of 
posts of honor, assigned for proved competency, and held for fidelity in 
the public employ ; that the dispensing of patronage should neither be 
a tax upon the time of all our public men nor the instrument of their 
ambition." 

Mr. Tilden, in his letter of acceptance, favors the " organization of a 
better civil service system, under the tests, wherever practicable, of 
proved competency and fidelity." It is noteworthy that he repeats the 
words "proved competency." It is clear therefore what his course 
would have probably been had the Electoral Commission declared him 
elected President instead of Hayes, 



GARFIELD AND ARTHUR. Ob 

gressmen, saying : *' The offices in these cases have 
become not merely rewards for party services, but re- 
wards for services to j^arty leaders." 

President Garfield says (Cong. Record, 1881, p. 3) : 
" The civil service can never be placed on a satisfactory 
basis until it is regulated by law. For the good of the 
service itself, for the protection of those who are in- 
trusted with the appointing power against the waste of 
time and obstruction to the public business, caused by 
the inordinate pressure* for place, and for the protec- 
tion of incumbents against mtriffue and toro7ig, f I shall, 
at the proper time, ask Congress to fix the tenure of the 
minor offices of the several Executive Departments, and 
to prescribe the grounds upon which removals shall be 
made during the terms for which incumbents have been 
appointed." 

President Arthur favored civil service reform in his 
letter of acceptance of the nomination for Vice-Presi- 
dent as well as in two annual messas^es. He found the 

* We press such appointments upon the Departments ; we crowd the 
doors ; we fill the corridors ; Senators and Kepresentatives throng the 
offices and bureaus until the public business is obstructed ; the patience 
of officers is worn out, and sometimes, for fear of losing their places by 
our influence, they at last give way, and appoint men, not because they 
are fit for the position, but because we ask it.— Garfield's Speech in 
Congress, 1870, 

Let it once be fully understood that continuance in office depends 
solely upon the faithful and efficient discharge of duties, and that no 
man will be removed to make place for anoth r, and the reform will be 
half accomplished.— Garfield at Athens, Ohio, 1879. 

To reform this service is one of the highest and most imperative 
duties of statesmanship. — Garfield in "Atlantic Monthly," July, 
1877, p. 61. 

f The italics are mine. The civil service law does not make suffi- 
cient provision " for the protection of incumbents against intrigue and 
wrong ; " neither does it •' prescribe the grounds upon which removals 
shall be made." (See introduction to Chapter YIII.) 



06 ?RESlt)ENT CLifiYELAND^S DECIDED VIeWS. 

" inordinate pressure for place " too great to bear, and 
further that it diverts the President's "time and at- 
tention from the proper discharge of other duties no 
less delicate and responsible, and which, in the very- 
nature of things, cannot be delegated to other hands." 
Among other things, he said : " Original appointments 
should be based upon ascertained fitness. The tenure 
of office should be stable. Positions of responsibility 
should, as far as practicable, be filled by the promotion 
of worthy and efficient officers." 

President Cleveland has proved himself a civil service 
reformer in deed as well as in word, not only as Presi- 
dent, but as Governor of New York. In his inaugural 
address he says (Cong. Record, 1885, p. 3) : " The peo- 
ple demand reform in the administration of the govern- 
ment and the application of business principles to public 
affairs. As a means to this eiid civil service reform 
should be in good faith enforced. Our citizens have 
the right to protection from the incompetency of public 
employes who hold their places solely as the reward of 
partisan service, and from the corrupting influence of 
those who promise and the vicious methods of those 
who expect such rewards. And those who worthily 
seek public employment, have the right to insist that 
merit and competency shall be recognized instead of 
party subserviency, or the surrender of honest political 
belief." 

Again, in his second annual message, President Cleve- 
land says (Cong. Record, Dec. V, 1886, p. 11): "The 
continued operation of the law relating to our civil ser- 
vice has added the most convincing proofs of its neces- 
sity and usefulness. It is a fact worthy of note that 
every public officer who has a just idea of his duty to 
the people, testifies to the value of this reform. Its 
gtanchest friends are found among those who under" 



MORTdAGlNG EX:KdttTIVE i^ATKdlsAG:^. ^T 

Stand it best, and its warmest supporters are those who 
are restrained and protected by its requirements. 

" The meaning of such restraint and protection is not 
appreciated by those who want places under the gov- 
ernment, regardless of merit and efficiency, nor by those 
who insist that the selection for such places should rest 
upon a proper credential showing active partisan work. 
They mean to public officers, if not their lives, the only 
opportunity afforded them to attend to public business, 
and they mean to the good people of the country the 
better performance of the work of their government. 

" It is exceedingly strange that the scope and nature 
of this reform are so little understood, and that so many 
things not included within its plan are called by its 
name. When cavil yields more fully to examination, 
the system will have large additions to the number of 
its friends. 

" Our civil service reform may be imperfect in some 
of its details ; it may be misunderstood and opposed ; 
it may not always be faithfully applied ; its designs 
may sometimes miscarry through mistake or willful in- 
tent ; it may sometimes tremble under the assaults of 
its enemies or languish under the misguided zeal of im- 
practicable friends ; but if the people of this country 
ever submit to the banishment of its underlying princi- 
ple from the operation of their government, they will 
abandon the surest guarantee of the safety and success 
of American institutions." 

Representative James A. Bayard of Delaware (after- 
ward United States Senator), the grandfather of Secre- 
tary of State Thomas F. Bayard, to whose patriotic and 
disinterested exertions is largely due Thomas Jefferson's 
election to the presidency in 1801, was decidedly op- 
posed to '* mortgaging the patronage of the Executive," 
to use his own words. His views on the civil service 



OS MR. bayard's HOKOEABLll CONCUCl^. 

problem are expressed in a deposition,* made on April 
3, 1806, *^in a cause depending in the Supreme Court 
of the State of New York, between James Gillespie, 
plaintiff, and Abram Smith, defendant." Mr. Bayard 
was a Federalist, but in the long contest (thirty-six bal- 
lots) for the presidency in the House of Representatives 
between the two great Republicans, Thomas Jefferson 
and Aaron Burr, was inclined, with the rest of his party 
(Federal), to support Burr, as being less opposed to 
them than Jefferson. But, after consultation and cor- 
respondence with Alexander Hamilton, Burr's personal 
character became better known to Mr. Bayard. There- 
fore, in order to keep Burr out of the presidency, and 
to prevent a failure to elect a President, and a conse- 
quent disruption of the new government, it was decided 
to put an end to the contest by the election of Jefferson. 
This was accomplished by Mr. Bayard, who held the 
vote of one State, casting a blank ballot.f But before 

* The deposition is adduced as evidence in the course of a " Vindica- 
tion of the late James A. Bayard," by his son, Senator James A. Bay- 
ard of Delaware, and may be found, with much other documentary evi- 
dence, in the Congressional Globe for January 31, 1855, page 137. Mr. 
Bayard's vindication of his father from the charge of falsehood made 
against him by Mr. Jefferson in his " Anas •' papers (ix, 209), is com- 
plete and overwhelming. Mr. Jefferson's charge was undoubtedly made 
under a misunderstanding of the facts of the case ; and something may 
also be attributed perhaps to the adroitness of Senator Smith (whose 
deposition appears on page 100) in drawing him out. 

t Mr. Bayard, in order to avoid even the suspicion of impure motives 
in giving, as he said, " the ' turn ' to the election," declined an appoint- 
ment as Minister to France, tendered to him by President Adams in Feb- 
ruary, 1801, and to which he had been confirmed by the Senate, because 
It '« would be held on the tenure of Mr. Jefferson's pleasure." He said : 
" My ambition shall never be gratified at the expense of a suspicion." 

Note.— I am indebted to Secretary of State T. F. Bayard for the 
mmute details concerning his grandfather's course and change of senti^ 
ment in the presidential election of 1801. 



VHAf MR. BAYARD WANTJ^t). 0§ 

this was done, it was thought proper to secure Mr. 
Jefferson's engagement in certain important political 
matters, which are explained in the following extract 
from the deposition of Mr. Bayard : 

"1 stated to Mr. Nicholas* that if certain points of 
the future administration could be understood and ar- 
ranged with Mr Jefferson, I was authorized to say that 
three States would withdraw from an opposition to his 
election. He asked me what those points were. I an- 
swered : First, sir, the support of public credit ; sec- 
ondly, the maintenance of the naval system ; and lastly, 
that subordinate public officers, employed only in the 
execution of details established by law, shall not be 
removed from office on the ground of their political 
character, nor without complaint against their conduct. 
I explained myself, that I considered it not only rea- 
sonable, but necessary, that offices of high discretion 
and confidence should be filled by men of Mr. Jeffer- 
son's choice. I exemplified by mentioning, on the one 
hand, the offices of the Secretaries of States, Treasury, 
foreign Ministers, &c., and on the other the Collectors 
of ports, &c. Mr. Nicholas answered me, that he con- 
sidered the points as very reasonable ; that he was sat- 
isfied that they corresponded with the views and inten- 
tions of Mr. Jefferson, and [that he] knew him well. 
That he was acquainted with most of the gentlemen 
who would probably be about him and enjoying his 
confidence, in case he became President, and that if I 
would be satisfied with his assurance, he could solemnly 
declare it as his opinion that Mr. Jefferson, in his ad- 
ministration, would not depart from the points I had 
proposed." f 

* Representative John Nicholas of Virginia. 

•j- Mr. Bayard's deposition is corroborated by a deposition of United 



loo ME. SMITH COKROBOBATES MR. BAYArS. 

Representative Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, on 
January 30, 1811, made a very original and unique 
speech on the subject of officeholding and the appoint- 
ment of Congressmen to office. 

*^' Early in the session," says Mr. Edmund Quincy 
("Life of Josiah Quincy," p. 219), '< Mr. Macon* of 
North Carolina moved the following amendment to the 
Constitution : 

'' ' Besolved, That no Senator or Representative shall 
be appointed to any civil office, place, or emolument, 
under the authority of the United States, until the ex- 
piration of the presidential term in which such person 
shall have served as a Senator or Representative.' 

States Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland, who was also a witness in 
the case of Gillespie vs. Smith, and who was requested by Mr. Bayard, 
in 1801, to inquire of Mr. Jefferson personally concerning the political 
topics named (p. 99), and to bring a direct reply the next day. Senator 
Smith says (Appendix to Cong. Globe, vol. xxxi, p. 138): "I did so. 
And the next day (Saturday) told him that Mr. Jefferson had said that 
he did not think that such officers ought to be dismissed on political 
grounds only, except in cases where they had made improper use of 
their offices to force the officers under them to vote contrary to their 
judgment. That as to Mr. McLane, he had already been spoken to in 
his behalf by Major Eccleston, and from the character given him by 
that gentleman, he considered him a meritorious officer; of course that 
he would not be displaced, or ought not to be displaced, I further 
added that Mr. Bayard might rest assured (or words to that effect), 
that Mr. Jefferson would conduct, as to those points, agreeably to the 
opinions I had stated as his." 

* Nathaniel Macon, born in North Carolina, 1757 ; served as a private 
in the Revolutionary War, having declined a commission. He was in 
the House and Senate ivrnw 1791 to 1828, the longest term of congres- 
sional service, I beheve, on record. He was Speaker from 1801 to 
1807; and president pro tern, of the Senate from 1825 to 1828. Died 
1837.— E. Quincy. 

It is noteworthy that Mr. Macon's proposed amendment, which was 
again presented and urged in 1826, is in substance the same as that 
of Representative Tucker in the first Congress. (See note, page 152.) 



MB. QUINCY'S GREAT SPEECH. lOl 

*' Mr. Quincy moved that the following proposition 
be added to it : 

" ' And no person standing to any Senator or Rep- 
resentative in the relation of father, brother, or son, by 
blood or marriage, shall be appointed to any civil office 
under the United States, or shall receive any place, 
agency, contract, or emolument from or under any de- 
partment or officer thereof.' " 

The following are extracts from Mr. Quincy's speech, 
as reported by his son : 

" Upon this subject of offices my sentiments may per- 
haps be too refined for the present condition of human 
nature. And I am aware, in what I am about to say, 
that I may run athwart political friends as well as 
political foes. Such considerations as these shall not, 
however, deter me from introducing just and high 
notions of their duties to the consideration of the 
members of the Legislature. I hold, sir, the accept- 
ance of an office of mere emolument, or which is 
principally emolument, by a member of Congress from 
the Executive, as unworthy his station, and incompati- 
ble with that high sense of irreproachable character 
which it is one of the choicest terrestrial boons of vir- 
tue to attain. For while the attainment of office is 
to members of Congress the consequence solely of co- 
incidence with the Executive, he who has the office 
carries on his forehead the mark of havino- fulfilled 
the condition. And although his self-love may denom- 
inate his attainment of the office to be the reward of 
merit, the world, which usually judges acutely on these 
matters, will denominate it the reward of service. * * '" 

" Such is the opinion which, in my judgment, ought 
to be entertained of the mere acceptance of office by 
members of Congress, But as to that other class of 



102 EXCOEIATING PEOFESSIO^fAL OFFICESEEKERS. 

persons, who are open, notorious solicitors of office, 
they give occasion to reflections of a very different na- 
ture. This class of persons in all times past have 
appeared, and (for I say nothing of times present) in 
all times future will appear, on this and the other 
floor of Congress, creatures who, under pretense of 
serving the people, are in fact serving themselves ; 
creatures who, while their distant constituents — good, 
easy men, industrious, frugal, and unsuspicious — dream, 
in visions, that they are laboring for their country's 
welfare, are in truth spending their time mousing at 
the doors of the palace or the crannies of the depart- 
ments, and laying low snares to catch for themselves 
and their relations every stray office that flits by them. 
For such men, chosen into this high and responsible 
trust, to whom have been confided the precious desti- 
nies of this people, and who thus openly abandon their 
duties, and set their places and their consciences to 
sale, in defiance of the multiplied, strong, and tender 
ties by which they are bound to their country, I have 
no language to express my contempt. I never have 
seen, and I never shall see, any of these notorious 
solicitors of office, for themselves or their relations, 
standing on this or the other floor, bawling and bully- 
ing, or coming down with dead votes in support of 
executive measures, but I think I see a hackney labor- 
ing for hire in a most degrading service ; a poor, earth - 
spirited animal, trudging in his traces, with much at- 
trition of the sides and induration of the membranes, 
encouraged by this special certainty, that, at the end 
of his journey, he shall have measured out to him his 
proportion of provender. 

*' But I have heard that the bare suggestion of such 
corruption was a libel upon this House and upon this 
people, I have heard that we were in this country so 



AFTER MANS OFFICE BEFOEE CORPSE IS COLD. 103 

virtuous that we were above the influence of these 
allurements ; that beyond the Atlantic, in old govern- 
ments, such things might be suspected, but that here 
we were too pure for such guilt, too innocent for such 
suspicions. Mr. Chairman, I shall not hesitate, in spite 
of such popular declamation, to believe and follow the 
evidence of my senses and the concurrent testimonies 
of contemporaneous beholders. I shall not, in my esti* 
mation of character, degrade this people below, nor 
exalt them far above, the ordinary condition of culti- 
vated humanity. And of this be assured, that every 
system of conduct or course of policy which has for 
its basis an excess of virtue in this country beyond 
what human nature exhibits in its improved state else- 
where, will be found on trial fallacious. Is there on 
this earth any collection of men in which there exists a 
more intrinsic, hearty, and desperate love of office or 
place — particularly of fat places ? Is there any country 
more infested than this with the vermin that breed in 
the corruptions of power ? Is there any in which place 
and official emolument more certainly follow distin- 
guished servility at elections, or base scurrility in the 
press ? And as to eagerness for the reward, what is 
the fact ? Let now one of your great officeholders, a 
collector of the customs, a marshal, a commissioner of 
loans, a postmaster in one of your cities, or any officer, 
agent, or factor for your territories or public lands, or 
person holding a place of minor distinction, but of 
considerable profit, be called on to pay the last great 
debt of nature. The poor man shall hardly be dead ; 
he shall not be cold ; long before the corpse is in the 
coffin, the mail shall be crowded to repletion with let- 
ters and certificates, and recommendations and repre- 
sentations, and every species of sturdy, sycophantic 
solicitation by which obtrusive mendicity seeks charity 



104 tTKStTRPASSEiD WOKD PAlNflKGg. 

or invites compassion. Wliy, sir, we hear the clamor 
of the craving animals at the treasury-trough here in 
this capitol. Such running, such jostling, such wrig- 
o-Uno", such clamberino[ over one another's backs, such 
squeahng because the tub is so narrow and the com- 
pany so crowded ! No, sir, let us not talk of stoical 
apathy toward the things of the national treasury, either 
iu this people or in their Representatives or Senators. 

"But it will be asked (for it has been asked), Shall 
the Executive be suspected of corrupting the national 
Legislature? Is he not virtuous? Without making 
personal distinctions or references, for the sake of 
argument it may be admitted that all Executives for 
the time being are virtuous — reasonably virtuous, Mr. 
Chairman — flesh and blood notwithstanding. And 
without meaning in this place to cast any particular 
reflections upon this or upon any other Executive, this 
I will say, that if no additional guards are provided, 
and now after the spirit of party has brought into so 
full activity the spirit of patronage, there never will 
be a President of these United States, elected by means 
now in use, who, if he deals honestly with himself, 
will not be able, on quitting his presidential chair, to 
address it as John Falstaff addressed Prince Hal : * Be- 
fore I knew thee, I knew nothing ; and now I am but 
little better than one of the wicked.' The possession 
of that station under the reign of party will make a 
man so acquainted with the corrupt principles of hu- 
man conduct ; he will behold oar nature in so hungry 
and shivering and craving a state, and be compelled 
so constantly to observe the solid rewards daily de- 
manded by way of compensation for outrageous patri- 
otism, that if he escape out of that atmosphere with- 
out partaking of its corruption, he must be below or 
above the ordinary condition of mortal nature. Is it 



A GOOD OFFICE FOE A GOOD OFFICE. 105 

possible, sir, that he should remain altogether unin- 
fected? What is the fact? The Constitution prohib- 
its the members of this and of the other branch of 
the Legislature from being electors of the President 
of the United States. Yet what is done ? The prac- 
tice of late is so prevalent as to have grown almost 
into a sanctioned usage of party. Prior to the presi- 
dential terms of four years, members of Congress, hav- 
ing received the privileged ticket of admission, as- 
semble themselves in a sort of electoral college, on the 
floor of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. 
They select a candidate for the presidency, * To their 
voice, to their influence, he is indebted for his eleva- 
tion. So long as this condition of things continues, 
what ordinary Executive will refuse to accommodate 
those who in so distinguished a manner have accom- 
modated him? Is there a better reason in the world 
why a man should give you, Mr. Chairman, an oflice 
worth two or three thousand dollars a year, for which 
you are qualified, and which he could give as well as 
not, than this — that you had been greatly instrumental 
in giving him one worth five and twenty thousand, for 
which he was equally qualified ? It is in vain to con- 
ceal it. So long as the present condition of things 
continues, it may reasonably be expected that there 
shall take place regularly between the President of the 

* This system continued till 1824, when William H. Crawford, who 
was nominated in accordance with it, ran behind both Adams and Jack- 
son. In 1828 Jackson and Adams ran withoat any formal nomination. 
The first national Convention was held by the Democratic party in Bal- 
timore in 1832, when Jackson and Van Buren were nominated. The 
Whigs held their first national Convention in Harrisburg in December, 
1839, when General Harrison and John Tyler were nominated. In New 
York and Pennsylvania the caucus system was superseded by State Con- 
ventions between 1820 and 1830. Mr. Quincy helped to kill "King 
Caucus," as the system was sometimes called. 



106 WHAT MU. QUINCY'S FATHEE SAID. 

United States and a portion of both Houses of Congress 
an interchange, strictly speaking, of good offices." * 

Mr. Quincy's speech, which may be found in full in 
Gales & Seaton's "Debates" for 1810-18]!, beginning 
at page 843, closed as follows : 

" The principle for which I contend, and which is 
the basis both of the original amendment and of my 
proposition, is this : Put it out of the power of the 
Executive to seem to pay any of the members of Con- 
gress, by putting it out of their power to receive. 
* Avoid the appearance of evil.' We have been taught 
to pray, * Lead us not into temptation.' They who 
rightly estimate their duties may find in public life no 
less necessity than in private life frequently to repeat 
this aspiration." * 

Josiah Quincy, Jr., father of the author of the fore- 
going remarkable speech, who died just before the Rev- 
olutionary War (1775), but whose able pen helped to 
gain American independence, says that " qiiam diu se 
bene gesseri?it^^ (during good behavior), is "a regula- 
tion which ought to be the tenure of all offices of public 
trust." (" Life of J. Quincy, Jr.," p. 443.) 

Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, in 1835, 
in a " Report on the extent of Executive Patronage," 
said (Cralle's " Calhoun," v, 152) : " Were a premium 
offered for the best means of extending to the utmost 
the power of patronage ; to destroy the love of coun- 
try, and to substitute a spirit of subserviency and man- 
worship ; to encourage vice and discourage virtue ; 

* Josiah Quincy (born Feb. 4, 1772, died July 1, 1864) "first laid 
down the law (1822) * * * that the publication of the truth, with 
a good intention, and for a justifiable end, is not libelous. This ruling 
excited much censure at the time, but is now the acknowledged rule of 
law in this country and in England." (Am. Cyclopedia, xiv, 154.) 



THE PROBLEM IN A NUTSHELL. lOV 

and, in a word, to prepare for the subversion of lib- 
erty and the establishment of despotism, no scheme 
more perfect could be devised." 

Again, in 1846, in a speech in the Senate, Mr. Cal- 
houn said, (iv, 302) : " The presidential election is no 
longer a struggle for great principles, but only a great 
struggle as to who shall have the spoils of office." 

Senator John Holmes of Maine, speaking of " Exec- 
utive power of Removal," explained the civil service 
problem in a nutshell. He said (G. & S.'s " Debates," 
1829-30, vol. vi, pt. i, p. 389) : ''The ability and fidel- 
ity of the officer in office would be better evidence 
than ten thousand recommendations in favor of the 
candidate who would supersede him. * * * 'Pl^g 
longer a faithful officer is in, the better will his experi- 
ence enable him to perform the duties." 

Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard, who has per- 
haps seen as much of the evils of the machine in poli- 
tics as any man in this country, says (" Dartmouth 
Oration," 1882) : *■' We see * * * hungry seekers for 
office, savage with delay and disappointment, and furi- 
ous for success. * * * From such scenes and contro- 
versies men of dignity, refinement, and self-respect nat- 
urally shrink, * * * and places that should be filled 
by men possessing qualities that win and deserve pri- 
vate and public confidence, are filled by adroit, schem- 
ing, unblushing manipulators, who scoff at personal 
dignity and self-respect, and avow themselves * prac- 
tical politicians.' * * * Personal independence, indi- 
vidual conscience, fidelity to honest conviction, weigh 
nothing and can avail nothing to the man enlisted in 
the spoils system of politics."* 

* The views of many other statesmen of the present day might be 
given, but they would make a small volume of themselves. The views 
of a few have already been given here and there. They are typical 



108 PATEOKAGE IS POWEE. 

William Paley, D.D., writing (about 1785) of "The 
British Constitution," says (" Moral and Political Phil- 
osophy," p. 205) : " When the Constitution conferred 
upon the Crown the nomination to all employments in 
the public service, the authors of this arrangement 
were led to it by the obvious propriety of leaving to a 
master the choice of his servants, and by the manifest 
inconveniency of engaging the National Council, upon 
every vacancy, in those personal interests which attend 
elections to places of honor and emolument. Our an- 
cestors did not observe that this disposition added an 
influence to the regal office which, as the number and 
value of public employments increased/^ would super- 
sede in a great measure the forms and change the char- 
acter of the ancient Constitution. They knew not, 
what the experience and reflection of modern ages have 
discovered, that patronage universally is power ; that 
he who possesses in a sufficient degree the means of 
gratifying the desires of mankind after wealth and dis- 
tinction, by whatever checks and forms his authority 
may be limited or disguised, will direct the manage- 
ment of public affairs. Whatever be the mechanism of 
the political engine, he will guide the motion. * * * 
Changes ought not to be adventured upon without a 
comjjrehensive discernment of the consequences — with- 
out a knowledge as well of the remote tendency as of 
the immediate design." 

In speaking of the checks and balances of the British 
Constitution, Doctor Paley says (p. 211) : " The King's 
choice of his Ministers is controlled by the obligation 
he is under of appointing those men to offices in the 



cases, and ought therefore to suffice. Many " leading statesmen's prin- 
ciples" appear in the succeeding chapter in preference to this because 
they treat of the power of removal, 

* The italics are mine. Compare with page 56. 



INFLUENCE OP FAVORITISM SUBDUED. 109 

state who are found capable of managing the affairs of 
his government with the two Houses of Parliament. 
Which consideration imposes such a necessity upon the 
Crown as hath in a great measure subdued the influ- 
ence of favoritism ; insomuch that it is become no 
uncommon spectacle in this country to see men pro- 
moted by the King to the highest offices and richest 
preferments which he has in his power to bestow, who 
have been distinguished by their opposition to his per- 
sonal inclinations." 

In speaking of plans for " an equal or a reformed 
representation," he says (pp. 215, 216): "One conse- 
quence, however, may be expected from these projects, 
namely, ' less flexibility to the influence of the Crown.' 
And since\the diminution of this influence is the de- 
clared and perhaps the sole design of the various 
schemes that have been produced, whether for regu- 
lating the elections, contracting the duration, or for 
purifying the constitution of Parliament by the ex- 
clusion of placemen and pensioners, it is obvious to 
remark that the more apt and natural as well as the 
more safe and quiet way of attaining the same end 
would be by a direct reduction of the patronage of the 
Crown, which might be effected to a certain extent 
without hazarding further consequences. Superfluous 
and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be 
suppressed for the present, but provisions of law be 
devised which should for the future restrain within 
certain limits the number and value of the offices in 
the donation of the King. * * * It is the nature 
of power always to press upon the boundaries which 
confine it."* 

* It is noteworthy that so profound a thinker as Dr. Paley should 
favor woman suffrage. Speaking of the right of representation, he says 
(p. 214): " We waive a controversy with those writers who insist upon. 

( 



110 PATEONAGE THE BOX OF PANDOEA. 

James Wilson, LL.D,, one of the framers of the na- 
tional Constitution,* and afterward an Associate Jus- 
tice of the United States Supreme Court, in the course 
of a lecture entitled a " Comparison of the Constitution 
of the United States with that of Great Britain," thus 
expatiates concerning the evils of patronage (" Lectures 
on Law," i, 446) : " We are now arrived, in our pro- 
gress, at another fountain, from which, in Great Brit- 
ain, the waters of bitterness have plentifully flowed — 
I mean the fountain of ofiice. * * * Oflices of trust 
and profit are scattered, with a lavish hand, among 
those by whom a return, very dangerous to the liber- 
ties of the nation, may be made, and from whom such 
a return is but too often expected. This is the box of 
Pandora, which has been opened on Britain. To its 
poisonous emanations have been owing the contamina- 
ted and contaminating scenes of venality, of prostitu- 
tion, and corruption which have crowded and disgraced 
her political theater. To the same efficacy have been 
owing the indiscriminate profligacy and universal de- 
generacy which have been diffused through every chan- 
nel into which the treasures of the public have pro- 
cured admission." 



representation as a ' natural ' right. We consider it so far only, as a 
right at all, as it conduces to public utility ; that is, as it contributes to 
the establishment of good laws, or as it secures to the people the just 
administration of these laws. These effects depend upon the disposition 
and abilities of the national counselors, * * * jf ([^[q right be 
* natural,' no doubt it must be equal, and the right, we may add, of one 
sex as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of representation that 
we have heard of begins by excluding the votes of women, thus cutting 
off, at a single stroke, one-half the public from a right which is as- 
serted to be inherent in all ; a right too, as some represent it, not only 
universal, but inalienable, and indefeasible, and imprescriptible." 

* Washington called Mr. Wilson " as able, candid, and honest a mem- 
ber as was in the Convention." (Bancroft's His. of the Const., ii, 241.) 



HOW BAD APPOINTMENTS SOMETIMES OCCUR. Ill 

In another lecture, entitled " Of Government " (i, 
401, 402), Justice Wilson lays down the following fun- 
damental principles for guidance in appointments to 
office : " The appointment to offices is an important 
part of the executive authority. Much of the ease, 
much of the reputation, much of the energy, and much 
of the safety of the nation depends on judicious and 
impartial appointments. But are impartiality and fine 
discernment likely to predominate in a numerous exec- 
utive body ? In proportion to their own number will 
be the number of their friends, favorites, and depend- 
ents. An office is to be filled. A person nearly con- 
nected by some of the foregoing ties with one of those 
who are to vote in filling it, is named as a candidate. 
His patron is under no necessity to take any part, par- 
ticularly responsible, in his appointment. He may ap- 
pear even cold and indifferent on the occasion. But 
he possesses an advantage, the value of which is well 
understood in bodies of this kind. Every member who 
gives, on his account, a vote for his friend, will ex- 
pect the return of a similar favor on the first con- 
venient opportunity. In this manner a reciprocal in- 
tercourse of partiality, of interestedness, of favoritism, 
perhaps of venality, is established ; and in no partic- 
ular instance is there a practicability of tracing the 
poison to its source. Ignorant, vicious, and prostituted 
characters are introduced into office ; and some of those 
who voted, and procured others to vote for them, are 
the first and loudest in expressing their astonishment 
that the door of admission was ever opened to men of 
their infamous description. * * * Those who possess 
talents and virtues, which would reflect honor on office, 
will be reluctant to appear as candidates for appoint- 
ments. If they should be brought into view, what 
weight will virtue, merit, and talents for office have 



112 HOW TO MAKE GOOt) APPOINTMENTS. 

in a balance held and poised by partiality, intrigue, 
and chicane ? 

" The person who nominates or makes appointments 
to office should be known. His own office, his own 
character, his own fortune should be responsible. He 
should be alike unfettered and unsheltered by counsel- 
ors. No constitutional stalking-horse should be pro- 
vided for him to conceal his turnings and windings, 
when they are too dark and too crooked to be exposed 
to public view. Instead of the dishonorable inter- 
course, which I have already mentioned, an intercourse 
of a very different kind should be established — an in- 
tercourse of integrity and discernment on the part of 
the magistrate who appoints, and of gratitude and con- 
fidence on the part of the people who will receive the 
benefit of his appointments. Appointments made and 
sanctioned in this highly respectable manner will, like 
a fragrant and beneficent atmosphere, diffuse sweetness 
and gladness around those to whom they are given. 
Modest merit will be beckoned to in order to encour- 
age her to come forward. Bare-faced impudence and 
unprincipled intrigue will receive repulse and disa])- 
pointment, deservedly their portion." 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE POWER OF REMOVAL. 

A remedy for its Mistakes or Abuse. — A synopsis of the great debate 
in the first Congress (1789) on the Power of Removal. — Tlie con- 
gressional decision then made criticised by Benton, Webster, and 
others. — The Four-years' Term Law and some opinions of it (note). 

The debate in the first Congress on the power to 
remove public officials was one of great interest and 
importance, and was besides very instructive. A bill 
was introduced in the House creating " The Depart- 
ment of Foreign Affairs," the Secretary of which was, 
in the words of the bill, " to be removable by the 
President of the United States."* The discussion was 
on striking out the last quoted words. The majority 
claimed that the President alone had the power of re- 
moval, while the minority claimed that the consent of 
the Senate was necessary ; that is, in the case of of- 
ficers confirmed by the Senate. 

Judged by the light of nearly a century of experi- 
ence, it is plain that both sides were partly right and 
partly wrong. The forefathers, w^ho were legislating 
for only about three million of people, were construct- 
ing a political chart to guide and protect future gen- 
erations, and it is not strange that they should have 
made a few^ mistakes. While it is clear, as pointed 
out by the majority, that the President should have 

* The motion to establish the above and other Executive Departments 
was made originally by Representative Boudinot, in a speech, on May 
19, 1789. 



114 A PROPOSED BOAED OF APPEALS. 

the power of removal, it is equally clear, as pointed 
out by the minority, that there should be a check to 
prevent him or anybody else from abusing it. Fur- 
ther, the President and his chief officials are as liable 
to make mistakes as other men. Of all public men 
they should be the first to correct a mistake or to 
right a wrong, and thus set an example for others to 
follow. 

We should give officeholders, chief as well as sub- 
ordinate, all the protection we can from rhistakes, dis- 
likes, fits of passion, prejudices, caprices, intrigues, and 
wrongs. But what kind of protection can we give 
them ? It appears to me that, under the civil service 
law system, a Board of Appeals should be established, 
which could be increased in number as the number of 
offices and the scope of the law increase, before which 
all reasonable complaints could be heard, and that where 
the complaint is sustained, the aggrieved official should 
be reinstated with full pay.* It is required by Rule 
16 that the Civil Service Commissioners shall perform 
the work of this proposed Board. But as the Commis- 

* There is a remedy for every distemper in government, if the people 
are not wanting to themselves. For a people wanting to themselves, 
there is no remedy. — James Wilson. 

Napoleon was a despot, it is said. Yet he never dismissed any one 
from public office without an inquiry and report of facts, and rarely 
ever without hearing the accused functionary ; never when the questions 
involved were civil or administrative. — Napoleonic Ideas. By Louis 
Napoleon. 

But Napoleon, who was a statesman as well as a soldier, sometimes 
dismissed officials withowt much ceremony. " ' You cannot find me 
guilty of dishonesty,' observed the minister, Barbe-Marbois, on receiving 
his dismissal. ' I had rather,' replied Napoleon, ' that you had shown 
yourself dishonest than a fool. There is a limit to one; there is none 
whatever to the other.' " (Crowe's " History of France," v, 147.) 

Napoleon was right in one respect at least, namely, that fools are not 
proper persons to fill public office^ 



EESTEAINT THE BODY-POLITIC SAFETY-VALVE. 115 

sioners are already overworked, the proposition is not 
practical. The functions of this proposed Board would 
resemble in one respect those of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, for one of the most important func- 
tions of the Supreme Court is to correct the mistakes 
of the legislative and executive departments. Again, 
having had nothing to do with the nomination, confir- 
mation, or appointment of oflicers, it would, like the 
Supi-eme Court, be free of prejudice. Such a Board 
would be at least a partial check on the President and 
all other chief officials, and would aid in preventing 
some future Jackson or Lincoln from throwing the 
official machinery of government out of gear. This is 
well, for restraint, in public as well as in private life, 
is the safety-valve of the body-politic. 

The minority, as before said, were certainly right 
about the necessity of a check to prevent the Presi- 
dent from abusing the power of removal. But the 
senatorial check they proposed, however practical it 
may have been then, is certainly not practical now, 
for, on account of the great increase of business, the 
Senate has hardly time now to look after confirmations, 
much less removals. Further, the exact check they 
proposed was incorporated in the Tenure of Office Act 
of 1866-67,* and was found in practice to be unsatis- 
factory. One example of its inefficacy will suffice. J. 
D. Cox, in an article in the North Americcm Review 
for January, 1871 (p. 87), in speaking of the corrup- 
tion at Washington after the demoralizing civil war, 
and incidentally of the Tenure of Office Act, says that 
" dishonest (official) incumbents were plundering the 
people under the shelter of a Tenure of Office Act, 
which seemed to be skillfully adapted to remove every 

*Ilepealeaml887, 



116 GREAT USE AND POWER OF THE SENATE. 

trace of responsibility from both the appointing and 
confirming powers. The Republicans in Congress were 
complaining that the President refused to remove men 
who were indicted or convicted in the courts, and the 
friends of the President retorted that the Senate refused 
to consent to the removal of others who Avere proven to 
be plunderers of the treasury on the like evidence." * 

Again, tbe minority were certainly right about it 
beino- the intention of the framers of the Constitution 
that the Senate should be a check on the President, 
and also (which was admitted by the majority) that 
its duties are sometimes executive and sometimes ju- 
dicial, and that it is to this extent blended with both 
the executive and judicial departments. The Senate, 
so far as the removal of an officer confirmed by it is 
concerned, is at all times a more or less perfect check 
on the President, because he has to depend on it for 
the confirmation of a successor. The Senate, in fact, as 
it is almost self-evident was the intention of the framers 
of the Constitution, exercises great power. It should 
therefore be composed of experienced and trained states- 
men only. No mere politician should enter its cham- 
ber. And it would be better, far better, that its mem- 
bers should all be as poor as Socrates, than that one of 
them should be chosen on account of his wealth, or be 
even charged with buying his election. Bad men may 
get into the Senate ; but the people who, on account 
of this fact, howl for its abolition, would destroy the 
equilibrium of the government. They might as well, 
for the same reason, ask for the abolition of either the 
House of Representatives or the United States Supreme 
Court. The proper remedy is purification. 

*See the remarkable prediction of Representative Ames, page 125. 
Mr. Madison (page 117) also indulges in some lamentable forebodings, 
and under the patronage system their realization is not impossible, 



T?HE i^^EED AND tTSE OF EESPONSlBltlTY. ll^f 



SPEECHES IN FAVOR OF REMOVAL BY THE PRESIDENT 

ALONE. * 

James Madison of Virginia said (pp. 462, 463, 496, 
498, 581) : " It is evidently the intention of the Con- 
stitution that the first Magistrate should be responsi- 
ble for the executive department. So far therefore as 
we do not make the officers who are to aid him in 
the duties of that department responsible to him, he 
is not responsible to his country. Again, is there no 
danger that an officer, when he is appointed by the 
concurrence of the Senate, and has friends in that body, 
may choose rather to risk his establishment on the favor 
of that branch than rest it upon the discharge of his 
duties to the satisfaction of the executive branch, which 
is constitutionally authorized to inspect and control his 
conduct ? And if it should happen that the officers 
connect themselves with the Senate, they may mutu- 
ally support each other, and for want of efficacy re- 
duce the power of the President to a mere vapor ; in 
which case his responsibility would be annihilated, and 
the expectation of it unjust. The high executive of- 
ficers, joined in cabal with the Senate, would lay the 
foundation of discord, and end in an assumption of the 
executive power, only to be removed by a revolution in 
the government. I believe no principle is more clearly 
laid down in the Constitution than that of responsi- 
bility. * * * 

* The salient points only of this debate are given. They are taken 
from vol. i of " The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the 
United States, compiled from authentic materials, by Joseph Gales, Sr." 
The speeches, divided pro and con, are given in the order of their de- 
livery ; but those who spoke twice or three times, have their remarks 
combined in one speech. Eepetitions of arguments, either by the same 
or different speakers, have, as far as practicable, been omitted, 



lis EEMOVAL AN EXECUTIVE POWEE. 

" Is the power of displacing an executive power ? I 
conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its nature 
executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and 
controllins: those who execute the laws. If the Con- 
stiiution had not qualified the power of the President 
in appointing to office, by associating the Senate with 
him in that business, would it not be clear that he would 
have the right, by virtue of his executive power, to 
make such appointment? Should we be authorized, in 
defiance of that clause in the Constitution, * The exec- 
utive power shall be vested in a President,' to unite 
the Senate with the President in the appointment to 
office ? * * * If it is admitted that we should not, 
I think it may be disputed whether we have a right 
to associate them in removing persons from office, the 
one power being as much of an executive nature as 
the other ; and the first only is authorized by being 
excepted out of the general rule established by the 
Constitution, in these words : ' The executive power 
shall be vested in a President.' * * * 

" The doctrine, however, which seems to stand most 
in opposition to the principles I contend for is that the 
power to annul an appointment is, in the nature of 
things, incidental to the power which makes the ap- 
pointment. I agree that if nothing more was said in 
the Constitution than that the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, should appoint 
to office, there would be great force in saying that the 
power of removal resulted, by a natural implication, 
from the power of appointing. But there is another 
part of the Constitution no less explicit than the one 
on which the gentleman's doctrine is founded. It is 
that part which declares that the executive power shall 
be vested in a President of the United States. The 
association of the Senate with the President in exer- 



GrOOi) OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE EEMOYED. llO 

cising that particular function is an exception to this 
general rule ; and exceptions to general rules, I con- 
ceive, are ever to be taken strictly.* But there is an- 
other part of the Constitution which inclines, in my 
judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it — 
the President is required to see that the laws be faith- 
fully executed. If the duty to see the laws faithfully 
executed be required at the hands of the Executive 
Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally in- 
tended he should have that species of power which is 
necessary to accomplish that end. * * * Now if the 
officer, when once appointed, is not to depend upon 
the President for his official existence, but upon a dis- 
tinct body (for where there are two negatives required, 
either can prevent the removal), I confess I do not see 
how the President can take care that the laws be faith- 
fully executed. * * * 

" The danger then consists merely in this : the Presi- 
dent can displace from office a man whose merits re- 
quire that he should be continued in it. What will 
* * * operate to prevent it (this abuse of power) ? 

* Daniel Webster says (iv, 193): " The error of this argument lies in 
this. It supposes the power of removal to be held by the President 
under the general grant of executive power. Now it is certain that the 
power of appointment is not held under that general grant, because it 
is particularly provided for, and is conferred, in express terms, on the 
President and Senate. If therefore the power of removal be a natural 
appendage to the power of appointment, then it is not conferred by the 
GENERAL WORDS granting executive power to the President, but is con- 
ferred by the special clause which gives the appointing power to the 
President and Senate. * * * if exceptions to a general rule are to 
be taken strictly, when expressed, it is still more clear, when they are 
not expressed at all, that they are not to be implied except on evident 
and clear grounds ; and as the general povver of appointment is confess- 
edly given to the President and Senate, no exception is to be implied in 
favor of one part of that general power, namely, the removing part, un- 
less for some obvious and irresistible reason." 



120 WHEN IMPEACJtiMENl? IS J (JSf lEl A:bL^. 

In the first place, he will be impeachable by this House, 
before the Senate, for such an act of maladministration, 
for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious 
officers would subject him to impeachment and removal 
from his own high trust. * * * Can he accomplish 
this end? No. He can place no man in the vacancy 
whom the Senate shall not approve. 

" If there is any point in which the separation of 
the legislative and executive powers ought to be main- 
tained with greater caution, it is that which relates to 
officers and offices. The powers relative to offices are 
partly legislative and partly executive. The Legisla- 
ture creates the office, defines the powers, limits its 
duration, and annexes a compensation. This done, the 
legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing 
to do with designating the man to fill the office. That 
I conceive to be of an executive nature." 

John Vining of Delaware said (pp. 465, 511): "If 
this power is not in the President, it is not vested in 
any body whatever. It cannot be within the legisla- 
tive power of the Senate, because it is of an adverse 
nature. It cannot be within the executive power of 
the Senate, because they possess none but what is ex- 
pressly granted by the Constitution, * * * 

" I take it that the best principle is that he who is 
responsible for the conduct of the officer, ought to have 
the power of removing him. * * * Perhaps it might 
be equally right that the responsible person should have 
the appointment of those who are to aid him. But 
this case is qualified by an express stipulation in the 
Constitution, and therefore must be submitted to. 

" The argument of convenience is strong in favor 
of the President, for this man (Secretary F. A.) is an 
arm or an eye to him. He sees and writes his secret dis- 
patches. He is an instrument over which the President 



SElCAtfi LESg INl'ilRlJStEi) Than PfiESil3ENT. 1^1 

ought to have a complete command. * * * jf ^-[^q Pres- 
ident removes a vahiable officer, which seems to be the 
great danger the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Smith) apprehends, it would be an act of tyranny which 
the good sense of the nation would never forget. But 
if the Senate turns out a good man, they might be re- 
elected by the Legislatures. The Senate may remove 
a good officer without feeling any injury. They are 
not feelingly sensible of the advantages arising from 
his labors, because they do not act in concert with him ; 
while the President, by such a removal, deprives him- 
self of a valuable and necessary aid. When a good 
officer is obtained, the President has every motive of 
justice, self-interest, and public good to retain him in 
his situation. None of these motives operate, or but 
faintly operate, upon the Senate." 

On page 570 Mr. Vining, in reply to Mr. Jackson, 
speaks of the danger " of denying the Executive a due 
proportion of power." This, he said, was the case in 
both Sweden and Poland. " In Sweden/' he said, " the 
limited power of the King was nearly annihilated by 
an aristocracy." The King, " for the security of his 
nation," and with the assent of the nation, had been 
compelled " to assume all the powers of despotism." 
Of Poland he said : " The object of the Poles has been 
to guard against what was called the encroachments 
of the throne. * It is not,' said they but a century ago, 
* a master that we want, it is only a chief.' Some went 
further, and asserted that a free people wanted no chief 
at all." Of our own government he said : " If by legis- 
lative encroachment we weaken the executive arm, we 
render it incapable of performing the functions assigned 
it by the Constitution, and subject it to become an easy 
prey to the other branches of the government." 

Elias Boudinot of New Jersey said (pp, 468, 409, 527, 
Q 



12^ THE SENATE MaY Tm^ARt* THE ^JRESIDEnT. 

528) : " Let us examine whether it (the power of re- 
moval) belongs to the Senate and President. Certain- 
ly, sir, there is nothing that gives the Senate this right 
in express terms. But they are authorized, in express 
words, to be concerned in the appointment. And does 
this necessarily include the power of removal ? If the 
President complains to the Senate of the misconduct of 
an officer, and desires their advice and consent to the 
removal, what are the Senate to do? Most certainly 
they will inquire if the complaint is well founded. To 
do this they must call the officer before them to answer. 
"Who then are the parties ? The supreme executive of- 
ficer against his assistant ; and the Senate are to sit as 
judges, to determine whether sufficient cause of removal 
exists. Does not this set the Senate over the head of 
the President ? But suppose they shall decide in favor 
of the officer. What a situation is the President then 
in, surrounded by officers with whom, by his situation, 
he is compelled to act, but in whom he can have no 
confidence ; reversing the privilege given him by the 
Constitution, to prevent his having officers imposed 
upon him who do not meet his approbation ! 

" But I have another more solid objection, which 
places the question in a more important point of view. 
The Constitution has placed the Senate as the only 
security and barrier between the House of Representa- 
tives and the President. Suppose the President has 
desired the Senate to concur in removing an officer, 
and they have declined. Or suppose the House has 
applied to the President and Senate to remove an of- 
ficer obnoxious to them, and they determine against the 
measure. The House can have recourse to nothing but 
an impeachment, if they suppose the criminality of the 
officer will warrant such procedure. Will the Senate 
then be that upright court which they ought to ap' 



Why thu senate shotild be UNPREJUDiCEr). i2^ 

peal to on Ibis occasion, when they have prejudged your 
cause ? I conceive the Senate will be too much under 
the control of their former decision to be a proper body 
for this House to apply to for impartial justice. As 
the Senate are the dernier resort, and the only court 
of judicature which can determine on cases of impeach- 
ment, I am for preserving them free and independent, 
both on account of the officer and this House. I there- 
fore conceive that it was never the intention of the 
Constitution to vest the power of removal in the Presi- 
dent and Senate ; but as it must exist somewhere, it 
rests on the President alone. * * * 

" The President nominates and appoints. He is fur- 
ther expressly authorized to commission all officers. 
Now does it appear from this distribution of power that 
the Senate appoints ? Does an officer exercise powers 
by authority of the Senate ? No. I believe the Presi- 
dent is the person from whom he derives his authority. 
He appoints, but under a check. It is necessary to 
obtain the consent of the Senate. But after that is 
obtained, I ask who appoints ? Who vests the officer 
with authority? Who commissions him ? The Presi- 
dent does these acts by his sole power, but they are ex- 
ercised in consequence of the advice of another branch 
of the government. If therefore the officer receives his 
authority and commission from the President, surely 
the removal follows as coincident. * * * The Con- 
stitution vested* all executive power in the President. 
The power of designating and appointing officers to 
execute the laws was in its nature executive. Conse- 
quently the President would appoint ex officiOy if he 
had not been limited by the express words of the Con- 
stitution. Hence he (Mr. Boudinot) inferred, ex officio, 
he would remove without limitation. 

* The four closing sentences are reported in the second person, 



124 SUSPENSION A NtJGATOEY POWEfi. 

*' Gentlemen say tliey have a sufficient remedy for 
every evil likely to result from connecting the Senate 
with the President. This they propose to do by allow- 
ing the power of suspension. This does not answer 
the end, because there is a possibility that the officer 
may not be displaced after a hearing before the Sen- 
ate. * * * ^e had better at once give a power 
that would answer two valuable purj)oses, than one alto- 
gether nugatory. In the first place, it (removal) would 
entirely separate the legislative and executive depart- 
ments, conformably to the great principles of the Con- 
stitution ; and, in the second place, it would answer the 
end of government better, and secure real benefits to 
the Union." 

Fisher Ames of Massachusetts said (pp. 474, 475, 476, 
477, 540) : "The executive powers are delegated to the 
President with a view to have a responsible officer to 
superintend, control, insj)ect, and check the officers nec- 
essarily em|)loyed in administering the laws. The only 
bond between him and those he employs is the confi- 
dence he has in their integrity and talents. When that 
confidence ceases, the principal ought to have power to 
remove those whom he can no longer trust with sefety. 
* * * The powers of the President are defined in the 
Constitution. But it is said that he is not expressly 
authorized to remove from office. If the Constitution 
is silent also with respect to the Senate, the argument 
may be retorted. If this silence proves that the power 
cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly proves 
that it cannot be exercised by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The power 
of removal is incident to government. But not being 
distributed by the Constitution, it will come before the 
Legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must be 
supplied by law. 



HOW SENATE MAY CAUSE SERIOUS TEOUBLE. 125 

"The attempt to blend the executive and legislative 
departments in exercising the power of removal is such 
a mixing as ought not to be carried into practice on 
arguments grounded on implication. And the gentle- 
man from Virginia (Mr. White's) reasoning is wholly 
drawn from implication. He supposes, as the Consti- 
tution qualifies the President's power of appointing to 
office by subjecting his nominations to the concurrence 
of the Senate, that the qualification follows of course 
in the removal. 

" Another reason occurs to me against blending these 
powers. An ofiicer who superintends the public reve- 
nue will naturally acquire a great influence. If he ob- 
tains support in the Senate, upon an attempt of the 
President to remove him, it will be out of the power 
of the House, when applied to by the first Magistrate, 
to impeach him with success, for the very means of 
proving charges of malconduct against him will be 
under the power of the officer. All the papers neces- 
sary to convict him may be withheld while the person 
continues in his office. Protection may be rendered 
for protection ; and as this officer has such exten- 
sive influence, it may be exerted to procure the re- 
election of his friends. These circumstances, in addi- 
tion to those stated by the gentleman* from New Jersey 
(Mr. Boudinot), must clearly evince to every gentleman 
the impropriety of connecting the Senate with the Pres- 
ident in removing from office. * 

* On page 542 Mr, Ames says : " If the Senate are to possess the 
power of removal, they will be enabled to hold the person in office, let 
the circumstances be what they may that point out the necessity or pro- 
priety of his removal. It creates a permanent connection. It will 
nurse faction. It will promote intrigue to obtain protectors and to 
shelter tools. Sir, it is infusing poison into the Constitution. * * * 
There is ruin in it, It is tempting the Senate with forbidden fruit," 



126 PRESIDENT'S EXECTJTIVE POWER ILLUSTRATED. 

" But why should we connect the Senate in the re- 
moval ? Their attention is taken up with other impor- 
tant business, and they have no constitutional authority 
to watch the conduct of the executive officers, and there- 
fore cannot use such authority with advantage. If the 
President is inclined to shelter himself behind the Sen- 
ate with respect to having continued an improper per- 
son in office, we lose the responsibility, which is our 
greatest security. The blame among so many will be 
lost. * * * 

" It must be admitted that the Constitution is not 
explicit on the point in contest. Yet the Constitution 
strongly infers that the power is in the President alone. 
It is declared that the executive power shall be vested 
in the President. Under these terms all the powers 
properly belonging to the executive department of the 
government are given, and such only taken away as are 
expressly excepted. If the Constitution had stopped 
here, and the duties had not been defined, either the 
President had had no powers at all, or he would acquire 
from that general expression all the powers properly 
belonging to the executive department. * * * 

"The President * * * is the agent. The Senate 
may prevent his acting, but cannot act themselves. It 
may be difficult to illustrate this point by examples 
which will exactly correspond. But suppose the case 
of an executor, to whom is devised land, to be sold 
with the advice of a certain person, on certain condi- 
tions. The executor sells, with the consent and on the 
conditions required in the will. The conditions are 
broken. May the executor re enter for the breach of 
them? Or has the person with whom he was obliged 
to consult in the sale any power to restrain him ? The 
executor may remove the wrongful possessor from the 
land^ though perhaps by the will he may hold it in trust 



SENATE NOT INSPECTORS OF OFFICERS. 127 

for another person's benefit. In this manner the Presi- 
dent may remove from office ; though, when vacant, he 
cannot fill it without the advice of the Senate." 

Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania said (pp. 479, 480, 
481) : " This is an office of considerable importance. 
* * * In all commercial countries it will require men 
of high talents to fill such an office, and great respon- 
sibility. It is necessary to connect the business in such 
a manner as to give the President a complete command 
over it ; so in whatever hands it is placed, or however 
modulated, it must be subjected to his inspection and 
control. * * * 

" Another reason why the power of removal should 
be lodged with the President rather than the Senate 
arises from their connection with the people. The Pres- 
ident is the representative of the people in a near and 
equal manner. He is the guardian of his country. The 
Senate are the representatives of the State Legislatures ; 
but they are very unequal in that representation. Each 
State sends two members to that House, although their 
proportions are as ten to one. Hence arises a degree 
of insecurity to an impartial administration. But if 
they possessed every advantage of equality, they can- 
not be the proper body to inspect into the proper be- 
havior of officers, because they have no constitutional 
powers for this purpose." 

John Lawrence of New York said (pp. 483, 484) : 
"It has been stated as an objection that we should 
extend the powers of the President, if we give him 
the power of removal ; and we are not to construe the 
Constitution in such way as to enlarge the executive 
power to the injury of any other ; that as he is limited 
in the power of appointment by the control of the Sen- 
ate, he ought to be equally limited in the removal. If 
tljere be any weight in this argument, it applies as forci- 



128 CONSISTENCY AND PEESIDENTIAL EEMOVALS. 

•bly against vesting the power conjointly in the President 
and Senate ; because if we are not to extend the powers 
of the Executive beyond the express detail of duties 
found in the Constitution, neither are we at liberty to 
extend the duties of the Senate beyond those precise 
points fixed in the same instrument. Of course if we 
cannot say the President alone shall remove, we cannot 
say the President and Senate may exercise such power. 

" It is admitted that the Constitution is silent on this 
subject. But it is also silent with respect to the ap- 
pointments it has vested in the Legislature. The Con- 
stitution declares that Congress may by law vest the ap- 
pointment of such inferior officers as they think proper 
in the President alone, in the courts of law, or heads 
of departments, yet says nothing with respect to the 
removal. * * * In those cases in which the Consti- 
tution has given the appointment to the President, he 
must have the power of removal for the sake of con- 
sistency ; for no. person will say that if the President 
should appoint an inferior officer, he should not have 
the power to remove him when he thought proper, if 
no particular limitation was determined by the law." 

Representative George Clymer of Pennsylvania said 
(pp. 489, 490) : " I am clear that the Executive has 
the power of removal as incident to his department ; 
and if the Constitution had been silent with respect 
to the appointment, he would have had that power 
also. The reason perhaps why it was mentioned in 
the Constitution was to give some further security 
against the introduction of improper men into office. 
But in cases of removal there is not such necessity for 
this check. What great danger would arise from the 
removal of a worthy man, when the Senate must be 
consulted in the appointment of his successor? Is it 
likely they will consent to advance an improper char- 



MK. BENSON'S ADMIRABLE ILLUSTRATION. 129 

acter? The presumption therefore is that he would 
not abuse this power ; or, if he did, only one good 
man would be changed for another. If the President 
is divested of this power, his responsibility is destroyed. 
You prevent his efficiency, and disable him from af- 
fording that security to the people which the Consti- 
tution contemplates. * * * ^pj^g Executive must 
act by others. But you reduce him to a mere shadow 
when you control both the power of appointment and 
removal. If you take away the latter power, he ought 
to resign the power of superintending and directing 
the executive parts of government into the hands of 
the Senate at once, and then we become a dangerous 
aristocracy, or shall be more destitute of energy than 
any government on earth." 

Egbert Benson of New York said (pp. 505, 506, 507) : 
"I will not repeat what has been said to prove that 
the true constrution is that the President alone has the 
power of removal, but will state a case to show the 
embarrassment which must arise by a combination of 
the senatorial and legislative authority in this particu- 
lar. I will instance the officer to which the bill re- 
lates. To him will necessarily be committed negotia- 
tions with the ministers of foreign courts. This is a 
very delicate trust. The supreme executive officer, in 
superintending this department, may be entangled with 
suspicions of a very delicate nature relative to the trans- 
actions of the officer, and such as from circumstances 
would be injurious to name. Indeed he may be so 
situated that he will not, cannot, give the evidence of 
his suspicion. Now, thus circumstanced, suppose he 
should propose to the Senate to remove the Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs. Are we to expect the Senate 
will, without any reason being assigned, implicitly 
submit to his proposition? They will not. Suppose 



ISO SENATE ONLY A CONSTITUTIONAL CHEC^; 

he should say he suspected the man's fidelity. Thef 
would say we must proceed further, and know the rea- 
son for this suspicion. They would insist on a full 
communication. Is it to be supposed that this man 
will not have a single friend in the Senate who will 
contend for a fair trial and a full hearing ? The Presi- 
dent then becomes the plaintiff and the Secretary the 
defendant. The Senate are sitting in judgment be- 
tween the Chief Magistrate of the United States and 
a subordinate officer. Now I submit to the candor of 
the gentlemen whether this looks like good government. 
Yet in every instance when the President thinks proper 
to have an officer removed, this absurd scene must be 
displayed. How much better, even on principles of 
expediency, will it be that the President alone have the 
power of removal. 

" It has been warmly contended that the power of 
removal is incidental to the power of appointment. It 
may be true in general, but upon examination we shall 
find there is a distinction in this case from what the 
general principle supposes. If the President and Senate 
are to be considered as one body, deliberating together 
on the business of appointments, every individual of 
which participates equal powers, the reasoning that has 
been urged will hold good. But I take it for granted 
that they are two distinct bodies, and can only give a 
simple affirmative or negative. No member of the Sen- 
ate has power to offer an original proposition. In short, 
the moment we depart from this simple idea that the 
provision in the Constitution is intended for any other 
purpose but to prevent the President from introducing 
improper persons into office, we shall find it difficult to 
form any certain principle upon which they ought to 
act, and our opinions and deliberations will be discord- 
ant and distracted." 



ME. SEDGWICK'S PERTINENT INQUIRIES. 131 

Mr. Benson further said that " if we declare in the 
bill that the officer shall be removable by the President, 
it has the appearance of conferring the power upon 
him." Therefore, in order to avoid even an apparent 
conference of power, and to do nothing more than de- 
clare the House's *' sentiments upon the meaning of 
a constitutional grant of power to the President," he 
moved as a substitute for the words " to be removable 
by the President," the following : " whenever the said 
officer shall be removed by the President." Mr, Madi- 
son, who aj^preciated Mr. Benson's delicate legislative 
distinction, seconded the latter's motion. The amend- 
ment was adopted by a vote of 30 to 18. 

Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts said (pp. 522, 
523) : " What is to be the consequence if the Senate 
are to be applied to (for permission to remove an of- 
ficer) ? If they are to do anything in this business, I 
presume they are to deliberate, because they are to ad- 
vise and consent. If they are to deliberate, you put 
them between the officer and the President. They are 
then to inquire into the causes of removal. The Presi- 
dent must produce his testimony. How is the question 
to be investigated ? Because, I presume, there must be 
some rational rule for conducting this business. Is the 
President to be sworn to declare the whole truth, and 
to bring forward facts ? Or are they to admit suspi- 
cion as testimony ? Or is the word of the President to 
be taken at all events ? If so, this check is not of the 
least efficacy in nature. But if proof be necessary, 
what is then the consequence? Why, in nine cases out 
of ten, where the case is very clear to the President 
that the man ought to be removed, the effect cannot 
be produced, because it is absolutely impossible to pro- 
duce the necessary evidence. Are the Senate to pro- 
ceed without evidence ? Some gentlemen contend not. 



132 SEP Ail ATE POWERS ThE ONLY SAFETY. 

Then the object will be lost. Shall a man, under these 
circumstances, be saddled upon the President who has 
been appointed for no other purpose but to aid the 
President in performing certain duties ? * * * If 
he is, where is the responsibility? * * * Without 
you make him responsible, you weaken and destroy the 
strength and beauty of your system. What is to be 
done in cases which can only be known from a long 
acquaintance with the conduct of an officer?" 

On page 582 Mr. Sedgwick says there are a thousand 
circumstances, exclusive of impeachments, which may 
demand removal from office, of which the President 
alone is the proper judge. 

Richard Bland Lee of Virginia said (pp. 525, 526) : 
"It is laid down as a maxim in government by all 
judicious writers that the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers should be kept as separate and distinct 
as possible, in order to secure the liberties of the people. 
And this maxim is founded on the experience of ages ; 
for we find that however governments have been estab- 
lished, however modified in their names or forms, if 
these powers are blended in or exercised by one body, 
the effects are ever the same — the public liberty is de- 
stroyed. * * * ^Y^Q framers of the Constitution 
* * * divided our government into three principal 
branches, with express declarations that all legislative 
power shall vest in one, all executive in another, and 
the whole judicial in a third. * * * 

" It is our duty to vest all executive power belonging 
to the government where the Convention intended it 
should be placed. It adds to the responsibility of the 
most responsible branch of the government ; and with- 
out responsibility we should have little security against 
the depredations and gigantic strides of arbitrary power. 
It is necessary to hold up a single and specific object to 



THE PUBLIC MUST HAVE SOMEBODY TO WATCH. 133 

the public jealousy to watch. Therefore it is necessary 
to connect the power of removal with the President. 
The Executive is the source of all appointments. Is his 
responsibility complete unless he has the power of re- 
moval? * * * If the power of removal is vested 
in the Senate, it is evident, at a single view, that the 
responsibility is dissipated, because the fault cannot the 
fixed on any individual. Besides the Senate are not 
accountable to the people. * * * But even if they 
were, they have no powers to enable them to decide 
with propriety in the case of removals, and therefore 
are improper persons to exercise such authority." 

Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts said (pp. 533, 
534) : " It has long been an opinion entertained of the 
j)eople of America that they would not trust the gov- 
ernment with the power of doing good lest it should 
be abused. * * * rpj^g question on the present 
occasion seems to stand on nearly the same ground — 
whether we shall trust the power of doing good to the 
Executive Magistrate, or deprive him of it for fear he 
may abuse it. * * * The only security which the 
Constitution means to give us is to call the officers of 
government to account if they abuse their powers, and 
not to cramp their exercise so as to make them inef- 
ficient. * * * 

" It has been said that the power would be more safe 
in the hands of the Senate than in that of the President. 
But I do not view it in that light. * * * It would 
be a very inconvenient and useless power for them to 
be possessed of. It is in nothing similar to the power 
they have in appointments. There they are really use- 
ful by their advice, because it is more probable that 
the Senate may be better acquainted with the charac- 
ters of the ofiicers that are nominated than the Presi- 
dent himself. But after their appointments such knowl- 



i34 EEMOVING SOMETIMES A §E:P ABATE POWER. 

edge is little required. The officer is placed under the 
control of the President, and it is only through him that 
the improper conduct of a person in a subordinate situ- 
ation can be known." 

Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania indulged in a semi- 
facetious speech, but he made one good point when he 
said (p. 533) : " Is anything more plain than that the 
President, above all the officers of government, both 
from the manner of his appointment and the nature of 
his duties, is truly and justly denominated the man of 
the people ? Is there any other person who represents 
so many of them as the President ? He is elected by 
the voice of the people of the whole Union. The Sen- 
ate are the representatives of the State sovereignties. 
* * * Yet this body is held up as more nearly 
related to the people than the President himself." 

Abraham Baldwin of Georgia said (pp. 557, 558, 
559) : "Gentlemen who undertake to construe, say they 
see clearly that the power which appoints must also 
remove. Now I have reviewed this subject with all 
the application and discernment my mind is capable of, 
and have not been able to see any such thing. There 
is an agency given to the President in making appoint- 
ments, to which the Senate are connected. But how it 
follows that the connection extends to the removal, 
positively I cannot see. They say that it follows as 
a natural, inseparable consequence. This sounds like 
logic. But if we consult the premises, perhaps the 
conclusion may not follow. The Constitution opposes 
this maxim more than it supports it. The President 
is appointed by electors chosen by the people them- 
selves, or by the State Legislatures. Can the State 
Legislatures, either combined or separate, effect his re- 
moval ? No. But the Senate may, on impeachment 
by this House. The judges are appointed by the Presi- 



THE BESTEAINING POWER OP IMPEACHMENT. l35 

dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
But they are only removable by impeachment. The 
President has no agency in the removal. Hence, I 
say, it is not a natural consequence that the power 
which appoints should have the power of removal also. 
We may find it necessary that subordinate officers 
should be appointed in the first instance by the Presi- 
dent and Senate. I hope it will not be contended that 
the President and Senate shall be ajDplied to in all cases 
when their removal may be necessary. * * * j (jig. 
pute the maxim altogether ; for though it is sometimes 
true, it is often fallacious. But by no means is it that 
kind of conclusive argument which they contend for. 

" But what is the evil of the President being at lib- 
erty to exercise this power of removal ? Why we 
fear that he will displace not one good officer only, but, 
in a fit of passion, all the good officers of the govern- 
ment ; by which, to be sure, the public would suffer. 
* * * I believe he could not turn out so many but 
that the Senate would still have some choice out of 
which to supply a good one. But even if he was to 
do this, what would be the consequence? He would 
be obliged to do the duties himself, or, if he did not, 
we would impeach him and turn him out of office as he 
had done others. I must admit though that there is a 
possibility of such an evil ; but it is a remote possibility 
indeed. * * * Checked and surrounded as his powers 
are, I see little cause for apprehension." 

Peter Sylvester of New York said (p. 561) : "I lay 
it down as a positive case that the President is invested 
with all executive power necessary to carry the Consti- 
tution and the laws passed in pursuance thereof into 
full effect, so far as these powers are unchecked and 
uncontrolled by express stipulations in the Constitution. 
If the exceptions with respect to appointments had not 



136 THE ADVOCATES OF SUSPENSION. 

been made, the President would have had that power 
as well as the power of removal. In the first his power 
is eclipsed by the interference of the Senate, bat in the 
last the manifestation is clear. Both these powers be- 
ing inherent in the executive branch of the government, 
must remain there." 

SPEECHES IN EAVOR OF EEMOYAL BY THE PRESIDENT 

AND SENATE. 

Alexander White of Virginia, who made the motion 
to strike out the words " to be removable by the Presi- 
dent," said (pp. 467, 517) : "It was objected that the 
President could not remove an officer unless the Senate 
was in session, but yet the emergency of the case might 
demand an instant dismission. I should imagine that 
no inconvenience would result on this account, because, 
on my principle, the same power which can make a 
temporary appointment can make an equal suspension.* 
The powers are apposite to each other. 

" The gentleman (Mr. Madison) says we ought not 
to blend the executive and legislative powers further 
than they are blended in the Constitution. I contend 
we do not. There is no expression in the Constitution 
which says that the President shall have the power of 
removal from office. But the contrary is strongly im- 
plied, for it is said that Congress may establish offices 
by law, and vest the appointment, and consequently the 
removal, in the President alone, in the courts of law, 
or heads of departments. Now this shows that Con- 
gress are not at liberty to make any alteration by law 
in the mode of appointing superior officers, and conse- 

* The practicability of suspension in lieu of removal was also advoca- 
ted by Messrs. Jackson, Sherman, Page, Stone, and Tucker. Mr. Bou- 
diiiot, as has already been shown, thought it would be too indecisive. 



THE DANGER IN AN AMBITIOUS PRESIDENT. 137 

quently that they are not at liberty to alter the manner 
of removal. 

" It has been said if the concurrence of the Senate 
be necessary, they may refuse to concur when a removal 
is proper. * * * y^Q ^j.g ^q presume the Senate 
will do their duty. * * * gy^ shall we, because 
the Senate may do wrong, give the President the power 
to act without them ? Is it contended that the Presi- 
dent has any superior agency in this business because 
he nominates ? We may as well contend, on the same 
principle, that because this House has the exclusive 
power of originating money bills, we may repeal a law 
of that nature without the consent of the Senate." 

William Smith of South Carolina said (pp. 457, 458, 
508) : " I imagine, sir, we are declaring a power in 
the President which may hereafter be greatly abused. 
* * * We ought to * * * contemplate this power 
in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply 
it to dangerous purposes. If we give this power to 
the President, he may, from caprice, remove the most 
worthy men from office. * * * 

" Another danger may result. If you desire an of- 
ficer to be a man of capacity and integrity, you may 
be disappointed. A gentleman possessed of these qual- 
ities, knowing he may be removed at the pleasure of 
the President, will be loath to risk his reputation on 
such insecure ground. As the matter stands in the 
Constitution, he knows if he is suspected of doing any- 
thing wrong he shall have a fair trial, and the whole of 
his transactions be developed by an impartial tribunal. 
He will have confidence in himself when he knows he 
can only be removed for improper behavior. But if he 
is subjected to the whim of any man, it may deter him 
from entering into the service of his country ; because, 
if he is not subservient to that person's pleasure, he 



138 ALEXANDER HAMILTON ON EEMOVALS. 

may be turned out, and the public may be led to sup- 
pose for improper behavior. This impression cannot be 
removed, as a public inquiry cannot be obtained. Be- 
sides this, it ought to be considered that the person who 
is appointed will probably quit some other office or 
business in which he is occupied. Ought he, after mak- 
ing this sacrifice in order to serve the public, to be 
turned out of place without even a reason being as- 
signed for such behavior ? Perhaps the President does 
not do this with an ill intention. He may have been 
misinformed ; for it is presumable that a President may 
have around him men envious of the honors and emol- 
uments of persons in office, who will insinuate suspi- 
cions into his honest breast that may produce a re- 
moval. Be this as it may, the event is still the same 
to the removed officer. The public suppose him guilty 
of malpractices. Hence his reputation is blasted, his 
property sacrificed. I say his property is sacrificed, 
because I consider his office as his property. He is 
stripped of this and left exposed to the malevolence of 
the world, contrary to the principles of the Constitution, 
and contrary to the principles of all free governments, 
which are that no man shall be despoiled of his prop- 
erty but by a fair and impartial trial. 

" Gentlemen say we ought not to suppose such an 
abuse of power in the President. But the Constitution 
wisely guards against his caprice in the appointment, 
and why should we abate the security in cases of re- 
moval ? " * 

* Representative Smith made the following quotation from General 
Alexander Hamilton (" The Federalist," Hallowell Ed., p. 358): " It has 
been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co- 
operation of the Senate in the business of appointments, that it would 
contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that 
body would be necessary to displace as well a,s to appoint, A change 



TENtJEE DUEING GOOD BEHAVIOR. 139 

On page 471 Mr. Smith says: "It will not be con- 
tended that the State governments did not furnish the 
late Convention with the skeleton of this Constitution. 
I have turned over the Constitutions of most of the 
States. In some instances I find the Executive Magis- 
trate suspends, but none of them have the right to re- 
move officers." On page 459 he says that in order to 
test and decide the constitutionality of the question of 
removal, a removed officer could apply to a court of 
justice for a mandamus to be restored to his office, and 
that the court would settle it. As to the tenure of sub- 
ordinate officers, he said they could " be regulated by 
law." But as to the removal of chief officials, he said 
tliat inasmuch as the Constitution prescribed impeach- 
ment only, it " contemplated only this mode." Messrs. 
Page and Huntington also believed in removal by im- 
peachment. Impeachment for removal, except where 
required by the Constitution, is of course impracticable 
nowadays, even for the Secretary of State, which cor- 
responds to the then (1789) proposed Secretary of For- 
eign Affairs. Messrs. Smith, Page, and Stone favored 
the holding of offices during good behavior. Other 
Representatives were opposed to this principle, and yet 



of the Chief Magistrate therefore would not occasion so violent or so 
general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be 
expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any 
station has given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new Presi-. 
dent would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person 
more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of 
the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of dis- 
credit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady 
administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which con- 
nects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disap- 
probation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own 
composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than 
anv other member of the government," 



140 REMOVAL A QUESTION OF COXSTITUTIOXALITY. 

they feared that worthy men wouki be removed from 
office. In this respect their arguments were both in- 
consistent and co*ntradictory. 

Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut said (p. 459) : 
" I think the clause ought not to stand. It was well 
observed that the Constitution was silent respecting the 
removal otherwise than by impeachment. I would like- 
wise add that it mentions no other cause of removal 
than treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde- 
meanors. It does not, I apprehend, extend to cases of 
infirmity or incapacity. Indeed it appears hard to me 
that after an officer has become old in an honorable ser- 
vice, he should be impeached for this infirmity. * * * 
It was said if the President had this authority, it would 
make him more responsible for the conduct of the of- 
ficer. But if we have a vicious President, who inclines 
to abuse this power, which God forbid, his responsi- 
bility will stand us in little stead. Therefore that idea 
does not satisfy me that it is proper the President 
should have this power." 

Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts said (pp. 472, 473, 
502, 574): "Some gentlemen consider this as a ques- 
tion of policy. But to me it appears a question of 
constitutionality, and I presume it will be determined 
on that point alone. 

" The best arguments I have heard urged on this 
occasion came from the honorable gentleman from Vir- 
ginia (Mr. Madison). He says the Constitution has 
vested the executive power in the President, and that 
be has a right to exercise it under the qualifications 
therein made. He lays it down as a maxim that the 
Constitution vesting in the President the executive 
power, naturally vests him with the power of appoint- 
ment and removal. Now I would be glad to know from 
that gentleman by what means we are to decide this 



fiiii SEN^ATE'S SALltTARlf SfABltlTT. 14l 

question. Is his maxim supported by precedent drawn 
from the practice of the individual States ? The direct 
contrary is established. In many cases the Executives 
are not in particular vested with the power of appoint- 
ment. And do they exercise that power by virtue of 
their office ? It will be found that other branches of 
the government make appointments. How then can 
gentlemen assert that the powers of appointment and 
removal are incident to the executive department of 
government? To me it appears at best but problem- 
atical. Neither is it clear to me that the power that 
appoints naturally possesses the power of removal. 

" It has been argued that if the power of removal 
vests in the President alone, it annuls or renders nuga- 
tory the clause in the Constitution which directs the 
concurrence of the Senate in the case of appointments. 
It behooves us not to adopt principles subversive of 
those established by the Constitution. 

" It has been frequently asserted, on former occa- 
sions, that the Senate is a permanent body, and was 
so constructed in order to give durability to public mea- 
sures. If they are not absolutely permanent, they are 
formed on a renovating principle, which gives them a 
salutary stability. This is not the case either with the 
President or House of Representatives. * * * j^^ 
appears to me that a permanency was expected in the 
magistracy,* and therefore the Senate were combined 
in the appointment to office. But if the President alone 
has the power of removal, it is in his power at any 
time to destroy all that has been done. It appears to 
me that such a principle would be destructive of the 
intention of the Constitution, expressed by giving the 
power of appointment to the Senate. It also subverts 
the clause which gives the Senate the sole power of 

* This could not be unless a President were elected term after term. 



il^ ME. GERfeY FEAliS THE PRESlf)£N^. 

trying impeachments, because the President may re- 
move the officer in order to screen him from the effects 
of their judgment on an impeachment. Why should 
we construe any part of the Constitution in such a 
manner as to destroy its essential principles, when a 
more consonant construction can be obtained ? * * * 

" It has been said by my colleague that these officers 
are the creatures of the law. But it seems as if we 
were not content with that. We are making them the 
mere creatures of the President. They dare not exer- 
cise the privilege of their creation, if the President 
shall order them to forbear, because he holds their 
thread of life. His power will be sovereign over them, 
and will soon swallow up the small security we have 
in the Senate's concurrence to the appointment ; and 
we shall shortly need no other than the authority of 
the supreme executive officer to nominate, appoint, con- 
tinue, or remove. * * * 

" It is said that the President will be subject to im- 
peachment for dismissing a good man. This in my 
mind involves an absurdity. How can the House im- 
peach the President for doing an act which the Leg- 
islature has submitted to his discretion ? 

" The Senate and this House may think it necessary 
to inquire why a good officer is dismissed. The Presi- 
dent will say : * It is my pleasure. I am authorized by 
law to exercise this prerogative. I have my reasons 
for it, but you have no right to inquire them of me.' 
This language may be proper in a monarchy ; but in 
a republic every action ought to be accounted for." 

Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire said (pp. 478, 
4:19) : " Surely a law passed by the whole Legislature 
cannot be repealed by one branch of it. So I conceive 
in the case of appointments it requires the same force 
to supersede an officer as to put him in office. I ac- 



14^ fiXECtJTlVE POWER NOT ALL PKESIcMT'S. 

knowledge that the clause relative to impeachment is 
for the benefit of the people. It is intended to enable 
their representatives to bring a bad officer to justice 
who is screened by the President. But I do not con- 
ceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Caro- 
lina (Mr. Smith), that it by any means excludes the 
usual ways of superseding officers. 

" When an important and confidential trust is placed 
in a man, it is worse than death to him to be displaced 
without cause. His reputation depends on the single 
will of the President, who may ruin him on bare sus- 
picion. Nay, a new President may turn him out on 
mere caprice, or in order to make room for a favorite. 
This contradicts all my notions of propriety. Every- 
thing of this sort should be done with due deliberation. 
Every person ought to have a hearing before he is pun- 
ished." 

James Jackson of Georgia said (pp. 487, 488, 489, 
630, 531, 555) : "If this power is incident to the ex- 
ecutive branch of government, it does not follow that 
it vests in the President alone, because he alone does 
not possess all executive powers. The Constitution has 
lodged the power of forming treaties, and all executive 
business, I presume, connected therewith, in the Presi- 
dent ; but it is qualified by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Sen- 
ate agree therein. The same has taken place with re- 
spect to appointing officers. * * * It may be wrong 
that the great powers of government should be blended 
in this manner. But we cannot separate them. The 
error is adopted in the Constitution. * * * 

" Behold the baleful influence of the royal preroga- 
tive when officers hold their commissions during the 
pleasure of the Crown ! At this moment, see the King 
of Sweden aiming at arbitrary power, shutting up the 



144 piiEsifcEXT AND sE?^Al:i5 cH:fic^ EAdfl of MM. 

doors of his Senate, and compelling, by force of arms, 
his shuddering councilors to acquiesce in his despotic 
mandates.* I agree that this is the hour in which we 
ouo-ht to establish our cjovernment. But it is an hour 
in which we should be wary and cautious, especially 
in what respects the Executive Magistrate. With the 
present, I grant, every power may be safely lodged. 

* * * May not a man with a Pandora's box in his 
breast come into power and give us sensible cause to 
lament our present confidence and want of foresight? 

* * * I think this power too great to be safely 
trusted in the hands of a single man, especially in the 
hands of a man who has so much constitutional power. 

* * * I cannot agree to extend this power, because 
I conceive it may at some future period be exercised 
in such a way as to subvert the liberties of my country. 

* * * If the President has the power of removing 
all officers who may be virtuous enough to oppose his 
base measures, what would become of the liberties of 
our fellow-citizens ? * * * 

" I differ with gentlemen who say that the Senate 
have no part of the executive power, or that the Presi- 
dent has no part of the legislative authority. I con- 
sider them as checks upon each other, to prevent the 
abuse of either. And it is in this way the liberties of 
the people are secured. I appeal for the truth of this 
sentiment to the writings of Publius. f 

" I call upon gentlemen once more to * * * prove 
to me that it was not the intention of this Constitu- 
tion to blend the executive and legislative powers. If 
these are the principles of the Constitution, why will 

* Compare with Mr. Vining's remarks, page 121. Also see the ad- 
mirable Swedish civil service regulations of the present day, page 186. 
The contrast between Sweden in 1789 and 1888 is remarkable, 

j- Alexander Hamilton, 



gentlemen contend for the independency of each branch 
of the government?" 

John Page of Virginia said (pp. 490-1, 519-20, 551, 
552) : " I venture to assert that this clause of the bill 
contains in it the seeds of royal prerogative. If gen- 
tlemen lay such stress on the energy of the government, 
I beg them to consider how far this doctrine may go. 
Everything which has been said in favor of energy in 
the Executive, may go to the destruction of freedom, 
and establish despotism. This very energy, so much 
talked of, has led many patriots to the Bastile, to the 
block, and to the halter. If the Chief Magistrate can 
take a man away from the head of a department with- 
out assigning any reason, he may as well be invested 
with power, on certain occasions, to take away his ex- 
istence. But will you contend that this idea is con- 
sonant with the principles of a free government, where 
no man ought to be condemned unheard, nor till after 
a solemn conviction of guilt, on a fair and impartial 
trial ? * * * If gentlemen had been content to say 
that the President might suspend, I should second the 
motion, and afterward the officer might be removed by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

" The f ramers of the government had confidence in 
the Senate, or they would not have combined them 
with the Executive in the performance of his duties. 
*' * * Some gentlemen contend that the Senate are 
a dangerous and aristocratic body. But I contend that 
they are a safe and salutary branch of the government, 
representing the republican Legislatures of the individ- 
ual States, and intended to preserve the sovereignty and 
independence of the State governments, which they are 
more likely to do than the President, who is elected by 
the people at large. A popular President, influenced 
bjr the sentiments of his electors, may be induced to 
'7 



146 i^otJRJ^oLb Checks on the PHESmEK'f. 

believe that it would be best for tbe general interest 
that those governments were destroyed. But as long 
as we have that body independent of him, and secured 
in their authority, we may defy such impotent attempts. 
They will watch his conduct and prevent the exercise 
of despotic power. But if they are weakened and strip- 
ped of their essential authority, they will become weak 
barriers against the strides of an uncontrolled power. 
If you take from them their right to check the Presi- 
dent in the removal of officers, they cannot prevent the 
dismission of a faithful servant who has opposed the 
arbitrary mandates of an ambitious President. The 
principles laid down in the Constitution clearly evince 
that the Senate ought not only to have a voice in the 
framing of laws, but ought also to see to their execu- 
tion. * * * I myself shall never be satisfied unless 
I see fourfold checks upon the President. It (the clause 
in the bill) will inevitably lead to the establishment of 
those odious prerogatives which we, by an arduous con- 
flict, have been endeavoring to get rid of. 

" Indecision, delay, blunders — nay, villainous actions 
in the administration of government — are trifles com- 
pared to legalizing the full exertion of a tyrannical 
despotism. Good God ! What ! authorize in a free 
republic, by law too, by your first act, the exertion 
of a dangerous royal prerogative in your Chief Magis- 
trate ! What ! where honor and virtue ought to be 
the support of your government, will you infuse and 
cherish meanness and servility in your citizens, and in- 
solence and arbitrary power in your Chief Magistrate, 
when you know that thousands of virtuous citizens are 
dissatisfied with your government because they think 
they see the seeds of monarchy in it ? And two whole 
States have refused to unite with you because they 
think your government dangerous to their liberties \ 



'^ A MONSTROUS DOCTRINE. '' i4*f 

Will you openly, before their faces, in a solemn act of 
Congress, insert words which fully justify their opin- 
ions and fears ? * * * 

" It is said the officers ought to be commissioned 
durante bene placito, et ne dure se bene gesserint^^ a 
monstrous doctrine. As to inferior officers, who, we 
are told, must also be impeached, Congress have a con- 
stitutional right to empower the President to appoint, 
and, I suppose, to remove also ; not that the power nec- 
essarily follows appointments." 

Roger Sherman of Connecticut said (pp. 491, 492, 
538, 576) : "It is a general principle in law as well as 
reason that there shall be the same authority to remove 
as to establish * * * unless there are express ex- 
ceptions made. * * * It is so in legislation, where 
the several branches whose concurrence is necessary to 
pass a law, must concur in repealing it. Just so I take 
it to be in cases of appointment ; and the President alone 
may remove when he alone appoints, as in the case of 
inferior officers to be established by law. * * * I 
have not heard any gentleman produce an authority 
from law or history which proves that where two 
branches are interested in the appointment, one of them 
has the power of removal. I remember that the gen- 
tleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick) told us that 
the two Houses, notwithstanding the partial negative 
of the President, possessed the whole legislative power. 
But will the gentleman infer from that that because 
the concurrence of both branches is necessary to pass 
a law, a less authority can repeal it ? This is all we 
contend for. 

" If gentlemen would consent to make a general law 
declaring the proper mode of removal, I think we should 
acquire a greater degree of unanimity, which, on this 
* During good pleasure, and not during good behavior, 



148 "A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS OF MEN. *> 

occasion, must be better than carrying the question 
against a large minority." 

Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland said (pp. 493, 
495, 564, 566, 567, 568, 569) : " If the Constitution had 
given no rule by which officers were to be appointed, 
I should search for one in my own mind. But as the 
Constitution has laid down the rule, I consider the mode 
of removal as clearly defined as by implication it can 
be. It ought to be the same as that of the appointment. 
What quality of the human mind is necessary for the 
one that is not necessary for the other ? Information, 
impartiality, and judgment in the business to be con- 
ducted are necessary to make a good appointment. Are 
not the same properties necessary for a dismission ? 

" I cannot subscribe to the opinion that the executive, 
in its nature, implies the power to appoint the officers 
of government. Why does it imply it ? The appoint- 
ment of officers depends upon the qualities that are nec- 
essary for forming a judgment on the merits of men ;* 
and the displacing of them, instead of including the 
idea of what is necessary for an executive officer, in- 
cludes the idea necessary for a judicial one. Therefore 
it cannot exist, in the nature of things, that an execu- 
tive power is either to appoint or displace the officers 
of government. Is it a political dogma ? Is it founded 
in experience ? If it is, I confess it has been very long 
wrapped up in mysterious darkness. * * * It is 
very forcible to my mind that the Constitution has con- 
fined his (the President's) sole appointment to the case 
of inferior officers. * * h^ 

"Now I would ask, in all cases where the integrity 

* Mr. Stone cut very close to the civil service law, for the examiners, 
by the aid of competitive examinations, form " a judgment on the merits 
of men." The law is the fulfillment of his prophecy, namely, " I believe 
the people can apply a remedy," &c. (p. 149). 



BALANCE BETWEEN PKESIDENT AND SENATE. 149 

and confidence is the same, whether it is more likely 
that one man should do right and exercise his power 
with propriety than a number of men with the aid of 
each other's deliberations ? Is it more likely that a 
number of men should do wrong than one man ? * * * 
It would be more difficult for a majority to be obtained 
in a body composed of members of thirteen independ- 
ent States in favor of despotic measures than might 
justly be expected from the caprice or want of judg- 
ment in a single individual. Is it likely the danger 
would be so great? I apprehend it is not. * * * 

" If the evils we apprehend should absolutely arise 
from our determination, I do not conceive, with some 
other gentlemen, that we are inevitably ruined. I be- 
li'ive the people can apply a remedy ; and I have no 
doubt but they have sense and resolution enough for 
that purpose. * * * 

" I suppose it is necessary to keep up the balance be- 
tween the Executive Mao-jstrate and the Senate. What 
is tliis balance? It is laid down in the Constitution 
that the President shall nominate and the Senate ap- 
prove. We are bound then to carry this balance 
throughout all the subjects to which it relates. If the 
President has the sole power of removal, you destroy 
the power of the Senate. And though you do not ex- 
pressly put the power of appointment in the President 
alone, yet you put it there effectively, because he may 
defeat, by removal, the joint appointment. Will this 
be giving the proper balance which the Constitution 
directs? No. It will be directly the reverse. 

" If all executive power is vested in the President, 
what right has this House to prescribe him rules to in- 
terfere in forming executive officers ? The Executive 
can better form them for itself. * * * 

" If I look to the constitution or nature of things, I 



150 AN APPOINTMENT AN IMPLIED CONTRACT. 

should be led to conclude that the body choosing ag(>nts 
has the power of dismissing them, because the power 
naturally lodges in those who have the interest and 
management of the concern. The executive business 
of this officer is under the superintendence and man- 
agement of the Senate as well as the President. Trea- 
ties with foreign nations must be conducted by the 
advice of the Senate, and concluded with their consent. 
Hence results a necessity in that body having a concern 
in the choice and dismissal of the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs. I do not see an}'- other sure or safe bottom 
on which the question can be determined. 

" In the nature of things, in all appointments, there 
is an implied contract ; on the part of the officer that 
he will perform the service, and on the part of those 
who appoint him that he shall have an adequate re- 
ward. In the engagement of the officer, qualities com- 
mensurate with the duties are required. In the reward, 
the dignity of the station and the qualities of the of- 
ficer ought to be estimated. And although in this en- 
gagement an officer may dispense of certain forms of 
trial, yet he can never surrender a natural right — he 
cannot engage to be punished without being guilty, or 
dismissed without being useless. It has been w^ell ob- 
served that the appointment ought to cease when the 
causes of it no longer exist. But it is equally clear 
that it ought to continue as long as the reasons re- 
main. And although in public and private life it may 
be proper to discharge an agent without divulging the 
reason, yet clearly a good reason ought to precede the 
dismission, because otherwise you do an act of injus- 
tice by a breach of contract. * * * 

" It has been judged by some gentlemen a dreadful 
affair that the President should become a party before 
the Senate, It would degrade his dignity. It was said 



LIBERTY EXALTS THE HUMAN SPECIES. 151 

the judiciary would be pleased if tliis weighty question 
could be taken off their hands. To what a bight do 
gentlemen exalt that character in their own minds ! 
How far above the level of the people, when they con- 
sider it derogatory to his dignity to institute an exam- 
ination into the conduct of an officer next to himself in 
rank ! when they consider it almost above human na- 
ture to determine a question of right between the Presi- 
dent and a great officer of the United States. If gen- 
tlemen have an idea that this character is to have such 
a degree of elevation above the community, it is time 
to think of restraining his power.* On what does power 
depend ? Not on the strength of arm, but opinion. If 
gentlemen will exalt a character above themselves, call 
him what you will, he will be possessed of monarchy, jj 

" We have expended our treasure, our blood, and our 
time to very little purpose if we do not think that lib- 
erty and safety exalt the human species. From the 
meanest to the highest rank in life, the propriety of 
conduct arises from the security and independence of 
situation. * * * 

" If a man is a candidate for an office held by the 
tenure of will and pleasure, he must examine his soul 
and see if there are qualities in him to enable him to 
cringe and submit to the arbitrary mandate of the Pres- 
ident. If he finds these qualities in his disposition, he 
is suited for the business. But if the Constitution is 
to be justly administered, and he finds himself disposed 



* Mr. Stone, so far as I know, is the first American to make this sug- 
gestion. It is fitting that the author of such a clear, profound, and pro- 
phetic argument should have this honor. A worthy President is entitled 
to the support, good-will, and even love of the people, but he is no better 
as a man than any other worthy citizen. Further, respectful criticism 
of the President's official acts is always in order, even by officeholders, 
Intelligent criticism is often useful. 



152 PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. 

to sacrifice to the pleasure of the Chief Magistrate, 
although he possesses qualities which suited him for 
his employment, yet he is unfit for the ofiice." 

Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina said (pp. 
584, 585) : " I am embarrassed on this question, as the 
yeas and nays are called, because the vote is taken in 
such a manner as not to express the principles upon 
which I vote. In the Committee of the Whole I voted 
for striking out the words that are now proposed to 
be struck out, and my reason was I- was doubtful 
whether it was proper to vest, on this occasion, the 
power in the President alone. It appears to me that 
the power is not necessarily vested in the President by 
the Constitution ; neither in the President and Senate. 
I find no words that fix this power precisely in any 
branch of the government. It must, however, by im- 
plication be in the Legislature, or it is nowhere until 
the Constitution is amended. * * * I apprehend a 
law is necessary in every instance to determine the ex- 
ercise of the power. In some cases it may be proper 
that the President alone should have it. I am not clear 
in my own mind what general rule, if any, can be 
established on this subject. Perhaps in other cases it 
may be lodged with the President and Senate ; or it 
may be given to the heads of departments. But who- 
soever is invested with it, it must be in consequence 
of a lav/ ; and the Legislature have a right to vest it 
where they please." 

Mr. Tucker closed his speech by saying, among other 
things, that perhaps it would be out of order to change 
the word remove to suspe7id. * 

* Mr. Tucker, some weeks after the close of the debate, moved the 
consideration of numerous amendments to the Constitution, among them 
the following (p. 762) : " Art. ii. Sec. 4, clause 3. At the end add these 
words : He shall also have power to suspend from his office, for a time 



JOHN ADAMS'S MISTAKE (NOTE). 153 

Thomas Sumter of South Carolina said (p. 591) : 
" This bill appears to my mind so subversive of the 
Constitution, and in its consequences so destructive to 
the liberties of the people, that I cannot consent to let it 
pass without expressing my detestation of the principle 
it contains. I do it in this public manner in order to 
fulfill what I think to be my duty to my country, and 
to discharge myself of Siuj concern in a matter that I 
do not approve." 

The bill passed the House by a vote of 29 to 22, and 
went to the Senate on the 14th of July. As before 
said, the words " to be removable by the President," 
had been amended to read : " whenever the said prin- 
cipal officer shall be removed from office b^ the Presi- 
dent of the United States, the chief clerk shall, during 
the vacancy, have charge and custody," &c. It was 
moved to strike out the italicized words. The debate 
lasted nearly four days, only one day less than that in 
the House. The vote was a tie (9 to 9), but as Vice- 
President Adams f voted in the negative, the words 
stood. The Senate's action vas disinterested if not 

not exceeding twelve months, any officer whom he shall have reason to 
think unfit to be intrusted with the duties thereof ; and Congress may 
by law provide for the absolute removal of officers found to be unfit for 
the trust reposed in them." 

Also the following : " Art. i, Sec. 6, clause 2. Amend to read thus : 
No person having been elected, and having taken his seat as a Senator 
or Representative, shall, during the time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States." 

* The world owes Mr. Sumter more than is apparent in the above 
remarks. Twice during the five days' debate he appealed to the House 
to postpone calling the yeas and nays in order to give the subject a 
full and free discussion. 

f Senator George F. Edmunds says (Supplement to Congressional 
Globe, 1868, p. 425): "Mr. Adams * * * was strongly opposed 
to the provision of the Constitution requiring the Senate to confirm any 
appointment." 



154 SIMPLE AND COMPOUND POWERS* 

patriotic, for it delegated a power to the Presideili 
which by implication at least belonged to itself and 
the President. The Senate sat with closed doors from 
1789 till 1795, "with a single exception, through all leg- 
islative as well as executive transactions." But Vice- 
President Adams kept notes for at least one day (July 
]5), and it is to him that the world is indebted for the 
following glimpse of what must have been a very in- 
structive debate (" Works of John Adams," vol. iii, 
pp. 408 to 412). 

NOTES OF ONE DAY'S DEBATE IN THE SENATE. 

Charles Carroll of Maryland : " The executive power 
is commensurate with the legislative and judicial pow- 
ers. 

*' The rule of construction of treaties, statutes, and 
deeds. 

" The same power which creates must annihilate. 
This is true where the power is simple, but when com- 
pound, not. 

" If a Minister is suspected to betray secrets to an 
enemy, the Senate not sitting, cannot the President dis- 
place nor suspend ? 

" The States Geneml of France demanded that offices 
should be during good behavior. 

" It is improbable that a bad President should be 
chosen ; but may not bad Senators be chosen ? 

"Is there a due balance of power between the exec- 
utive and legislative, either in the general government 
or State governments? 

" Montesquieu. English liberty will be lost when the 
legislative shall be more corrupt than the executive. 
Have we not been witnesses of corrupt acts of Legis- 
latures, making depredations? Rhode Island yet per- 
severes." 



EQUILIBEltTM OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER. 155 

Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut : " We are sworn to 
support the Constitution. 

" There is an explicit grant of power to the President 
which contains the power of removal. The executive 
power is granted ; not the executive powers hereinafter 
enumerated and explained. 

" The President, not the Senate, appoints ; they only- 
consent and advise. 

*' The Senate is not an executive council ; has no 
executive power. 

" The grant to the President express, not by impli- 
cation." 

Pierce Butler of South Carolina : " This power of re- 
moval would be unhinging the equilibrium of power in 
the Constitution. 

" The Stadtholder withheld the fleet from going out, 
to the .iniioyance of the enemies of the nation. 

" In treaties, all powers not expressly given, are re- 
served. Treaties to be gone over, clause by clause, by 
the President and Senate together, and modeled. 

" The other branches are imbecile ; disgust and 
alarm ; the President not sovereign ; the United States 
sovereign, o/ people or Congress sovereign. 

" The House of Representatives would not be in- 
duced to depart, so well satisfied of the grounds." 

Senator Ellsworth again : " The powers of this Con- 
stitution are all vested ; parted from the people, from 
the States, and vested, not in Congress, but in the 
President. 

" The word sovereignty is introduced without deter- 
minate ideas. Power in the last resort. In this sense 
the sovereign executive is in the President. 

"The United States will be parties to a thousand 
suits. Shall process issue in their name versus or for 
themselves ? 



156 THE PllESiDEi^T JHOT ABOVE THE LAW. 

"The President, it is said, may be put to jail for 
debt." 

Richard Henry Lee of Virginia : " United States 
merely figurative, meaning the people." 

William Grayson of Virginia : " The President is 
not above the law ; an absurdity to admit this idea 
into our government. Not improbable that the Presi- 
dent may be sued. Christina II of Sweden committed 
murder. France excused her. The jurors of our lord, 
the President, present that the President committed 
murder. A monarchy by a side wind. You make him 
vmdex injuriariim.^ The people will not like 'the ju- 
rors of our lord, the President,' nor * the peace of our 
lord, the President,' nor his dignity ; his crown will 
be left out. Do not wish to make the Constitution a 
more unnaturifl, monstrous production than it is. The 
British Court is a three-legged stool ; if one leg is . 
longer than another, the stool will not stand. 

" Unpalatable ; the removal of officers not palatable. 
We should not risk anything for nothing. Come for- 
ward like men, and reason openly, and the people will 
hear more quietly than if you attempt side winds. 
This measure will do no good, and will disgust." 

Senator R. H. Lee again : ** The danger to liberty 
greater from the disunited opinions and jarring plans 
of many than from the energetic operations of one. 
Marius, Sylla, Caesar, Cromwell trampled on liberty 
with armies. 

" The power of pardon ; of adjourning the Legisla- 
ture. 

" Power of revision sufficient to defend himself. He 
would be supported by the people. 

" Patronage gives great influence. The interference 
more nominal than real. 

* An avenger of injury. 



ENGLISH LIBERTY OWING TO JURIES. 157 

" The greater part of power of making treaties in the 
President. 

" The greatest power is in the President ; the less 
in the Senate. 

" Cannot see responsibility in the President or the 
great officers of state. 

" A masked battery of constructive powers would 
complete the destruction of liberty. 

" Can the Executive lay embargoes, establish fairs 
(sic), tolls, &c. 

" The Federal government is limited ; the legislative 
power of it is limited ; and therefore the executive and 
judicial must be limited. 

" The Executive not punishable but by universal con- 
vulsion, as Charles I. 

*' The legislative in England not so corrupt as the 
executive. 

" There is no responsibility in the President or min- 
istry. 

^^ JBlackstone. The liberties of England owing to 
juries. The greatness of England owing to the genius 
of that people. 

"The Crown of England can do what it pleases, 
nearly. 

"There is no balance in America to such an Exec- 
utive as that in England. 

" Does the executive arm mean a standing army ? 

"Willing to make a law that the President, if he 
sees gross misconduct, may suspend pro tempore.'' 

William Paterson of New Jersey : " Laments that 
we are obliged to discuss this question ; of great im- 
portance and much difficulty. 

" The executive coextensive with the legislative. Had 
the clause stood alone, would not there have been a dev- 
olution of all executive power ? 



{ I 



158 NO POWERS WITHOUT PBOPEE BALANCE^. 

" Exceptions are to be construed strictly. This is an 
invariable rule." 

Senator Grayson again : " The President has not a 
continental interest, but is a citizen of a particular State. 
A K. of E. otherwise ; K. of E. counteracted by a large, 
powerful, rich, and hereditary aristocracy. Hyperion 
to a satyr. 

" Where there are not intermediate powers, an alter- 
ation of the government must be to despotism. 

" Powers ought not to be inconsiderately given to 
the Executive without proj^er balances. 

" Triennial and septennial Parliaments made by cor- 
ruption of the Executive. 

"Bowstring.* General Lally. f Brutus's power to 
put his sons to death. 

" The power creating shall have that of uncreating. 
The Minister is to hold at pleasure of the appointer. 

"If it is in the Constitution, why insert it in the 
law ? Brought in by a side wind, inferentially. 

" There will be every endeavor to increase the consol- 
idatory powers ; to weaken the Senate and strengthen 
tlie President. 

" No evil in the Senate participating with the Presi- 
dent in removal." 

George Read of Delaware: "The President is to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is 
responsible. How can he do his duty or be responsible, 
if he cannot remove his instruments ? 

" It is not an equal sharing of the power of appoint- 

* A Turkish instrument of death. 

TyL^K^""''' ^' ^''"^' "" ^'^"""^ ^''^^'^''^ ""^^ distinguished himself in 
1757-58 by making a plucky but unsuccessful expedition against Eng- 
land s East Indian possessions, was born in Romans, Dauphiny, in 1V02 
and beheaded in Paris in 1766. Through the efforts of his son, the 
trial was revised and the sentence finally reversed in 17V8. 



A QUESTION OP EXPEDIENCY. 159 

ment between the President and Senate. The Senate 
are only a check to prevent impositions on the Presi- 
dent. 

" The Minister an agent, a deputy to the great Ex- 
ecutive. 

" Difficult to bring great characters to punishment 
or trial. 

" Power of suspension." 

William S. Johnson of Connecticut : " Gentlemen 
convince themselves that it is best the President should 
have the power, and then study for arguments. 

"Exceptions. Not a grant. Vested in the Presi- 
dent would be void for uncertainty. Executive power 
is uncertain. Powers are moral, mechanical, material. 
Which of these powers ? What executive power ? The 
land ; the money ; conveys nothing. What land ? what 
money ? 

" Unumquodque dissolvitur eodem modo quo ligatur.* 

" Meddles not with the question of expediency. 

" The executive wants power by its duration and its 
want of a negative, and power to balance. Federalist.'''* 

Senator Ellsworth asked : " What is the difference 
between a grant and a partition ? " 

Ralph Izard of South Carolina: " Cujus est insti- 
tuere, ejus est abrogare."f 



Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri, in the report 
of the Select Committee on amending the Constitution 
of the United States, made on March 1, 1826, in speak- 
ing of the construction put upon the Constitution by 
the first Congress, says it yielded to the President " the 
kingly prerogative of dismissing officers without the 

* A thing is loosed by the same means by which it is bound. 

f He who has the power to institute, has also the power to abrogate. 



160 THE FOUE-YEAES' TEiTUKE OF OFFICE LAW. 

formality of a trial." (Appendix to Gales & Seaton's 
"Debates," 1826, vol. ii, pt. ii, p. 132.) 

Daniel Webster, in a speech in the Senate, in 1835, 
on "The Appointing and Kemoving Power," said (Ev- 
erett's Webster, iv, 184, 185, 196): "I do not mean 
to deny, and the bill does not deny, that the President 
may remove officers at will, because the early decision 
adopted that construction, and the laws have since uni- 
formly sanctioned it. The law of 1820,* intended to 

* The four-years' tenure of office law, the first section of which (prac- 
tically the whole law) is as follows : 

*' That from and after the passage of this act all district attorneys, 
collectors of customs, naval officers, and surveyors of the customs, navy 
agents, receivers of public moneys for lands, registers of the land offices, 
paymasters in the army, the apothecary general, the assistant apotheca- 
ries general, and the commissary general of purchases, to be appointed 
under the laws of the United States, shall be appointed for the term of 
four years ; but shall be removable from office at pleasure." 

In 1836 all postmasters drawing an annual salary of $1,000 or more 
were also included in the provisions of the four-years' law. 

Thomas Jefferson, writing to James Madison on November 29, 1820, 
says of this law (vii, 190): "It saps the constitutional and salutary 
functions of the President, and introduces a principle of intrigue and 
corruption which will soon leaven the mass, not only of Senators, 
but of citizens. It will keep in constant excitement all the hungry cor- 
morants for office ; render them, as well as those in place, sycophants 
to their Senators ; engage these in eternal intrigue to turn out one and 
put in another, in cabals to swap work, and make of them, what all ex- 
ecutive directories become, mere sinks of corruption and faction." 

In reply Mr. Madison says : " The law terminating appointments at 
periods of four years is pregnant with mischiefs. * * * If the error 
be not soon corrected, the task will be very difficult, for it is of a nature 
to take a deep root." 

John Quincy Adams, who was till about 1805 an independent Feder- 
alist, and afterward an independent Republican, says (Morse's Adams, 
p. 179): "Efforts had been made by some of the Senators to obtain 
different nominations, and to introduce a principle of change or rotation 
ia office at the expiration of these commissions, which would make the 



ORIGINATED FOR CAMPAIGN PURPOSES. 161 

be repealed by this bill, expressly affirms the power. 
* * * At the same time, after considering the ques- 

government a. perpetual and unintermitting scramble for office. A more 
pernicious expedient could scarcely have been devised * * * I de- 
termined to renominate every person against whom there was no com- 
plaint which would have warranted his removal," 

Senator Samuel L. Southard of New Jersey, who, like Webster and 
others, advocated the repeal of the law, says (G. & S.'s Debates, 1835, 
vol. xi, pt. i, pp. 421, 422): " The law, as it stood, placed every man 
who was not above being bribed by office, in the market, feeling and 
acting on the principle that he was to support the man who would keep 
him in office. Pass the bill before the Senate and the result will be 
far different. Each officeholder would be independent, and would look 
solely to a faithful discharge of his duty for his continuance in office. 
As the law now stood * * * each one not influenced by pure mo- 
tives, would say to the Executive : ' Will you retain me in office if I 
support you ? ' " 

Mr. George William Curtis says (Senate Report No. 576, for 1882, p. 
154): " The law of 1820 * * * was introduced in the Senate by a 
friend of William H. Crawford of Georgia [Mahlon Dickerson], who was 
a presidential candidate, and it was introduced, as John Quincy Adams, 
who was then in Washington and in the Cabinet, specifically states, for 
the purpose of helping Mr. Crawford in his campaign." 

Mr. Curtis further says, in one of his annual civil service addresses at 
Newport, R. I., that the bill was drawn by Mr. Crawford himself. 

Mr. Dorman B. Eaton says (" The Term and Tenure of Office," pp. 
24, 28): "In that year (1820) William H. Crawford, Secretary of the 
Treasury, was a presidential candidate, and Van Buren, who was to 
come into the Senate in 1821 (even then an aspirant for the presidency), 
was Crawford's supporter. They were unsurpassed for their skillful use 
of patronage. Both were able to see that if the terms of the inferior 
officers were reduced to four years, there would be more patronage to 
dispose of. * * * The four-years' law, for which the only apology 
was the pretended need of bringing inferior officers to a more frequent 
and strict account before the people, was followed by 297 defaulting 
collectors, receivers, &c., reported by the Secretary of the Treasury to 
the House on March 30, 1838." 

But w^hile Mr. Crawford was probably the power behind the throne, 
and while the law may have been intended by him and a few others for 
campaign purposes only, there were probably but few statesmen of that 



162 UNSUSPECTING STATESMEN ENTBAPPED. 

tion again and again within the last six years, I am very 
willing to say that, in my deliberate judgment, the 
original decision was wrong. I cannot but think that 
those who denied the power in 1789 had the best of 
the argument. * * 'i^ I believe it to be within the just 
power of Congress to reverse the decision of 1789." * 



day who were aware of the fact, A few defalcations set the sensitive 
statesmen of 1820 to thinking about a remedy, and it may be that 
they were all caught in Mr. Crawford's four-years' law trap. However 
this may be, the defalcations spoken of by Mr. Eaton show that the too 
sensitive statesmen of 1820 made a mistake; in fact, that they got out 
of the frying-pan into the fire. 

Daniel Webster, in the course of his powerful speech on the appoint- 
ing and removing power, testifies to the conscientiousness of some of 
the statesmen of 1820, He desired to repeal the four-years' law, but 
he says : *' I agree that it has in some instances secured promptitude, 
diligence, and a sense of responsibility. These were the benefits which 
those who passed the law expected from it, and these benefits have in 
some measure been realized." 

Senator David Barton of Missouri says (G. & S.'s Debates, 1830, vol. 
vi, pt. i, pp. 464, 465) : " The legislator of 1820 naturally asked himself 
what term and tenure of office would attain the desired public security. 

* * * The evil of the old law was that, while the government w^as 
plodding through some tedious process of law, * * * the defaulter 
could embezzle our funds * * -Jfr and escape to Texas, &c., before 
the process had ascertained whether there was lawful cause for removal 
or not." 

Representative Ames, speaking in the first Congress of the slow pro- 
cess of removal by impeachment, predicted this precise result. He 
said : " While we are preparing the process, the mischief will be perpe- 
trated, and the offender will escape." 

* In a speech at Worcester, Mass., in 1832, Mr. Webster thus criti- 
cised President Jackson's official nominations and the patronage system 
(i, 262) : " Within the last three years more nominations have been 
rejected on the ground of ' unfitness ' than in all the preceding forty 
years of the government. And these nominations, you know, sir, could 
not have been rejected but by votes of the President's own friends. 

* * * In some not a third of the Senate, in others not ten votes, and 
in others not a single vote could be obtained, * * * ^n this, sir. 



MR. WEBSTER'S STATESMAN-LIKE WORDS. 163 

Henry Clay says (Colton's " Speeches of H. Clay," 
ii, 20) : " No one can carefully examine the debate in 
the House of Representatives in 1789 without being 
struck with the superiority of the argument on the 
side of the minority, and the unsatisfactory nature of 
that of the majority. How various are the sources 
whence the power is derived ! Scarcely an}?- two of 
the majority agree in their deduction of it." 

John C. Calhoun says (ii, 430) : *' I was struck, on 
reading the debate, with the force of the arguments 
of those who contended that the power (of remOval) 
was not vested by the Constitution in the Executive. 

is perfectly natural and consistent. The same party selfishness which 
drives good men out of office will push bad men in. Political proscrip- 
tion leads necessarily to the filling of offices with incompetent persons, ■ 
and to a consequent mal-execution of official duties. And in my opin- 
ion, sir, this principle, * * * unless the public shall effectually 
rebuke and restrain it, will entirely change the character of our govern- 
ment." 

Again, in his speech on the appointing and removing power, Mr. Web- 
ster thus philosophizes concerning the evils of patronage (iv, 180, 183): 
" The unlimited power to grant office and to take it away gives a com- 
mand over the hopes and fears of a vast multitude of men. It is gener- 
ally true that he who controls another man's means of living controls 
his will. Where there are favors to be granted there are usually enough 
to solicit for them ; and when favors once granted may be withdrawn at 
pleasure, there is ordinarily little security for personal independence of 
character. The power of giving office thus affects the fears of all who 
are in and the hopes of all who are out. Those who are ' out ' endeavor 
to distinguish themselves by active political friendship, by warm per- 
sonal devotion, by clamorous support of men in whose hands is the 
power of reward; while those who are 'in' ordinarily take care that 
others shall not surpass them in such qualities or such conduct as are 
most likely to secure favor. They resolve not to be outdone in any of 
the works of partisanship. The consequence of all this is obvious. 

" Men in office have begun to think themselves mere agents and ser- 
vants of the appointing power, and not agents of the government or thQ 
country." 



164. OPINIONS OF CALHOUN AND KENT. 

To me they appeared to be far more statesman-like 
than the opposite arguments, and to partake much 
more of the spirit of the Constitution." 

Again, in speaking of the powers of the President, 
Mr. Calhoun says (i, 219, 220) : " I do not add the 
power of removing officers, the tenure of whose office 
is not fixed by the Constitution, which has grown into 
practice ; because it is not a power vested in the Presi- 
dent by the Constitution, but belongs to the class of 
implied powers, and, as such, can only be rightfully 
exercised and carried into effect by the authority of 
Congress." 

Chancellor James Kent, speaking of the decision of 
the Congress of 1789, says (" Commentaries," i, 344) : 
"This question has never been made the subject of 
judicial discussion ; and the construction given to the 
Constitution in 1789 has continued to rest on this loose, 
incidental, declaratory opinion of Congress, and the 
sense and practice of government since that time. It 
may now be considered as firmly and definitively set- 
tled, and there is good sense and practical utility in 
the construction. It is, however, a striking fact in the 
constitutional history of our government that a power 
so transcendent as that is, which places at the disposal 
of the President alone the tenure of every executive 
officer appointed by the President and Senate, should 
depend upon inference merely, and should have been 
gratuitously declared by the first Congress in opposition 
to that high authority of the Federalist,* and should 
have been supported or acquiesced in by some of those 
distinguished men who questioned or denied the power 
of Congress even to incorporate a national bank." 

Joseph Story, LL.D., says (" Exposition of the Con- 
stitution," N. Y. Ed., 1881, p. 175) : "If we connect 
* Alexander Hamilton, 



JEi*fiSRsoit 01!^ THE s^nate*s poWee^. 165 

this power of removal * * * with another power, 
which is given in the succeeding clause, to fill up va- 
cancies in the recess of the Senate, the chief guards 
intended by the Constitution over the power of appoint- 
ment may become utterly nugatory. A President of 
high ambition and feeble principles may remove all 
officers, and make new appointments in the recess of 
the Senate ; and if his choice should not be confirmed 
by the Senate, he may reappoint the same persons in 
the recess, and thus set at defiance the salutary check 
of the Senate in all such cases." 

Senator George H. Williams of Oregon says (Sup- 
plement to Cong. Globe, 1868, p. 458) : " Concerning 
the decision of 1789, * * * j^ may be said that it 
was brought about by the arguments of James Madison 
in the House and the casting vote of Vice-President 
Adams in the Senate, both of whom at the time ex- 
pected to fill the executive office, and both of whom, 
it has been said, looked upon a contrary decision as 
expressing a want of confidence in the then adminis- 
tration of Washington.* Experience has demonstrated 
its mischievous and corrupting tendencies and effects." 

* The same reasons may have influenced Thomas Jefferson also. At 
the request of President Washington he wrote an " opinion whether the 
Senate has a right to negative the * grade ' he (the President) may think 
it expedient to use in a foreign mission as well as the * person ' to be 
appointed," in the course of which he said (" Works of John Adams," 
iii, 576) : " The Senate is not supposed by the Constitution to be ac- 
quainted with the concerns of the executive department. It was not 
intended that these should be communicated to them; nor can they 
therefore be qualified to judge of the necessity which calls for a mission 
to any particular place, or of the particular grade, more or less marked, 
which special and secret circumstances may call for. All this is left to 
the President. They are only to see that no unfit person is employed." 

The original manuscript of this Opinion was found among President 
Adams's papers. As he was Washington's successor in office, the latter 
probably gave it to him for reference. It is not in Jefferson's own works. 



166 *HE CRITICS SOMEWHAT PREJUDICE^. 

Representative Chilton Allan of Kentucky says (G. 
& S.'s Debates, 1833-34, vol. x, pt. iii, pp. 3354-56) : 
" The first fatal error that crept into our system ol 
government was the power conferred in 1789 upon the 
President to remove public officers — a power given to 
the popularity of President Washington, and which he 
never abused — a power that remained harmless in the 
statute ^book for forty years. This power has been 
called up from its long slumber. It has displayed its 
character. * * * The power of removal for opinion's 
sake at once saps the foundation of republican govern- 
ment and introduces the spirit of monarchy. * * * 
This power of removal, in its origin, was not intended 
to go further than to the removal of officers for whose 
conduct the President is immediately responsible. But 
of late the broad ground is taken that he can command 
and remove those for whose conduct he is not respon- 
sible." 



The foregoing criticisms of the decision of the first 
Congress express the prejudice rather than the deliber- 
ate judgment of the critics. President Jackson's whole- 
sale removals created such a profound impression on 
the statesmen of his day, that even Mr. Webster ad- 
mitted that they may have biased his judgment. This 
must have been true, for otherwise how could such a 
statesman fail to commend the profound arguments of 
the majority in the great debate, some of which experi- 
ence has proved to be true? 

The American people are possessed of an inherent fear 
of monarchical power. But they came by it honestly, 
for it is hereditary, having been transmitted down from 
the forefathers. In further proof of this fact, let the 
following extracts from the speeches and writings of 
President Jackson's contemporaries speak for them- 



TliE PRESIDENT TOO BUSY FOR MISCHIEF. 16? 

selves. They do not all refer directly to the power of 
removal, but, like the preceding criticisms, they show 
the same fear and dislike of monarchical power and the 
same prejudice caused by President Jackson's removals. 
The speakers all feared and some predicted direful 
future results. They were greatly alarmed at the pros- 
pect of a corrupt President. A corrupt President would 
be a calamity. But the President is so beset as it were 
by constitutional checks, the most potent perhaps being 
the power of impeachment, that no permanent injury 
need be feared unless the people as well as the Presi- 
dent become corrupt. Besides the constitutional checks, 
the President nowadays is so engaged in the transaction 
of legitimate business that he has but little time to con- 
coct conspiracies. Further, political conspiracies, com- 
paratively speaking, are rare in this country. They 
are in fact opposed to the genius of American institu- 
tions. But in spite of all this, the wise words of the 
far-seeing statesmen of 1789 and 1829 cannot be too 
carefully weighed or too much heeded 

Senator David Barton of Missouri says (G. & S.'s 
Debates, 1829-30, vol. vi, pt. i, pp. 368, 462) : " He 
denied that in any cases, except the Cabinet officers, 
the Federal officers were ever intended to be rendered 
the servile creatures of the Executive, * * * but) 
were intended to be freemen, looking to the faithful 
performance of their duties and to the protection of 
the Senate and the laws for their offices. It was fit 
that the officers of a despot should live or die by the 
breath of their master. That suited such form of gov- 
ernment. Not so in a republic — a government of law. 
* * * If this abuse of the offices be tolerated, his- 
tory will tell posterity that a combination of aspirants 
destroyed the constitutional liberties of the United 
States by the usual gradations of tyranny and bribery, 



16S EEMOtAtS MtS* NOT StrfiSERVU AMBlflOJf. 

as was feared and deprecated by the Father of his 
Country!" 

Senator George M. Bibb of Kentucky, speaking of 
President Jackson's " Protest," * and of the power of 
removal, says ('* Debates," 1833-34, vol. x, pt. ii, pp. 
1499, 1513): "The power of removal of officers, al- 
though not expressly limited by the Constitution to 
any particular specified causes, is yet qualified and reg- 
ulated by the public uses and benefits for which it was 
conferred, and is abused and perverted when exercised 
^Q * * * subserve selfish ambition. * * * jje 
(the President) makes and unmakes at his pleasure. 
*This is my will, and that is your duty. I take the 
responsibility. Obey me, or I dismiss you, and supply 
your place by one whose opinions are well known to 
me.' Can it be true ? Does any free man believe that 
all officers, subject to removal, are also subject to the 
order and direction of the President in the exercise of 
the duties and trusts which their offices impose, and 
which they are bound by oath to execute faithfully ? 
Is the President the sole interpreter of the Constitution 
and laws for them ? * * * This prerogative power 
far exceeds any possessed by the King of England, for 
there it is an established maxim that ' no man shall 
dare assist the Crown in contradiction to the laws of 



* President Jackson's " Protest," which was really an argument in 
defense of his course in removing the deposits in the United States 
Bank, was brought out by the following resolution, which was intro- 
duced by Senator Clay : 

Resolved, That the President, in the late executive proceedings in 
relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and 
power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of 
both. 

This resolution was expunged from the journal January 16, 183 7, hy 
Avoteof 24to 19. 



fas laWs a^ov£2 Tii^ eoMMiisDs oi? m^i?. 16D 

the land.' * * * They (the writers of the Protest) 
might have learned from the speeches and writings of 
the wise and virtuous of ancient and modern times that 
no government is well constituted ' unless the laws pre- 
vail above the commands of men.' " * 

Representative George McDuffie of South Carolina 
says (Debates, vol. x, pt. iii, pp. 3454, 3455) : "I have 
deemed it important to speak thus distinctly on the dis- 
missing power, because I have a deep and solemn con- 
viction that if Congress does not interpose, speedily and 
effectually interpose on this subject, the day is not dis- 
tant when this government will sink into deep corrup- 
tion and absolute monarchy. * * * jf y^^ bring all 
the offices of this government into the political market 
as the legitimate * spoils of victory ; ' if every aspirant 
to the presidential office inscribes on his banner this 
celebrated motto to animate his partisans, is not the 
whole mass of the offices and patronage of your gov- 
ernment converted into a mighty fund of corruption, 
sufficient to purchase an imperial crown, and which 
no human contrivance can permanently resist ? Mr. 
Speaker, the immense patronage of this government, 
under this new doctrine of the absolute right of every 
new President to discharge all the incumbents from 
office at his mere will and pleasure, to make way for 
his partisans, is a power I would not trust in the hands 
of an angel, if there were an angel in human form." 

* Senator Bibb further says : " One of the great securities for liberty 
consists in the division of the powers of government. Thus safety in 
legislation is consulted by having many Senators and many Representa- 
tives. Safety in the judicial department is consulted by having a plu- 
rality of judges. So the safety in the executive department consists in 
distributing the povs^ers into numerous compartments, subjecting each 
officer to a personal responsibility, and to the law ; whereby a govern- 
ment of laws is created, and not a government at the will of one man," 

(P, mi.) 

9 



170 EfiMoVlL OP BEV0LU*l6i^^AEf SOLMlESi. 

Senator John Tyler of Virginia says (Debates, vol. x, 
pt. i, pp. 672, 673): "Is the presidential power only 
to be considered dangerous when he (the President) is 
at the head of an army ? Patronage is the sword and 
the cannon by which war may be made on the liberty 
of the human race. * * * If the offices of the gov- 
ernment shall be considered but as 'spoils,' to be dis- 
tributed among a victorious party, then indeed, sir, the 
consequences are most fatal. All stability in govern- 
ment mui5t be at an end. Novices are introduced in 
the place of long-tried, experienced, and faithful public 
agents, and the public interests necessarily suffer, and 
suffer severely." 

Senator Peleg Sprague of Maine says (p. 388) : " Since 
the political victory of 1828, the vultures have been 
screaming over the battle-field, and * even the cries of 
the widows and the orphan ' could not scare them from 
their prey. A spirit of proscription for opinion's sake, 
scarcely paralleled in the annals of free governments, 
has swept in terror over the land, prostrating the purest 
and the best, breaking down the independent, bending 
the feeble, and leaving the timid, like trembling slaves, 
to eat their bread in fear. Veteran soldiers of the 
Revolution have been sacrificed for daring to exercise 
the freedom for which they fought ! Officers of the 
late war, Republicans of '98, patriots at all times, have 
been punished for daring, in a republican country, to 
breathe the language of freemen ! " 

Senator Samuel L. Southard of New Jersey says (pp. 
161, 162) : "I do not mean at this time to discuss the 
existence of the power of dismission, or to question its 
constitutionality. * * * rpj^^ gp^-jg ^^ ^^^,^^ * * * 

are the triumphs of corruption over virtue and the Con- 
stitution. The power of dismission, if to be exercised 
M all, should be exercised for competent cause } an^ 



Patrick ueney feaes power and :tiNGs. iH 

that competent cause must exist in the law, and by 
the commands of the law ; must be connected with the 
actual discharge of the duties required by law ; to pre- 
vent the performance of acts expressly forbidden by 
law ; to secure the performance of acts expressly com- 
manded by law ; to relieve from fraud and mental in- 
capacity to discharge the duties arising under circum- 
stances which could not otherwise be controlled. * * * 
There is not a man on earth to whom I would confide 
it in the extent now claimed by the advocates of the 
Executive." 

Representative William F. Gordon of Virginia says 
(Debates, vol xi, pt. ii, pp. 1282, 1285, 1286) : '" I verily 
believe * * * the wise and patriotic framers of our 
Constitution have unintentionally given to the execu- 
tive power a fearful and dangerous ascendency, which 
makes it an overbalance to all the other departments of 
government. * * * Patrick Henry* uttered this 
sententious maxim of political wisdom : * When you 
give power, you know not what you give.' * * * 
We may all very plainly see that the contest for the 
executive office is the rock on which the permanency 
of this republic is likely to be wrecked ; and the vehe- 
mence of this contest will ever be in proportion to the 
executive patronage. * * * I desire to limit and 
restrain the executive patronage." 

* Mr. Henry's words were spoken in the Virginia Convention of 1788, 
the Convention that adopted the national Constitution, Speaking of 
the Constitution, Mr. Henry said (Wirt's " Life of Patrick Henry," p, 
296): " This Constitution is said to have beautiful features. When I 
come to examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly fright- 
ful ! Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting. It squints 
toward monarchy » * * * Your President may easily become Kinir," 

Mr. Henry opposed the adoption of the Constitution with more elo- 
quence than reason. But despite his and other men's eloquenge it was 
adopted by a vote of 89 to Id. 



i^2 STATEMENT OE RI^ASONS FOR EEMOfAt. 

Albert Gallatin, one of the founders of the govern- 
ment, and for fourteen years Secretary of the Treasury 
under Jefferson and Madison, in a letter to his wife, 
dated Washington, May 2, 1829, says (Adams's Galla- 
tin, p. 633) : " On every occasion I have freely expressed 
my entire disapprobation of the system of removal for 
political opinions." 

Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland says (Debates, 
1831-32, vol. viii, pt. i, p. 1363): "I am opposed to 
removals from office for opinions declared. But, sir, I 
l\^ould remove any officer who made use of his office to 
force inferiors to act contrary to their wishes. I would 
remove every postmaster who had been known to frank 
the 'coffin handbills,' or any other abusive papers of 
either of the candidates." 

Senator Thomas Ewing of Ohio says (Debates, vol. 
X, pt. ii, p. 1416) : *• I will advise and consent to the 
appointment of no man, to any office, who has earned 
that appointment in the arena as a political gladiator. 
And I will advise and consent to the reappointment of 
no man to any responsible office who, while he held that 
office, abused it to the mere purposes of party, instead 
of using it for the benefit of his country. * * * At 
the same time I would inquire into no man's political 
opinions or personal preferences. It is a gross abuse 
that such inquiries have ever been made in appointments 
to office." 

Senator Hugh L. White of Tennessee says (Debates, 
vol. xi, pt. i, pp. 488-9) : " It is asked by the opponents 
of this bill what benefit its friends expect from a state- 
ment of the reasons of the removal when the nomination 
of a successor is presented to the Senate. I answer for 
inyself, I wish to cut up by the roots the demoralizing 
tendencies of office-hunting. * * * Under the pres- 
ent state of things * * * office-hunting will become 



HOW OFFICE-HUNTERS DECEIVE PRESIDENT. ll^ 

a science. Men will be selected and furnished with 
funds to defray the expense of coming to Washington 
for the purpose of having one set turned out and an- 
other set put in, by means of artful tales, secretly got- 
ten up and reduced to writing, which it is supposed 
will never see the light. This officer and representative 
of office hunters will come on with one pocket full of 
bad characters, with which to turn out incumbents, and 
the other filled with good characters, with which to 
provide for his constituents. * * * Require the 
reasons for removal to be stated, and no man will dare 
to make a statement which he does not believe to be 
true, because exposure and disgrace will certainly be 
the consequence. You will take out of the hand of the 
cowardly assassin the poisoned dagger heretofore used 
in the dark. You will shield the Executive against 
mistakes founded on false representations." 

Senator Benton, chairman of a Committee on Exec- 
utive Patronage, in a report made on May 4, 1826, says 
(Appendix to G. & S.'s Debates, vol. ii, pt. ii, p. 133) : 
" In coming to the conclusion that executive patronage 
ought to be diminished and regulated on the plan pro- 
posed, the Committee* rest their opinion on the ground 
that the exercise of great patronage in the hands of 
one man has a tendency to sully the purity of our in- 
stitutions and to endanger the liberties of the country. 
This doctrine is not new. A jealousy of power, f and 
of the influence of patronage, which must always ac- 
company its exercise, has ever been a distinguished 

* The Committee consisted of Senators T. H Benton of Missouri, 
Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, Martin Van Buren of New York, 
Hugh L. White of Tennessee, William Findlay of Pennsylvania, Mahlon 
Dickerson of New Jersey, John Holmes of Maine, Robert Y. Hayne of 
South Carolina, and Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky. 

j- Compare with page 166, 



174 PKESIDENT J. Q. ADAMS CREATES A FLURRY. 

feature in the American character. It displayed itself 
strongly at the period of the formation and of the 
adoption of the Federal Constitution. * * * Noth- 
ing could reconcile the great men of that day to a Con- 
stitution of so much power but the guards which were 
put upon it against the abuse of power. Dread and 
jealousy of this abuse displayed itself throughout the 
instrument. To this spirit we are indebted for the free- 
dom of the press, trial by jury, liberty of conscience, 
freedom of debate, responsibility to constituents, power 
of impeachment, the control of the Senate over appoint- 
ments to office." 

The American jealousy of power is still further illus- 
trated by the following extracts from speeches in the 
United States Senate in 1826.* 

Senator John Branch of North Carolina says (De- 
bates, vol. ii, pt. i, pp. 386, 387) : "It is tirtie to re- 
enact Magna Charta. It is time to reassert the prin- 
ciples of the Declaration of Independence. * * * 
Are we dependent on the whim, or caprice, or courtesy 
of the President for power? * * * The Senate w^as 
wisely designed to act as a check on the appointing 
power. * * * It is intended, I trust, to be perpetual. 
It was so designed. But I have the most awful fore- 
bodings that it will not be. * * * It (the Con- 
stitution) may not prove an adequate protection against 
the insidious encroachments of ambitious leaders." 

Senator John Randolph of Virginia says (p. 392) : 
"Since the revolution of 1801, the practice has been 
settled that the Secretary of State shall succeed the 

* These speeches were the result of a special message from President- 
John Q. Adams, wherein he claimed the independent right to appoint 
a representative to a " Congress of American Nations, to be assembled 
at Panama." But out of courtesy to the Senate, he did not exercise tlie 
filleted right. 



PATRONAGE LIKE ARCHIMEDES'S LEVER 175 

President. Hence it is that the Secretaryship of State 
has been the apple of discord under all administrations 
succeeding that of Mr. Jefferson. It was the bone of 
contention between Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Robert Smith. 
There are more here besides myself (looking at Mr. 
Macon) that know it. It has been the apple of discord, 
ay, and of concord too, sir, since. It has been the 
favorite post and position of every bad, ambitious man, 
whether apostate Federalist or apostate Republican, who 
wishes to get into the presidency, * * * 'honestly 
if they may, corruptly if they must.' It has been that 
which Archimedes wanted to move the world, * * * 
'a place to stand upon,' ay, and to live upon too, sir, 
and, with the lever of patronage, to move our little 
world." 

Senator Littleton W. Tazewell of Virginia says (p. 
602) : " I utterly deny the correctness of this doctrine, 
which seeks to create a new, substantive, and fruitful 
source of power, in existing or future Presidents, from 
the past practices of their predecessors. And I deny 
more strongly, if I may do so, the authority to enlarge 
the volume of power issuing from this newly discovered 
fountain by the process of induction and reasoning by 
analogy. Let it be once granted that the practice of one 
President gives a legitimate authority to his successor, 
and that this authority may be enlarged by analogies, 
and it must be obvious to all that the power granted 
by the people to the Executive, although made by the 
Constitution but a school-boy's snow-ball, in a few turns 
would become a monstrous avalanche, that must one 
day crush themselves." 

Senator John Chandler of Maine says (pp. 633, 634, 
635) : " Hardly a session of Congress passed but what 
some power, some patronage was gained by the Execu- 
tive. * * * In this government the departments 



1V(3 POWERS SHOULD BALANCE LIKE A SEE-SAW. 

were to balance each other. How was this balance to 
be kept up ? Not by constantly increasing the power 
of one department of the government ; but the House 
of Representatives should take care of the portion com- 
mitted to them, the Senate theirs, and the President his. 
* * * Balance anything. Get a rail and play at see- 
saw. Give one a little more than the other, and away 
he would go. So it was with these powers. Give one 
of them only a hair's breadth more than it ought to 
have, and the balance would be destroyed. * * * 
Governments were made on the suspicion that all those 
who had power would go wrong." 



CHAPTER IX. 

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY. 

Its Utility. — The Civil Service Systems of England, Canada, British 
India, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, and China. 

A SHORT account of the civil service laws and cus- 
toms of a few representative nations is a fitting con- 
clusion to this book. Comparative political economy, 
past as well as present, is a useful and instructive study. 
It ought to be made a distinct branch of study in all 
governments, for it is full of information and promise. 
Like comparative anatomy (and pathology also, for na- 
tions suffer with diseases as it were), it reveals new 
sources of light. It is as broad as the earth itself, and 
as various as the divisions and subdivisions of men. 
If the combined wisdom of the world does not at least 
approximate perfection, what will?* The bigot and 
the narrow-minded man only will reject useful laws or 
regulations because they were originated in England, 
France, China, or India. The time may come when it 
will be said of the United States of 1888, "They had 
only the fragment of a government, for they either re- 
jected or were ignorant of the wisdom of other nations." 
What would be thought of a nation that rejected the 
telegraph because it had its origin in another nation? 
Washington's recommendation, which was approved by 
Jefferson, of the establishment of a National Univer- 

* Let us avail ourselves of the wisdom and experience of former 
ages. Let us aggregate the knowledge of every nation. — John Vining. 



178 HISTORY OF ENGLISH EIaMiNAI^IOI^S. 

sity for " the education of our youth in the science o^ 
government " was certainly a wise one. 

The English civil service law is much like our own ; 
but it contains provisions that ours does not, namely. 
Preliminary examinations are held for the purpose of 
weeding out those who are " too stupid or ignorant to 
have a chance on a competitive trial." Pensions are 
granted, provided the official has served ten years — • 
one sixtieth of the original salary being allowed for 
ten years of service, and an additional sixtieth for each 
succeeding year till the fortieth, when the increase stops. 
Pecuniary embarrassment, caused by an officeholder's 
imprudence, forfeits " that honorable position in the 
service which is necessary to give him a claim to pro- 
motion or increase of salary from length of service." 
There is a " movable clerical force of all work," that 
goes " from department to department, as convenience 
may require." These salutary regulations are worthy 
of imitation. 

Mr. Dorman B. Eaton says that promotion examina- 
tions for the customs service were begun in England 
by Lord Liverpool in 1820 ; that non competitive ex- 
aminations were begun by Lord Melbourne between 
1834 and 1841, but that "the decisive part of the con- 
test between patronage and open competition was be- 
tween 1845 and 1855, though the victors did not take 
possession of the whole field until 1870." Lor-d Mel- 
bourne favored competitive examinations, but they were 
thought to be " too great an innovation to begin at 
once." The order for the competitive system of exam- 
ination was issued on May 21, 1855. 

In Canada an act of Parliament was passed in 1882 
providing for non-competitive civil service examinations. 
It was amended in 1883, 1884, and 1885. The exam- 
inations are (1) prelimmary, for lower grade offices ; 



THE PRACTICAL KEQIJIREMENTS IN CANADA. 179 

(2) qiiaUfying, for clerkships and higher grade offices ; 

(3) promotion^ for those ah-eady in the service. The 
preliminary and qualifying examinations are held twice 
a year ; the promotion but once. But when the exi- 
gencies of the service require it, provision is made for 
special examinations. The examinations are held simul- 
taneously throughout the Dominion, and are conducted 
by subexaminers. The written papers are transmitted 
to the Board of Examiners at Ottawa, where they are 
examined and valued. The successful candidates in 
the preliminary and qualifying examinations receive 
certificates and have their names printed in the Offi- 
cial Gazette. Candidates who pass the preliminary 
examination, have the option of taking the qualifying 
one also. The examinations embrace the elementarj^ 
branches of education, but candidates are permitted to 
take certain prescribed optional subjects. These are 
translating English into French and French into Eng- 
lish, book-keeping, short-hand, telegraphy, type-writing, 
and ^precis' writing. The last consists in condensing 
the salient points of reports, &c., into about a fourth 
of the printed matter. For the inside service, that 
is, for those employed in the different departments at 
Ottawa (the capital), there is an additional allowance 
of $50 per annum for every additional optional subject, 
not exceeding four, in which a candidate may pass. In 
most cases an annual increase of salary is allowed, but 
it cannot exceed the prescribed limit of the respective 
classes. When a vacancy occurs in a class next above 
the one in Avhich an employe is serving, he may, on 
passing the promotion examination, be promoted to it. 
lie thus reaps the advantage of a double increase of 
salary — (l) by promotion ; (2) by annual increase. Ex- 
aminations are held in either the English or French lan- 
guage, at the option of the candidate. Thirty per cent. 



180 MK. THOEBUEIS" I'AVOSS (30MPSl:iTl^E TESTS. 

of the marks allowed for each branch of study and 
fifty per cent, of the aggregate number of marks given 
to all the subjects must be attained. That is, if there 
are eight subjects taken, there must be 400 marks made. 
There is a probationary period of six months, both for 
original and promotion appointments. The respective 
ages at and between which all ordinary appointments 
to the inside service are made are 15, 18, and 35 years — 
15 for places below that of a third-class clerk ; in other 
cases 18. Deputy Heads of Departments, officers, and 
employes, whose appointments are of a permanent char- 
acter, can only be removed from office by authority of 
the Governor in Council. Employes guilty of miscon- 
duct or neglect of duty are suspended without pay till 
such time as the suspension is removed. There is an 
attendance hook in which all employes, under Deputy 
Heads, are required to record their names every morn- 
ing, or at such other times as may be required by the 
Governor in Council. 

In a letter dated Ottawa, Canada, September 9, 1887, 
J. Thorburn, LL.D., Chairman of the Board of Exam- 
iners, to whom I am indebted for the foregoing facts 
in regard to the Canadian civil service system, says : 

Dear Sir: The civil service examinations in Canada 
differ in some important respects from those in Great 
Britain and in the United States. With us they are 
only qualifying, not necessarily, when passed, leading 
to appointments ; whereas with you and in England, 
with a few specified exceptions, they are competitive. 
In this respect, I am satisfied, you have the advantage 
of us, for, as is now generally admitted, the more fully 
the political element is eliminated from them, the better 
it is for the public service. 

Our government has not hitherto seen its way to 



lEAUKli^G THEIR PROMOTION. 181 

adopt a competitive system. It retains the power of 
selecting any candidate who has passed the examina- 
tion test, irrespective of his standing as compared with 
that of others, and the result therefore naturally follows 
that as soon as an applicant for office finds that he has 
" passed the Rubicon," he sets to work at once to bring 
all the pressure, political, social, or religious, that he 
can obtain to bear upon the different ministers of the 
Crown, and it will generally be found that the weakest 
and least deserving of the candidates, conscious of their 
deficiencies, are those that make the most strenuous and 
persistent efforts to secure political backing. 

Another serious drawback to our qualifying system 
of examination is to be found in the fact that out of 
the large number of candidates who every year reach 
the standard required by the examiners, probably not 
more than one in twenty has the least prospect of ap- 
pointment. In course of time therefore we shall have a 
large army of disappointed aspirants, each one of whom 
thinks he has some special claim upon the government, 
waiting for something to turn up, instead of betaking 
themselves to other avocations of life. 

You will see from the copy of the rules and regula- 
tions sent to you that we have a promotion examination 
for those already in the service. This has given rise 
to considerable opposition, especially on the part of 
those who have been a long time in the service. The 
experience, however, of the Deputy Heads has been 
largely in its favor. It exercises a wholesome and 
steadying influence on the younger members of the ser- 
vice when they know that they have to ea^'n their pro- 
motion, instead of relying for it upon the interest and 
solicitations of influential friends. I find that in Eng- 
land they have a modified form of promotion examina- 
tions. These are held at the request of the heads of 



182 COMPETITIVE TESTS iH fiMfiSfl lNi)lA. 

the several departments for the purpose of selecting 
those who are fittest for promotion or reward, but they 
are not necessarily required by law. 

In reply to your question as to the extent of the 
reform in Her Majesty's dominions, I answer that the 
system of examination for public offices is in operation 
in India, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
New Zealand, and Jamaica, and so far as I have been 
able to learn, it is found to work satisfactorily. 
Respectfully yours, 

J. THORBURN. 

In another letter (April 11, 1888) Mr. Thorburn says : 
" The government has decided to have only one prelim- 
inary and qualifying examination instead of two a year. 
The Secretary of State has given notice of his intention 
to make certain slight emendations in the civil service 
act. When there are 80 or 100 candidates at an ex- 
amination, it is difficult to keep them from copying 
from each other ; and in some cases we have had can- 
didates personating others. To deal with such cases 
the Chairman will be authorized to examine witnesses 
under oath, and have the delinquents punished. I am 
not without hope that we shall yet have competitive 
examinations in Canada." 

The British India civil service law, which requires 
strict competitive examinations, was passed in 1853, 
two years before the passage of the English act. In 
fact, England wished to try an experiment, and began 
it in India. The plan for the enforcement of the law 
was drawn by Lord Macaulay, Lord Ashburton, Doctor 
Melvill, Doctor Jowett, and Sir John S. Lefevre. 

" India," says Mr. E. F. Waters, " has a special ad - 
ministration, dijffering from all the other dependencies 
of the Crown. Her Governor has larger powers, and 



THE VAEIETY OE LANGUAGE IN INDIA. 183 

all appointments in the civil, medical, engineering, and 
artillery services of that immense and densely popula- 
ted country (150,000,000 people) are based upon com- 
petitive examination. * * * Different candidates 
are examined (according to the different Provinces of 
India, or the different departments they may vs^ish to 
enter), in addition to ordinary studies, in jurisprudence, 
law of evidence, law of India, political economy, his- 
tory and geography of India, Arabic, Bengali, Hindi, 
Hindustani, Malayalum, Marathi, Persian, Sanskrit, 
Tamil, and Telugu." 

Mr. D. B. Eaton says that natives of France, Canada, 
Brazil, and the United States have won appointments 
in the Indian service. 

Non-competitive examinations were held in British 
India long before 1853, but they were not very success- 
ful, notwithstanding the applicants were required to 
attend Haileybury College for two years. For exam- 
ple, Mr. Eaton says that in the years 1851 to 1854, both 
inclusive, 437 applicants were examined for commissions 
in the Indian army. Nearly a third failed in English 
and a still greater number in arithmetic. This college, 
which was conducted on the patronage system plan, 
was abolished in 1854. 

In Prussia (Germany) the civil service has been gov- 
erned since her humiliation in 1806 by the first Napo- 
leon as scientifically perhaps as has her military ser- 
vice, which, in turn, in 1870-71, humiliated the third 
Napoleon, and one has improved and strengthened the 
government about as much perhaps as the other.* The 
following speaks for itself (Cyclopedia of Political Sci- 

* Prussia owes it very much to the high order of efficiency which has 
been introduced into her civil service that she has risen to be one of 
the first powers in the world. Improvements in administration have 
hardly been less in France and Great Britain.— C. C. Andrews. 



184 EXAMINATIO:n" And RE-EXAMINATIOlif. 

ence, iii, 445) : " Various services are directly subor- 
dinate to the Ministry of State (council of ministers), 
such as the official journal, the archives, printing, and 
various others, notably the Commission of Examination 
for future functionaries. To be a functionary it is nec- 
essary to have studied three years at the University, 
to have passed a period of instruction and preparation 
for the public service, and to undergo a new examina- 
tion, called the state examination^ before the Commis- 
sion. The candidate then obtains the title of Assessor, 
which confers the right of being employed and compen- 
sated, but some time elapses before a place with the 
title of Councilor can be had. The functionaries of 
lower grade and simple employes, are likewise obliged 
to pass an examination, but the requirements are not 
so great. 

" As to the internal organization of the public ser- 
vices, some are organized into bureaus ; that is, they 
have a chief, a sole functionary, and employes. But 
most of these services have Councils or Committees, in 
which the President often has a great preponderance, 
but in which each Co.uncilor has his powers (decernat) 
clearly defined." 

In France the civil service is free of politics and pub- 
lic offices are held during good behavior. Mr. E. F. 
Waters, who has traveled in France and other parts of 
Europe, and who was for twenty years an editor of 
the Boston Daily Advertiser, in a pamphlet (issued in 
1881) entitled "The Great Struggle in England for 
Honest Government," says (p. 28) : " It is not con- 
tended that the English service is the best attainable. 
The French system is in some respects better. * It is 
the result of nearly a hundred years of experience. 
Every officer in it below Minister of Finance, com- 
menced his service in a clerkship, or some more subor- 



GREAT STABILITY OF SERVICE IN PRANCE. 185 

dinate position, and the advancement which his fidelity 
and ability secured has never been hindered by polit- 
ical frowns, or even by political revolutions. His ap- 
pointment was without partiality, and public examina- 
tions have awarded him his promotions.* For more 
than fifty years a record has been kept of every man's 
official conduct, as reported by different superior of- 
ficers. * * * Under such a system, it becomes 
almost impossible for an unworthy man to work his 
way to a position where his incompetency or corruption 
can largely prejudice the reputation of the service, or 
materially affect the revenue of the empire.' " 

In a letter dated October 10, 1887, Mr. Waters fur- 
ther says of the French civil service : " It is bureau- 
cratic, but intelligent, honest, and faithful. Their en- 
tire idea is to do their duty, and nothing else, and they 
take an extreme pride in their position. A common 
track-guard on a State railway is as proud as a King 
of his position, and although courteous, is unrelenting 
in carrying out instructions. Nothing can exceed the 
courtesy of the higher trained officials." f 

Concerning the French diplomatic and consular ser- 
vices Mr. Abram S. Hewitt says (Cong. Record, 1878, 
p. 1652) : "A most elaborate scheme of examination is 
laid down for admission to the permanent consular and 
diplomatic services. The examinations embrace interna- 
tional law, diplomatic history, statistics, political econ- 
omy, geography, and the languages — two modern lan- 
guages besides their own. * * * Promotion is made 
from the lower grades of the entire foreign service." 

* Compare with page 56, " with or without the President," &c. 

f The prodigious eagerness for office in France is due, in a very large 
degree, to the fact that government offices are permanent, a quality 
which more than makes up for the extreme smallness of the salaries, — 

E. L. GODKIN. 



186 AN INGEXlOrS SWINDLE CHECKED. 

These eminently practical examinations have been in 
force for about sixty-five years. 

In Sweden subordinate public officials and employes 
are appointed without regard to politics and serve dur- 
ing good behavior. This has been the rule since 1809, 
the date of the adoption of the present Constitution. 
Subordinate officials can only be removed after trial, 
but are suspended immediately on complaint. Experi- 
ence has shown that any tendency this rule may have 
to cause disrespect or disobedience is overbalanced by 
the hope of promotion and better pay, which can only 
be attained by faithful service. Some of the higher 
officials, however, can be removed by the King without 
trial. Again, notwithstanding strict non-competitive 
examinations for all officials are required, the King, in 
cases of emergency, can dispense with them. All ap- 
pointments are made by the King and his Ministers. 

It is noteworthy that there are three entirely different 
sets of distillery inspectors — the wit)iess, the controller, 
and the over controller. One watches the other. All 
are required to see that no distillery manufactures more 
than the annual prescribed quantity of liquors. This 
latter provision, in case the liquor tax is raised, prevents 
an ingenious swindle. In the United States, for exam- 
ple, when there is talk of increasing the liquor tax, dis- 
tilleries usually double their manufacture. When the 
tax is actually raised, little or no liquor is manufac- 
tured for about a year. The government thus loses 
heavily the first year after the increase. 

There are two distinct grades of education for public 
offices in Sweden.* For subordinate offices, such as the 

* In Sweden " education is not free except for the poor ; but it is ob- 
ligatory in this sense, that children cannot be admitted to their first 
communion until they are able to read and write." ("Cyclopedia of 
Political Science," iii^ 838.) 



THE EDUCATION REQUIRED IN SWEDEK. 18^ 

post and customs departments, it is only required that 
a person sliall have graduated at a high school ; but 
for those who wish to enter any of the higher branches 
of the service, it is necessary to pass at least one of two 
examinations at the University. There are two high 
school courses — the practical and the classical. The 
practical course consists of geography, history, arithme- 
tic, algebra, trigonometry, chemistry, mineralogy, bot- 
any, drawing, and the French, English, and German 
languages. The classical course embraces the Latin, 
Greek, and Hebrew languages instead of the English 
and German. It is necessary to pass an examination 
in one of these courses in order to enter the University. 
The University course consists of political economy, 
judicial encyclopedia, the law of nations, Swedish con- 
stitutional law, administrative law, the law of private 
rights, and legal process. There are three University 
examinations, the preliminary, requiring about a year's 
study, and the written and oral, requiring from two 
to two and a half years of additional study. Each an- 
swer in the written examination must be wholly im- 
promptu, and must be made in about eight hours. 
Only those who pass the written examination can enter 
the oral, which is public, and which also occupies about 
eight hours. There are two other University courses 
and kinds of examination, both in law, either of which 
qualify a person for admission to the civil service, 
though they are intended more especially as tests for 
admission to the judicial service. 

The respectability of the service is probably the main 
reason why students devote so much time to study in 
order to enter it. Further, in some cases the pay is 
good, and only about six or eight hours' work a day 
is required. Owing to the long course of study, office- 
holders are usually 24 years old on entering the service. 



188 THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS OF SKRTICE. 

An applicant, who must furnish certificates from two 
reputable persons as to his character, practical ability, 
&c., is almost invariably appointed first as a * super- 
numerary,' at an annual salary of 1,000 crowns (about 
$270).* After serving for about eight years, on proba- 
tion as it were, he is promoted to a regular or * fixed ' 
position, and his salary is increased. After this, pro- 
motions to fill vacancies in all ordinary ofiices usually 
go to the person who has served longest in the next 
lower grade. But this is not the case in important 
offices. In these the only question is as to ability. 

There is, in some cases, after five and ten years of 
service, an annual increase of pay of from about $125 
to $150 respectively. There is a practice, peculiar to 
the Dapartment of Foreign Affairs, of granting * expect- 
ance' pay (about $1,000 a year) to persons temporarily 
out of diplomatic employment. Pensions are paid to 
persons of 70 years of age, provided they have served 
30 years ; and also to persons of 65 years of age, pro- 
vided they Sire disabled and have served about 40 years. 
The annual sum paid is from about $800 to $2,000. 
There is also a "separate pension establishment for 
widows and children of persons in the service," the 
funds for which are raised by assessing the public of- 
ficers, in addition to which the government annually ap- 
propriates about $24,000. f 

In Norway the civil service rules are practically the 
same as in Sweden. "Norway is united with Sweden 



* A Swedish crown (kronor, formerly called riksdaler) is equivalent 
to $0.26.8. 

t The facts concerning the civil service of Sweden are based on a 
report of Minister C. C, Andrews, and were furnished to him, in Swed- 
ish, by M. Von Steyern, the Dispatching Secretary and Secretary-in-Chief 
of the Ecclesiastical Deparlment. (See " Foreign Relations of the Uni- 
ted States," 1876, pp. 553 to 564.) 



66Mp:fifitivii EXAMiNATioi^s i?6n 4,oo6 ¥fiARl isd 

under one sovereign, but according to the terms of its 
Constitution (adopted November 4, 1814, and revised 
in 1869), is 'free, independent, indivisible, and inalien- 
able.' The King exercises the executive power through 
a Council of State, consisting of two Ministers of State 
and seven Councilors. Two of the Councilors and one 
Minister reside near the King at Stockholm, and the 
remainder are at Christiania." In Sweden the govern- 
ment consists of the King and " a Council of State, 
composed of ten members, two of whom, called Min- 
isters of State, hold the portfolios of Justice and For- 
eign Affairs, and eight of whom are called Councilors 
of State." In Norway it is noteworthy that " the rail- 
ways and telegraphs are the property of the govern- 
ment." I am informed by the Swedish Norwegian Con- 
sul in New York that this is partly the case in Sweden 
also. * 

In China competitive examinations have been in use 
about 4,000 years. Mr. William A. P. Martin says the 
system is "the most admirable institution of the Chinese 
empire." He further says (North American Review, 
July, 1870, pp. 65, 6Q, 68, 72, 75, 76) : " The germ from 
which it (the competitive system) sprung was a maxim 
of the ancient sages, expressed in four syllables, Ilu 
hie7i jin neng — 'employ the able and promote the 
worthy,' and examinations were resorted to as affording 
the best test of ability and worth. Of Yushun, that 
model Emperor of remote antiquity, who lived about 
2,200 B. C, it is recorded that he examined his officers 
every third year, and after three examinations either 
gave them promotion or dismissed them from the service. 

" Every third year the government holds a great ex- 
amination for the trial of candidates, and every fifth 

* The words quoted in the above paragraph are from the Americaa 
Cyclopedia, 



too THE COMi*ETlTlVE StSfEM A SAFETY^YALVfi. 

year makes a formal inquisition into the record of its 
civil functionaries. * * * The candidates for office, 
those who are acknowledged as such in consequence 
of sustaining the ' initial trial,' are divided into three 
grades, * * * < budding geniuses,' ' promoted schol- 
ars/ and those who are ' ready for office.' 
' " We have met an old Mandarin, who related with 
evident pride how, on gaining the second degree, he 
had removed with his whole family to Peking, from the 
distant province of Yunnan, to compete for the third ; 
and how at each triennial contest he had failed, until, 
after more than twenty years of patient waiting, at the 
seventh trial, and at the mature age of three-score 
years, he bore off the coveted prize. He had worn his 
honors for seven years, and was then Mayor of the 
city of Tientsin. In a list now on our table of 99 suc- 
cessful competitors for the second degree, 16 are over 
40 years of age, 1 62, and 1 83. The average age of 
the whole number is above 30 ; and for the third degree 
the average is of course proportionally higher. 

" The political bearings of this competitive system 
are too important to be passed over, and yet too nu- 
merous to be treated in detail. * * * it serves the 
state as a safety-valve, providing a career for those am- 
bitious spirits which might otherwise foment disturb- 
ances or excite revolutions. Whilst in democratic coun- 
tries the ambitious flatter the people, and in monarchies 
fawn on the great, in China, instead of resorting to 
dishonorable acts or to political agitation, they betake 
themselves to quiet study. They know that their men- 
tal caliber will be fairly gauged, and that if they are 
born to rule, the competitive examinations will open to 
them a career. The competitive system has not indeed 
proved sufficient to employ all the forces that tend to 
produce intestine commotion j but it is easy to perceive 



i^a^ Sfs'TEM A KIND OF CONSTITUTION. l91 

that without it the shocks must have been more fre- 
quent and serious. 

" It operates as a counterpoise to the power of an 
absolute monarch. Without it the great offices would 
be filled by hereditary nobles, and the minor offices be 
farmed out by thousands to imperial favorites. With 
it a man of talents may raise himself from the hum- 
blest ranks to the dignity of viceroy or premier. Tsi-^ 
ang siang pun im chu7ig, ' the General and the Prime 
Minister are not born in office,' is a line that every 
school-boy is taught to repeat. Rising from the peo- 
ple, the Mandarins understand the feelings and wants 
of the people, though it must be confessed that they 
are usually avaricious and oppressive in proportion to 
the length of time it has taken them to reach their ele- 
vation. Slill they have the support and sympathy of 
the people to a greater extent than they could have if 
they were the creatures of arbitrary power. The system 
therefore introduces a popular element into the govern- 
ment — a check on the prerogative of the Emperor as to 
the appointment of officers, and serves as a kind of 
Constitution to his subjects, prescribing the conditions 
on which they shall obtain a share in the administration 
of the government. * * * It is the Chinaman's 
ballot-box, his grand charter of rights. Even the Em- 
peror cannot tamper with it without peril. Though 
the Emperor may lower its demands, in accordance 
with the wishes of a majority, he could not set it aside 
without producing a revolution. 

"In districts where the people have distinguished 
themselves by zeal in the imperial cause, the only 
recompense they crave is a slight addition to the num- 
bers on the competitive prize list. Such additions the 
government has made very frequently of late years, in 
ponsideration of money supplies. It has also, to relieve 



i§2 ifiiAMlNES PEiCHING ^ttf fo MaJ^H, 

its exhausted exchequer, put up for sale the decorations 
of the literary orders, and issued patents admitting con- 
tributors to the higher examinations without passing 
through the lower grades. But though the government 
thus debases the coin, it guards itself jealously against 
the issue of a spurious currency. Seven years ago 
Peiching, First President of the Examining Board at 
Peking, was put to death for having fraudulently con- 
ferred two or three degrees. The fraud was limited in 
extent, but the damage it threatened was incalculable. 
It tended to shake the confidence of the people in the 
administration of that branch of the government which 
constituted their only avenue to honors and office."* 

* Mr. Martin, in order to show how strictly the examinations are con- 
ducted, says : " The government examinations of China admit about 
2,000,000 candidates every year, and pass only 1 per cent." He says 
that about 2,000 competitors enter the lists for the degree of Budding 
Geniuses, and that of this number about 20 are successful. But they 
win honors only ; further competition is necessary to attain office. The 
successful student " is the best of a hundred scholars, exempted from 
liabihty to corporal punishment, and raised above the vulgar herd. The 
social consideration to which he is now entitled makes it a grand day 
for him and his family." Of the " model scholar of the empire," or 
*' scholar laureate," who is chosen every three years by the Emperon 
Mr. Martin says : " Provinces contend for the shining prize, and the 
town that gives the victor birth becomes noted forever. Swift heralds 
bear the tidings of his triumph, and the hearts of the people leap at 
their approach. We have seen them enter a humble cottage, and amid 
the flaunting of banners and the blare of trumpets, announce to its 
startled inmates that one of their relations had been crowned by the 
Emperor as the laureate of the year. And so high was the estimation 
in which the people held the success of their fellow-townsman, that his 
wife was requested to visit the six gates of the city, and to scatter be- 
fore each a handful of rice, that the whole population might share in 
the good fortune of her household." 

Mr. Martin may well ask what could be more democratic than choos- 
ing one of the chief officers of a nation of about 450,000,000 people 
from " a humble cottage," or words to that effect, 



eONFUCltJS'S WISDOM AND STATESMANSHIP. 193 

" One great defect," says the Encyclopedia Britan- 
nica (v, 669), "in the competidve system in China is 
that there is no limit to the number of candidates, nor 
to the age when they may go up for examination, and 
the result is that, what with the surplus victors and 
the unsuccessful aspirants,* who go on trying year after 
year until they have become gray-haired old men, there 
exists a large non-producing class in the community 
which acts as a dead weight on the national prosperity." 

Confucius (551 B.C.), the philosopher and statesman, 
whose wise words are an important supplement to the 
foregoing extracts, speaking of officeseekers and office- 
holders, says ("Chinese Classics," i, 189) : "While they 
have not got their aims, their anxiety is how to get 
them. When they have got them, their anxiety is lest 
they should lose them. When they are anxious lest 
such things should be lost, there is nothing to which 
they will not proceed." 

Confucius's estimate of the value of education as a 
qualification for officeholding may be inferred from th6 
following (p. 208) : " The student, having completed 
his learning, should apply himself to be an officer. The 
officer, having discharged all his duties^ should devote 
his leisure to learning." 

A government founded on these principles is sure to 
stand. It is like a house built on a rock. When it 
perishes, if a government founded on imperishable prin- 
ciples can perish, it will be from natural causes. But 
alas for the Chinese, the same wall that for so many 
centuries inclosed their learning and wisdom, also ex- 
cluded the learning and wisdom of other nations ! 

John W. Draper says (" Intellectual Development of 
Europe," ii, 397, 398) : "A trustworthy account of the 



* Compare with Mr. Thorburn's remarks on page 181. 



194 (JrEAT tJNITY Of* TUE CtllNESi. 

present condition of China would be a valuable gift to 
philosophy, and also to statesmanship. On a former 
page I have remarked that it demands the highest pol- 
icy to govern populations living in great differences of 
latitude. Yet China has not only controlled her cli- 
matic strands of people — she has even made them, if 
not homogeneous, yet so fitted to each other that they 
all think and labor alike. Europe is inevitably hasten- 
ing to become what China is. In her we may see what 
we shall be like when we are old." 

Note. — William Alexander Parsons Martin, D.D., LL.D., quoted in 
this chapter, was born in Livonia, Indiana, April 10, 1827; went to 
King-po, China, in 1850, where he was engaged for ten years in mis- 
sionary labor. From 1863 till 1868 he was a missionary at Peking, and 
in 1869 became President of the Tong Weng College in that city and 
Professor of international law. He acted as an adviser of Chinese offi- 
cials on questions of international law when disputes have arisen with 
European powers, notably during the conflict with France in 1884-85. 
In 1885 he was made a Mandarin of the third class. (Appleton's Cyc. 
of Am. Biography, iv, 234.) 



INDEX. 



Adams J. on removals, 91 ; notes, 
163, 165; notes of debate in Sen- 
ate on power removal, 154-159. 

Adams John Quiney, on removals, 
92; notes, 160, 174. 

Allan Chilton, power removal, 166. 

Ames F. power removal, 1 24-2Y ; 
predictions of, 125-26, 162. 

Andrews C. C. notes, 183, 188. 

Appeals, a proposed board of, 114. 

Application papers, how marked 
(note) 26. 

Applicants furnish three certificates 
as to character (note) 27. 

Aristocracies, cause of and remedy 
for, 68-66. 

Aristocracy, danger of officeholders', 
61-70; the Roman and English, 
63, 64; views of latter, in 1855, 
of English civil service law, 69. 

Aristocrats, we must discriminate 
between real and apparent, 62. 

Arthur Chester A. preaches and 
practices fitness for and stability 
in office, 37, 96. 

Baldwin Abraham, power removal, 
134-35. 

Bancroft George, note, 24. 

Barton David, on purity and free- 
dom of elections, 42 ; his excuse 
for the 4-years' law (note) 162; 
tenure during good behavior, 167. 

Bayard James A. why he changed 
his vote from Burr to Jefferson 
in 1801, civil service views of, 
vindication of, &c, 97-100. 



Bayard T. F. obligation to, 98 ; de- 
nounces so-called ' practical poli- 
ticians ' and spoils system, 107. 

Bell J. on freedom of elections and 
patronage evils, 42 ; quotes Eng- 
lish history and a celebrated res- 
olution of Parliament (note) 43. 

Benson E. power removal, 129-31. 

Benton T. H. note, 19 ; on patronage 
and the freedom of elections, 41 ; 
on decision first Congress as to 
power of removal, 169 ; report 
on executive patronage, 173. 

Bibb George M. on power of remo- 
val, 168; on the division of the 
powers of government (note) 169. 

Board of Appeals, a proposed, 114. 

Boudinot E. note, 113; power re- 
moval, 121-24. 

Branch J. on Senate's functions and 
danger ambitious leaders, 174. 

Brenton Samuel, resolution of, 9. 

Bribery at elections, the danger of, 
Buchanan, Harrison, Benton, Jef- 
ferson, and Bell on, 39-43. 

British India, civil service of, 182. 

Brooks E. competitive tests, &c. 65. 

Buchanan James, on danger of bri- 
bery at elections, 40 ; would not 
inquire as to the political opinions 
of subordinate officers, 93. 

Burr Aaron, the founder perhaps of 
the ' machine ' in American poli- 
tics (note) 71. 

Burt Silas W. difference between 
conduct of public and private bu- 
siness (note) 19 ; on competitive 



ld6 



li^DEX. 



examinations, 35 ; one of the first 
to hold examinations, 37. 
Butler F. power removal 155. 

Calhoun John C. denounces spoils 
system, criticises debate in first 
Congress on removal, and gives 
his own opinion, 106, 163-64. 

Canada, civil service of, 178-82. 

Carroll C. power removal, 154. 

Caucus system, the (note) 105. 

Chamber Commerce, New York, fa- 
vors examinations for custom 
house officials, 35, 36, 

Chandler J. departmental balances, 
175-76. 

China, civil service of, 189-92. 

Civil service bills, various, 7, 8. 

Civil service law, the, summary of 
pi'ovisions of, 9-12 ; why its scope 
should be increased, 12, 13 ; fruits 
and features of, 17-21 ; its chief 
object, 19; its constitutionality, 
20-24 ; only an elaboration and 
improvement of two other laws — 
§§ 164 and 1753 of U. S. Revised 
Statutes, 23 ; causes a radical 
change, 24 ; will increase effi- 
ficiency, elevate politics, aid in 
purifying elections, &c. 38-40 ; 
will promote self-respect, hon- 
esty, impartiality, &c. 53-56 ; has 
caused a welcome and salutary 
change and promises a complete 
reform of the civil service, 89, 90. 

Civil service laws, two other, 23. 

Clay H. denounces Jackson's pro- 
scriptive policy, relates an inci- 
dent of a democratic convention, 
tells Senator Marcy that Gov. Met- 
calfe practiced the merit system, 
criticises decision of first Con- 
gress on power of removal, 76, 
81, 163; resolution of, 168. 

Cleveland Grover, on corruption at 
Castle Garden, 56, 57 ; notes, 89, 
90 ; defends the civil service law 
system, 96, 97. 

Clinton D. W. on patronage, 73. 

Clymer G. power removal, 128. 

Commission, the civil service, no 
more right to depart from the law 



and evidence than a judge or jury 
(note) 26, 27. 

Commission, the New York State 
civil service, on results realized 
* and competitive examinations, 18, 
33 ; also competitive examina- 
tions in Ireland, 34 ; favors read- 
justment of salaries, 66. 

Committee of Parliament on pro- 
motion examinations (note) 28 ; 
why they should be carefully con- 
ducted, ^28. 

Comparative poHtical economy, 177. 

Competitive examinations, 26-37 ; 
their impartiality and utility, 26- 
28 ; use of trial by probation, 
27 ; appointees independent of 
politicians, 28 ; have same effect 
as West Point examinations, 28 ; 
a check on politically ambitious 
chief officials, 29 ; relieve the 
President and others of burdens 
of which even Washington com- 
plained, 29 ; sometimes the means 
of securing private employment, 
30 ; superior to non-competitive 
examinations, 30 ; not a guaran- 
tee of good character, but raiy 
expose bad character, 30, 31 ; ed- 
ucation required, 31 ; high char- 
acter of the individuals examined 
(note) 31 ; in Ireland, 34. 

Confucius, maxims of, 193. 

Constitution, the American, W. E. 
Gladstone's opinion of (note) 21. 

Cox J. D. exposes corruption at 
Washington, 30, 58, 87 ; Tenure 
of Office act, inefficacy of, 115. 

Crosby H. on politicians (note) 54. 

Crockett D, testifies to Gen. Jack- 
son's susceptibility to flattery, 77. 

Curtis George William, obligation 
to, 4 ; what officeholders should 
and should not do, 45 ; civil ser- 
vice law not un-American, 67-69 ; 
peroration to his 1885 Newport 
address (note) 68 ; spoils system 
in vogue in New York in 1801 
and amusing incident connected 
therewith (note) 71 ; the reasons 
for and authorship of the four- 
years' law, 161. 



INDEX. 



19Y 



Draper's (John W.) warning of a 
false standard of social distinc- 
tion and description of the de- 
pravity of the Roman aristocracy 
that resulted therefrom (note) 63 ; 
on Chinese government, 193. 

Eaton Dorman B, author of civil 
service law bill, 7 ; examinations 
sometimes expose bad character, 
31; "vicious, extraneous influ- 
ence," 57 ; on Aaron Burr and 
Martin Van Buren, 71 ; on Eng- 
lish civil service history, 178 ; on 
civil service of British India, 183, 

Edmunds George F. introduces a 
civil service bill, 8 ; says Presi- 
dent John Adams was opposed to 
the confirmation of appointments 
by the Senate (note) 153. 

Edward I, election law of, 46. 

Elections, interference with, see 
" Bribery at Elections." 

Elections, David Barton on purity 
and freedom of, 42 ; W. J. Graves 
on same and Jackson's removals, 
44. 

Ellsworth Oliver, power removal, 
155-56, 159. 

English civil service law, good effect 
of, 50 ; some of its features, 178. 

English election laws, chief, from 
1275 till 1883, 46-52. 

Everett Edward, favors educational 
qualifications for office, 32, 33. 

Ewing T. against confirming ' polit- 
ical gladiators ' by Senate, 172. 

Examinations by the Postmaster- 
General and Secretary of Navy 
(note) 29. 

Examinations, competitive, see com- 
petitive examinations. 

Examiners, why government officials 
are chosen to act as such (note) 9. 

Fisher S. S. holds first competitive 
examinations, 36, 37. 

Foot Samuel A. attributes prescrip- 
tive policy to Van Buren, 76. 

Forsyth John, 'boomerang' speech 
of, 78. 

France, civil service of, 184-85. 



Franklin Benjamin, deprecates high 
salaries, 64 ; warns the constitu- 
tional convention against ambi- 
tious and avaricious men, 88. 

Fruits and facts, 17-25. 

Gallatin A. on the qualifications of 
subordinate officers, 32 ; opposes 
i*emoval for opinion's sake, 172. 

Garfield James A. clear and plain 
vrords of, 95. 

George II, election laws of, 49. 

George III, election law of, disfran- 
chising 40,000 voters, 49. 

George IV, election law of, 50. 

Gerry E. power removal, 140-42. 

Godkin Edwin L. maxim of, office- 
holders' aristocracy, insults by 
and cause of aristocracies, inso- 
lence of office, eagerness for office 
in France, 36, 61, 62, 65, 70, 186. 

Goodhue B power removal, 133. 

Gordon William F. fears executive 
patronage and power, 171. 

Government Departments, the, con- 
ducted as schools, would produce 
diplomatists, financiers, soldiers, 
&c. (note) 28. 

Gladstone William E. on American 
Constitution (note) 21. 

Grant Ulysses S. on patronage sys- 
tem, 30 ; recommendations of, 94. 

Graves E. 0. testimony of (note) 58. 

Graves Wm. J, on freedom of elec- 
tions and Jackson's removals, 44. 

Grayson William, power removal, 
156, 158. 

Hager Albert D. letter of (note) 83. 

Hamilton Alexander, principles and 
proposed plan of, 21, 22; Senate 
should participate m removals as 
well as appointments, 138. 

Harrison William H. on removal 
and the freedom of elections, 41. 

Hartley T. power removal, 127. 

Hawley Senator, report of, 59. 

Hawthorne Julian, report of, 64. 

Hayes President, views of, 94. 

Hayne Senator, on Van Buren, 78. 

Henry P. eloquent but mistaken op- 
position of to Constitution, 171. 



198 



INDEX. 



Henry YI, election laws of, 46, 47. 

Hewitt Abrara S. on French diplo- 
matic and consular services, 185. 

Hill David B. on competitive exam- 
inations, 34. 

Holmes Senator, maxim of, 107. 

Huntington B. power removal, 140. 

Huske General, on English officials 
in American colonies, 16. 

Insolence of Office, remedy for, 

70. 
Ireland, competitive examinations 

in, 34. 
Ivins William M. modus operandi 

of present English election law 

explained by, 50-62. 
Izard R. power removal, 159. 

Jackson Andrew, first to practice 
patronage system nationally, 71 ; 
letters of, 73 ; probable causes 
of his radical change, 74-79. 

Jackson J. power removal, 143-45. 

Jackson Mrs. abuse and death of, 74. 

James Sir H. election law of, 52. 

James T. L. postoffice rules of, 87. 

Jay Chief Justice John, civil service 
principles and practices of, 22. 

Jay John, report of and note on, 57. 

Jefferson Thomas, on duration of 
constitutions and laws; opposed 
to monopolies (note) 21 ; talent 
and worth for office, 32 ; on re- 
movals, 91 ; mistake of (note) 98 ; 
on 4-years' law (note) 160 ; writes 
opinion for Washington on Sen- 
ate's confirmatory powers (note) 
165. 

Jenckes Thomas Allen, bill of, 8 ; a 
touch of humor, 62. 

Johnson Andrew, his comparatively 
conservative course, S7 ; power 
removal liable to abuse, 93. 

Johnson W. S. power removal, 159. 

Jones P. H. competitive tests, 37. 

Kent James, power removal, 164. 
Kinney William, alleged remark of 

and note on, 83. 
Kleiner J. J. declines renomination 

on account of officeseekers, 60. 



Lallt Thomas A. note on, 158. 

Law, the civil service, see civil ser- 
vice law. 

Lawrence John, probably antedated 
Burr in advocating patronage sys- 
tem, 72 ; power removal, 127. 

Leading statesmen's principles, 91- 
112. 

Lee R. B. power removal, 132. 

Lee R. H. power removal, 156-57. 

Lewis Sir G. C. on adapting laws to 
the people (note) 24. 

Lewis William B. letter to Jackson 
on danger patronage system, 75. 

Life tenures, no danger in if based 
on merit, 66 ; will be rare, 66. 

Lincoln A. preaches one thing and 
practices another, 83 ; letter of, 
83 ; remarks of to Lamon, Sum- 
ner, and Schurz, 84 ; Lamon's 
dark picture of (note) 84. 

Livermore S. power removal, 142. 

Low Seth, on competitive examina- 
tions, 34. 

Lowell James Russell, on Prince of 
Wales's celebrated speeches, 64. 

Macaulay Thomas Babington, on 
corrupt English elections, 47. 

Macon Nathaniel, resolution of and 
note on, 100. 

Madison President, on appointing 
and removing powers, 21 ; mis- 
take of, 81 ; on spoils of victory, 
92; power removal, 117-20; on 
4-years' law (note) 160. 

Marcy William L. speech of, proba- 
ble cause of his using the word 
* spoils,' and humorous letter of, 
81, 82 ; letter from James Parton 
about, 82. 

Martin William A. P. on Chinese 
civil service, 189-92; note, 194. 

Massachusetts, report of civil ser- 
vice commission of, 13. 

May T. E, colonial officeholders, 16. 

McDuffie G. power removal, 169. 

McKee Samuel, resolution of, 66. 

Metcalfe Thomas, non partisan ap- 
pointments of (note) 81. 

Mill J. S. on competitive tests, 30. 

Miller Senator, on Yan Buren, 78, 



iKDEX. 



iSD 



Monarchical power, inherent fear of 

Americans in, 166. 
Monroe James, views of, 92. 
Mundella Mr, note, 64. 
Murtha W. H. good example of, 56. 

Napoleon I, official rules and anec- 
dote of (note) 114. 

Norway, civil service and govern- 
ment of, 188-89. 

O'Brien H. on laborers (note) 13. 

Office, insolence of, remedy for, 70. 

Officeholders' aristocracy, danger of, 
61-70; the Koman and English, 
63, 64; views of latter, in 1855, 
of English civil service law, 69. 

Officeholders' salaries, too much dif- 
ference in, 64-66; readjustment 
of, 66. 

Officeholders, should be protected 
from mistakes, dislikes, fits of 
passion, &c. 114, 

Officeholding, ordinary, something 
better than, 90. 

Officeseeking, Senator Hawley's pic- 
ture of, 60. 

Page J. power removal, 145-47. 

Paley W. disquisition of on patron- 
age, 108-9 ; favors woman suf- 
frage (note) 109. 

Parton James, on Van Buren's tact 
and secrecy, 79 ; letters from, 80, 
82; exposes patronage system, 80. 

Paterson W. power removal, 157. 

Patronage and merit systems com- 
pared, 53-58. 

Patronage evils insidious, 89. 

Patronage pandemonium, the, 86-8. 

Patronage system, the, 71-90; its 
fairness only apparent, 72, 73. 

Pearson H. G. on competitive exam- 
inations, 85. 

Peiching (president Chinese examin- 
ing board) put to death for fraud, 
192. 

Pendleton George H. introduces civil 
service law bill, 7. 

Poindexter G, on Van Buren, 77. 

Potts William, obligation to and re- 
port of, 14-0. 



Power of removal, the, 113-76. 

Principle, voting for a man of is 
voting for, 39. 

Probation, trial by, 27, 28. 

Promotion examinations, compulso- 
ry, 11; why they should be care- 
fully conducted, 28 ; committee 
of Parliament on, 28. 

Prussia, civil service of, 183. 

Public business, why its fundamen- 
tal rules are same as private, 19. 

QuiNCY JosiAH, characteristic prop- 
osition and speech of, 101-6 ; rule 
of law laid down by (note) 106. 

Quincy Josiah jr. maxim of, 106. 

Randolph John, the presidency and 
the lever of patronage, 1 74, • 

Read G. power removal, 168. 

Reform, civil service, " surest guar- 
antee of the safety and success of 
American institutions," 97. 

Removals, number of by seven first 
Presidents (note) 93. 

Republic, a, cannot stand multiform 
and long-continued corruption, 40. 

Resolution, civil service, of national 
democratic convention of 1876 
(note) 94, 

Reynolds Governor, views of, 83, 

Robertson Wm. H. on competitive 
examinations, 35. 

Roman aristocracy, depravity of, 63 ; 
anecdote of JuUus Caesar, 64, 

Salaries, officeholders', too much 
diiference in, 64-66 ; readjust- 
ment of, 66. 

Schurz Carl, bill of, 8 ; letter from 
about Lincoln, 84, 

Scott Thomas, power removal, 134. 

Sedgwick T. power reraov;!, 131. 

Senate, great power and use of, 116; 
sat with closed doors from 1 789 
till 1795, 154; Vice-President J. 
Adams keeps notes of one day's 
debate of, 154. 

Sherman R. power removal, 147. 

Sherwin Henry, on the relation of 
competitive examinations to edu- 
cation (note) 18, 



200 



index:. 



Smith S. deposition of (note) and 
oil removal for opinion's sake, 
100-72. 

Smith W. on power removal, im- 
peachment, &c. 137-39. 

Some of the law's promises, 38-52. 

Southard Samuel L. when removal 
is justifiable, 170; on repeal 4- 
years' law 161. 

Sp'rague P. describes effects of Jack- 
son's prescriptive policy, 170. 

Stone M. J. power removal, 148-52 ; 
prophecy of (note) 148 ; a cring- 
ing disposition requisite for an 
office held at will and pleasure, 
151. 

Story Joseph, power removal, 164. 

Sumner Charles, author first com- 
petitive civil service bill, 7. 

Sumter Thomas, on power removal 
and note on, 153. 

Sweden, civil service of, 186-88. 

Sylvester P. power removal, 135. 

Tazewell Littleton W. on execu- 
tive power, 175. 

Tenure of office law, failure of, 115. 

Tenures, life, no evil in if based on 
merit and why they will be rare, 
66, 67 ; used by demagogues as a 
scare-crow, 67. 

Thomas J. L. examinations held by, 
37. 

Thorburn J. obligation to and let- 
ters from, 180-82. 

Tilden S. J. gift of, 33 ; civil service 
views of (note) 94. 

Tree of Liberty, what will kill it, 41. 

Trevelyan Sir C. (note) 18. 

Trumbull Lyman, author Sec. 1753 
U. S. Rev. Stat. 7 ; bill of, 58. 

Tucker Thomas Tudor, on power of 
removal, 152 ; proposed constitu- 
tional amendments (note) 152. 

Tyler John, favors regulating and 
restraining power removal, 93 ; 
danger of patronage, 170. 

Van Buren Martin, on the draw- 
backs of patronage, 79 ; debate 



on confirmation of, 76-9 •, a good 
word from J as. Parton about, 80. 

Veteran soldiers, Massachusetts, tri- 
umph of (note) 47. 

Veteran soldiers and sailors (and, 
under new rules, their widows 
and orphans) preference for, 11, 
47. 

Vining J. on power removal, Swe- 
den and Poland, and comparative 
political economy, 120-21, 177. 

Washington George, on burdens of 
officeseeking, 29; maxim of, 32; 
on establishment of a national 
university, 32 ; lays foundation 
for the civil service law, 91. 

Waters E. F. note, 16 ; on civil ser- 
vices of British India and France, 
and letter from, 182-84-85. 

Webster D. on legislative powers 
(note) 20 ; maxim of, 86 ; public 
virtue the principle of republican 
governments (note) 40 ; depreca- 
ted high salaries (note) 64 ; pre- 
diction of (note) 79 ; criticises 
Madison (note) 119 ; criticises de- 
cision first Congress on removal, 
160; on 4-years' law, Jackson's 
nominations, and the evils of pat- 
ronage (notes) 162-63. 

Wheeler E. P. civil service law in- 
spired by the genius of American 
institutions, 18. 

White A. power removal, 136. 

White Hugh L. on evils of office- 
hunting, 172. 

William III, election laws of, 47. 

William and Mary, election law of, 
47. 

Williams G. H. on decision of first 
Congress on removal, 165. 

Wilson Justice, on evils of patron- 
age and rules for appointments, 
110; Washington's opinion of 
and maxim of (notes) 110-14. 

Wise Henry A. on Van Buren, 79. 

Women in national and Massachu- 
setts services, 13, 25 ; suffrage of, 
(note) 109. 



